

Šum #9

Exit or Die Koreografija Kirurginja postajati- -truplo

Kazimir Kolar

Voranc Kumar

Skrivni Jeruzalem

Miroslav Griško

Advanced Persistent Threats in the Arts

Patrick Steadman

Scarlett Jo- hansson Le- aps to Your Lips

An interview with R. Scott Bakker
Primož Krašovec, Marko Bauer

Izhod iz filozofije

Robert Bobnič

Šum #9

Exit or Die

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1003

Kirurginja

KAZIMIR KOLAR

1011

Skrivni Jeruzalem

MIROSLAV GRIŠKO

1029

Advanced Persistent Threats in the Arts

PATRICK STEADMAN

1041

Koreografija postajati-truplo: kratka genealogija
umirajočega telesa v računalniških igrah

VORANC KUMAR

1073

Scarlett Johansson Leaps to Your Lips

An Interview with R. Scott Bakker

PRIMOŽ KRAŠOVEC, MARKO BAUER

1101

Izhod iz filozofije: François Laruelle

ROBERT BOBNIČ

1121

Points of View: On Photography & Our Fragmented,
Transcendental Selves

MATT COLQUHOUN

1137

Autism Wars: Neurodivergence as Exit Strategy

DOMINIC FOX

1151

Kapitalizem in čustva

PRIMOŽ KRAŠOVEC

1175

On Letting Go

ARRAN CRAWFORD

Uvodnik

Izstop, exit, predstavlja relativno pogosto paradigmo v umetnosti. Od boeme v romantiki, avantgardnih izstopov v življenje, prisilnih izstopov zaradi nevključitve oz. marginalizacije praks do zaključkov karier, praks neprakse in smrti. Lahko gremo celo tako daleč in napišemo, da je prav exit najbolj romantizirani kliše umetnosti, in strinjal bi se tudi Žižek, ko pravi, da je ideologija najmočnejša ravno na svojih robovih. Vendar smo si tukaj exit zamislili drugače.

Seveda, izstop nas zanima kot redifiniranje pogojev umetnosti, kot praksa poskusov novih oblik razmišljanja o tem, kaj bi umetnost sploh bila, potem ko se okoli nje vršijo velike spremembe na področju organizacije družbe. Seveda, zdi se, da je svet vse bolj tuj umetnosti in da ji internet, nove oblike vojn, kriptovalute, memi, tehnologije, kognitivne znanosti, bioinženiring, Cambridge Analytica itd. delajo precej težav, kajti ne prihaja do deformacije celotnega polja umetnosti, temveč le do priključevanja teh zagat kot tem, in to brez rekonfiguracij. Seveda, gre za vprašanje možnosti popolne rekonstrukcije polja umetnosti v situaciji, ki je malodane enaka nenadni menjavi gospodarskega in političnega sistema: ali bo to sploh še umetnost ali pa bomo imeli opravka z nečim drugim.

Ampak vse to je beside the point.

Šum#9 ni manifest ali skupek vizij okoli dileme, ki je bila v določenem obdobju znana kot *Čto delat?*. Te dileme tukaj ni. Spomnimo se Zupančiča v Šum#5: level 2. Sprememba se je že zgodila, zdaj pa exit or die. In v tem je razlika. Prva možnost situacijo razume kot potrebo po reinvenции, preusmeritvi posameznikovega delovanja. Druga pa kot potrebo po povečanju intenzitete. Prva se vidi kot sodobna, kot na špici časa, ki ga bo odtlej spremenila vsaka njena gesta. Druga se vidi v zaostanku za prihodnostjo. Prva se vidi za volanom avtomobila. Druga vidi, da je vozilo avtonomno, in se sprašuje, kje v motorju se nahajajo hitrostne blokade, in na redditu išče bootleg *removal tutorial*.

V tem momentu je umetnost na terenu svoje bliskovite širitve ne le s temami, žanri, temveč tudi z infrastrukuro in

kapitalom zaostala pri koncentraciji svojih primarnih trgov: produkcije v(r)ednosti. Znanost in tehnologija s tem širjenjem nista imeli problemov, umetnost pa. Od tu naprej sta dve možnosti, ali se umetnost opusti kot nasedlo naložbo, kot preveliko državno podjetje. Ni *too big to fail*. Ali pa se uniči, kar je v njej trenutno živega, da bo umrla in bo na njenem mestu kar najhitreje nastalo nekaj novega, nekaj novim razmeram prilagojenega ali pa še neprilagojenega.

Omenjena bliskovita rast produkcije v umetnosti je bila posledica produkcije blaga nizke dodane vrednosti. Gre za industrijo *second tier merchandise* drugih sistemov za trge zabave, ki pa je bila odvisna od načrtne vsakokratne devalvacije specifičnih parametrov v umetnosti.¹ Izjemno zanimiv set produktov s širokim trgom bo v naslednjih letih povozil *user-specific content creation*, kjer so algoritmi napredovali od kuriranja feedov h generiranju novih in za vsakega uporabnika *custom* narejenih vsebin.²

Potreben je torej umeten obrat, takšen, kot je bil izveden v drugih gospodarskih sistemih, na Kitajskem na primer.

Umetnost je dovolj velik produkcijski ekosistem, vsebuje dovolj velik dotok kapitala, delovne sile in institucij, da lahko opusti proizvodnjo nizkocenovnih produktov za druge branže (filozofijo, teorijo, znanost, nove tehnologije, politične projekte itd.), se preusmeri v R&D ter začne proizvajati nekaj *in-house*. To, da se posveti specializaciji, pomeni, da ukine geste psevdov-aplikativnosti. Preneha z dokazovanjem ali, bolje, deklarativnim izkazovanjem (performiranjem) svoje aplikativnosti, kot to v zadnjem valu poskuša početi že od propada avantgard v 80. dali (s serijami *sandbox walk-throughjev* s *cheat engini*, ki so nastavljeni na godmode).

Prestrukturiranje v začetku rekonfigurira polja raziskovanja. Novih parametrov ni mogoče določiti vnaprej, saj tudi če bi

1 Načrtna/umetna devalvacija je omenjena, ker v makroekonomiji deluje v paru s produkcijo blaga nizke dodane vrednosti. Primer: Kitajska je večkrat načrtno devalvirala svojo valuto, da je lahko za zunanje trge znižala cene delovne sile. Industriji blaga visoke dodane vrednosti teh strategij ni treba uporabljati, saj je strošek delovne sile relativno manjši delež končne cene.

2 Če so računalniške igre interaktivne in če so prav tako določena oblika glede na uporabnika spremenjajoče vsebine, je *user-specific content creation* to, da ne le da se stvari v igri prilagajajo gestam igralca, temveč se spreminja vse. In z vse mislimo vse, kar generira podobo, torej od tega, da sploh gre za igro, kakšne podobe, njihova razmerja, količina, vse.

jih, bi veljali le nekaj sekund. Vizualno je tukaj *placeholder* za še nedefinirano intenzivirano področje ukvarjanja, ki se bo oblikovalo na mestu umetnosti. Vizualno postane znanost, postane tehnologija. Ne gre za proučevanje efektov, temveč za vzpostavitev odnosa do strukturacije kot grajenja sistemov v natančnih kompleksnostih ter v jasni preverljivosti doslednosti konstrukcije – do zadnjega detajla. Zraven spada tekmovalno vzdušje v poglabljanju teh polj ter brutalen *peer scrutiny*. Znanost se ukvarja s koncepti in stroji, kot so črne luknje, teorija strun, kvantni računalnik, brez vnaprej določenih, temveč le s spekulativnimi aplikacijami teh konceptov ali strojev. Dovršitev, razvijanje koncepta. Umetniško delo kot stroj brez aplikacije, kot kvantni računalnik: struktura neslutenih možnosti, bolj sofisticirana od prejšnjih različic stroja ter možna šele na podlagi cele vrste dognanj s področij fizike, tehnologije itd.

Umetnost ni več /pol/, temveč se znotraj nenačrtovanih in neomejenih praks zgodi acefalizacija in fragmentacija praks. Usmeritve so razpršene in brez trajnih zavezništev. Raziskovanje poteka „neinteligentno“ (Dennettov *competence without comprehension*), brez skupnih načrtov in njihovih izvrševanj.

Umetnost postane infrastruktura določenega raziskovanja, ki je preverljivo skozi različne discipline. In ni privilegirano področje izražanja mnenj, moraliziranja, področje praznih eksekucij že vnaprej dognanih konceptov sosednjih intelektualnih produktov.

Temveč področje polnega tveganja.

Prestrukturiranje proizvodnega sistema umetnosti ter polna investicija v lasten R&D proizvede set produktov, ki kotirajo na trgih z že vzpostavljenou visoko likvidnostjo (preverljivost in konvertibilnost), kot sta trga znanosti in tehnologije. Proizvodi visoke dodane vrednosti začnejo prevladovati in nadomestijo protekcionistične prakse selektivnega uvoza intelektualnih produktov preko preferiranih ideoloških imenovalcev.

Z razmišljanjem o oblikah kot tehnologiji in s pretočnostjo proizvedenih vrednosti pride do pospešitve njenih evolucijskih ciklov. Spremembe med cikli niso izključno permutacijske, temveč pride do proliferacije med seboj razlomljenih in konkurenčnih mikrosistemov, ki se vzpostavljajo brez kontinuitete in z različnimi možnostmi aplikacij. Fragmentacija umetnosti

Šum #9

v skupke lokalnih katastrof in intenziviranih poskusov. Vizualni inženiring.

In tako se umetnost vključi v operacije največjih pomenov, ni le njih interpret. V raziskovanje vesolja. V načrtovanje vojaških vdorov. V mutiranje nevronskih povezav. V meddržavne tajne operacije. V svetovanje glede strukturiranja korporacij in sovražnih prevzemov. V vzajemne sklade. V raziskovanje kvantnih računalnikov. V procese samoučenja AI. V prostore med besedami.

— Andrej Škufca

Editorial

In art, exit is a relatively common paradigm. From bohemia in Romanticism, avant-garde exits into life and forced exits due to non-integration or marginalisation of practices to career endings, practices of non-practice and death. We could even take a step further and say that exit is the most romanticised cliché of art—and Žižek would agree, saying that ideology is most powerful at its margins. But we see exit as something different.

Of course, we're interested in exit as an act of redefining the conditions of art, as a practice of attempts at new ways of thinking about what art could be at a time when all around it great changes in the organisation of society come to pass. Of course, it seems that the world has become increasingly foreign to art and that the internet, new forms of war, cryptocurrencies, memes, technologies, cognitive sciences, bioengineering, Cambridge Analytica etc. are troublesome, as instead of the entirety of the art field being deformed, these issues become affixed as themes without ever being reconfigured. Of course, this is a question of whether the field of art could be fundamentally reconstructed in a situation that is more or less equal to a sudden upheaval of an economic or political system: Will we even be dealing with art or with something else?

But all of that is beside the point.

Šum#9 is not a manifesto nor an aggregate of visions of a dilemma that was at a certain period known as *Chto delat?*. Such a dilemma does not exist here. Let us recall what Zupančič wrote in Šum#5: level 2. The change has already happened, now it's *exit or die*. And that's the difference. One possibility sees the situation as a need for reinvention, for a shift in one's activity. The other as a need to increase the intensity. One sees itself as contemporary, as being on the cutting edge of a time that will from now on be steered by its every single gesture. The other sees itself as falling behind the future. One sees itself in the driver's seat. The other sees that the vehicle is autonomous, wonders where the speed limiter is installed and starts looking for a bootleg removal tutorial on reddit.

In pace with its rapid expansion with not only themes and genres, but its infrastructure and capital as well, art has begun to fail at concentrating its primary markets: the production of knowledge (or value). In contrast, science and technology haven't had any problems with this expansion. There are two possibilities from this point on. Either art is abandoned as a failed investment, as an over-inflated public institution. It's not too big to fail. Or that it is destroyed and the life inside it is left to die and something new, something already or not yet adapted to the new circumstances, can immediately spawn in its place.

The mentioned rapid growth of production in art was a consequence of the production of goods with low added value. This is the second tier merchandise industry of other systems meant for entertainment markets, which depended on incessant planned devaluation of specific parameters in art.³ In the coming years, this incredibly interesting set of products with a broad market will be overrun by user-specific content creation where algorithms will have evolved from curating feeds to generating new contents that are custom-made for each user.⁴

What we therefore need is an artificial shift, not unlike those that have been undertaken in other economic systems, for instance in China.

As a production system, art is big enough and has sufficient inflow of capital, workforce and institutions to abandon the production of low-cost products for other branches (philosophy, theory, science, new technologies, political projects etc.), to focus on *R&D* and start with the production of something *in-house*. By specialising, it abolishes gestures of pseudo-applicability. No longer trying to prove, or rather, declaratively demonstrate (perform) its own applicability, as the previous waves had tried

3 Planned/artificial devaluation is mentioned because in macroeconomics, it works hand in hand with the production of goods with low added value. Example: China has intentionally devaluated its currency several times in order to reduce the cost of labour for external markets. The industry of high added value has no need for such strategies, since labour costs represent a relatively small percentage of the final price.

4 If computer games are interactive and for that very reason a form of content that changes with regard to the user, *user-specific content creation* means not only that different objects in the game adapt to the player's gestures, but that everything changes. And by that we mean everything that generates an image, including that it even is a game, the images, the relations between them, their quantity, everything.

Šum #9

to do (with series of *sandbox walk-throughs* with *cheat engines* set to godmode) since the fall of avant-gardes in the 1980s.

Initially, restructuring reconfigures the fields of research. New parameters cannot be predetermined, because even if they were, they would only be valid for a few seconds. Here, the visual is a placeholder for the not-yet-defined intensified field of activity that will emerge in art's place. The visual becomes science, it becomes technology. It is not about studying the effects within, but establishing a relation towards structuration as a way of building systems and their precise complexities and with a clear verifiability of the structure's consistency—down to the very last detail. This generates an atmosphere deepening these fields alongside brutal peer scrutiny. Science deals with concepts and machines, e.g. black holes, string theory, quantum computers, with no predetermined, only speculative applications of these concepts or machines. Perfecting, evolving the concept. The artwork as a machine with no application, as a quantum computer: a structure of unimaginable possibilities, more sophisticated than previous versions of the machine and only possible after a series of discoveries in physics, technology etc.

Art is no longer a /pol/, as acephalisation and fragmentation of practices come about within unplanned and unlimited practices. Specialisations are dispersed and have no lasting alliances. Research is carried out “non-intelligently” (Dennett's *competence without comprehension*), without any common plans or their realisation.

Art becomes the infrastructure of a certain research that is verifiable through various disciplines. And it is not a privileged field for expressing opinion and moralising, a field of empty executions of already ascertained concepts of adjacent intellectual products.

Instead, it becomes a field of absolute risk-taking.

Restructuring the production system and a maximum investment into art's own R&D produce a set of products that are listed on markets with an already established high liquidity (verifiability and convertibility), such as the science and technology market. Products with high added value begin to prevail and replace protectionist practices of selectively importing intellectual products through preferred ideological denominators.

Šum #9

With forms being thought of as technology and with the liquidity of produced values, its cycles of evolution accelerate. Changes in between cycles are not exclusively permutational, for reciprocally fractured and competitive microsystems that are established without any continuity and with different possibilities of application proliferate. Fragmentation of art into aggregations of local catastrophes and intensified attempts. Visual engineering.

Now art joins the operations of greatest importance, it no longer solely interprets them. Space exploration. The planning of military invasions. Mutation of neuron connections. Transnational covert operations. Corporate structure and hostile takeovers consulting. Hedge funds. Research on quantum computers. Processes of self-learning AI. Spaces between words.

— Andrej Škufca

Šum #9



1001



Kirurginja

Kazimir Kolar

1

Petek zvečer. Predbožična večerja pri predstojniku. Predstojnikove večerje so narejene po istem vzorcu: viski, hrana, prva buteljka, druga buteljka, hrana, še več vina. Abstiniram, toda v glavi se mi začne vrteti od Zaldiarja, ki sem ga pogolnila popoldne, preden sem opravila dve urgentni sekcijski (obstruirana ledvična arterija in razlitje žolča), zato se odvlečem na kavč v dnevni. Tu je temno in poskušam umirjeno dihati. Vendar se vrtenje v glavi nadaljuje. Zakaj to vrtenje? Ponavadi ni bilo tako hudo. Ponavadi me je tableta samo rahlo peljala. Zavrtim se na bok, zavzamem embrionalno lego in poskušam zadremati. Pogovor v jedilnici počasi ugaša in ničesar ne zamujam. Luči se izklapljaljajo. Skušam se stopiti z notranjim valom omotice. Toda potem se na drugo stran kavča usedeta dve ženski. To sta precej bebavi bitji. Prepoznam ju po glasu – anestezistki s sosednjega oddelka sta. Ena izmed njiju je noseča in zato kar naprej čvekata o presejalnih testih. Da je preiskava nuhalne svetline trapast algoritem, ki na koncu ne da *rezultata*, ampak zgolj *verjetnost*, in da je negativno lažnih rezultatov pri odkrivanju Downa *pet od-stotkov*, kar je *grozljivo*, če pomisliš. Ja, super, kaj takega. Seveda sta obe poročeni, z večimi otroki itd. Nato na veliko izpovedujeta svoje izkušnje z rojevanji in kako sta se mučili na porodni postelji. Kaj pa sta pričakovali, kozi zmešani? Sem jima jaz kriva, da sta nasedli na moško zgodovino in se nenadoma znašli v mreži tujih načrtov?

Zbudim se okoli treh zjutraj. Nekaj ni v redu. Na kozlanje mi gre. Poleg tega po zunanji strani levega stegna čutim metuljasto dotikanje, ki postaja čedalje bolj čvrsto, dokler se ne prestavim na hrbet in ob sebi zagledam predstojnikovo sedečo silhueto. To je šok, ne samo zame, tudi zanj. Tako glasno zavreščim, da ga odnese v zrak. „Zakaj pa to?“ me sprašuje, medtem ko po vseh štirih prilezem do predsobe in si v naglici natikam čevlje. Z desno roko se nekako naslanjam na ploskev ogledala, sicer bi padla. Cel prostor je ukrivljen in zožan in oprijemam se sten, ko se opotekam proti izhodu. „Poklical ti bom taksi,“ in „pomagal ti bom,“ mislim, da ga slišim reči, ampak sem tako zadeta, da v tistem trenutku nad mene pade temna zavesa. Ničesar več ne zmorem, moje roke so mrtve, prav tako noge. Povsem sem paralizirana. Predstojnikove roke me zgrabijo in nesejo nekam dol, vendar prisegam, da v njegovem pohotnem gibanju telesa začutim, kako se v njegovem nabreklem udu dviga sesirjeno seme.

2

Naslednji dan divjam po nakupih in na izhodu iz podzemne garaže skoraj podrem klošarja, ki drži napis POMAGAJTE MI, SEM NA SOCIALNEM DNU, NISEM ALKOHOLIK, deset minut kasneje pa v svoj voziček neusmiljeno mečem nakupovalni material in si nabavljam hrano za božično večerjo. Na koncu dobim sijajno idejo in v butiku poleg supermarketa kupim dva japonska noža. Prvi je namenjen za pripravo sušija in je ročno kovan po bušido metodi (tehnični list navaja 62 plasti/listov), kar pomeni, da je oster kot britev. Drugi je prav tako zastrašujoč: namenjen je za rezanje filejev, prevlečen z magnezijevoplastjo, pohvali se z nadstandardno specifikacijo (jeklo tipa 66-67 HRC) in stane dobrih 150 evrov. Ti dve umetnini bosta čudovito dopolnili mojo obširno zbirkovo kuhinjskih nožev.

Nato v garažni hiši zagledam debeluha, visok je približno 170 centimetrov in mora tehtati 120 kilogramov, kar ga po indeksu telesne mase uvršča v razred zelo debelih oseb. Vedno sem sovražila debele ljudi, še posebej moškega spola. Smrdijo mi. Ko jih dobim na mizo, se mi dviguje. Takrat razvijejo ogaben vonj in skoraj bruham, ko se prebijam skozi desetcentimetrski sloj podkožne masti, ko prebadam njihov peritonej in mišične fascije ali ko s protruzijsko cevko, po kateri je napeljana laparoskopska

sonda, prebadam njihove medrebrne membrane. Edino veselje, ki sem ga v tem primeru občasno deležna, je, da kakšnemu „po nesreči“ zlomim rebro. Uživam v tistem zloveščem poku, ob katerem se nekateri študentje medicine sredi operacijske sobe sesedejo na tla.

Tega debeluha bi z velikim veseljem poklicala k sebi (pod pretvezo, naj mi pomaga zlagati vrečke s hrano), potem pa mu v prsnici koš porinila nož za rezanje filetov. Tega ne bi nihče opazil, prostor je prazen in še preden bi kdo prihitel na pomoč, bi vrečke hitro zmetala v avto, se usedla za volan in odpeljala iz garažne hiše.

Popoldne preživim s kuhanjem brokolijevega namaza, vmes poslušam floridski vaporwave, večino časa pa poležavam na kavču in tuhtam. Ob petih dobim predstojnikov SMS: Lepa si in pametna, vendar ne razumem tvojega ravnanja. Vse skupaj se mi zdi otročje. Odrasti, prosim te. Odpišem mu zelo hitro: **DOTAKNI SE ME ŠE ENKRAT, PA TE BOM PRIJAVILA.**

Po večerji veliko razmišljam o sebi. O svojem življenju in preteklosti. Moja bolečina je neznosna, še posebej huda je v osamljenih, mračnih dneh, ko se mi kar trga. Takrat si nadenem črn plašč, si pripravim kovček z najljubšimi noži in se odpravim v park. Najraje ob mraku, ko so sence na ulicah najdaljše. Ustavim se pri otroških igralih in opazujem igro otrok. Včasih zasledujem ljudi, ki osamljeno blodijo po obronkih parka in si domišljajo, da so varni. Sprehajalcem se poskušam približati na najmanjšo možno razdaljo. V nekaterih primerih jih vprašam po vžigalniku. Ali po poti v mesto. Tu pa tam se z njimi zapletem v klepet. Seveda nihče ne ve, kaj je v mojem kovčku, in nihče ne ve, kaj so motivi mojih sprehodov. Seveda se nikoli nič ne zgodi. Takšni sprehodi me po navadi pomirijo in ko neham tavati po nočnem parku, lahko v miru zaspim.

Že od nekdaj sem sanjala, da bi ubijala. Mogoče je to zaradi nadzora. Kdor ubija, ima absoluten nadzor, kdor je ubit, se popolnoma podredi, takšen je zakon narave. Ne vem, kdaj so se začele te sanje. Mogoče med študijem medicine. Toda če pomislim malo bolje, že prej, pri mojih 12 letih. Takrat sem prvič zaklala kozjega mladiča. Ne hecam se. Živila sem na kmetiji – oče mi je pokazal. Sprva je bilo mučno, a sem hitro osvojila tehniko in izgubila tremo. Ubiti kozjega mladiča je enostavno. Ključno je, da žival ne zazna nervoze. Vse moraš

delati hladno, brez čustev in razmišljanja. Vseeno pa moraš vzdrževati določen nivo osredotočenosti. Prav tako je pomembno, da izvedeš dovolj močan podolžni rez po vratni arteriji (najlažje je, ko mladiča nekdo pita z jabolkom, ker je takrat vrat lepo iztegnjen), potem žival pograbiš za zadnje noge in jo z glavo navzdol poneseš v posebno kad, kjer izkrvavi. V minuti kozji mladič izgubi zavest, po dveh minutah pa nastopi možganska smrt.

3

Svoje dni sem pisala kratke zgodbe. Take osladne. Govorile so o samospoznavanju in intimnosti. O plasteh duše. Pošiljala sem jih nekemu uredniku. Precej znanemu uredniku, verjetno ga poznate. Stavek manjka, mi je pisal nazaj. Kakšen stavek, sem ga vprašala. Začetni stavek, stavek, ki bralca izstrelji v novo vesolje. Tako mi je odgovarjal, vsevedni urednik. Prvi stavek mora biti močan, bralca mora prikovati k tekstu. Takrat sem mu še zaupala in se nisem jezila. Spravila sem se v knjižnico, pregledala police s tujo in domačo književnostjo – stavka od nikoder. Začetni stavek, začetni stavek, sem si govorila. Toda v resnici je bilo vse kaotično. Ni bilo pravila, kako naj bi izgledal prvi stavek. Nekdo je začel s potnikom, ki zre v pročelje železniške postaje, spet drugi z „odločitvijo“ glavnega junaka, da bo žalil vesolje. Dolgo sem iskala stavek in po enem mesecu obupala. Nikoli ne bom napisala kratke zgodbe, sem si rekla. To je bilo preveč za mojo znanstveno dušo. Zopet sem pisala uredniku. To je bilo zadnje pismo, tako sem se odločila. Z njim sem bila zelo iskrena. Povedala sem mu, kaj počnem v življenju. Da ljudem odpiram trebuhe in jim popravljam notranje organe. Da rešujem življenja. Da sem abdominalna kirurginja, osamljena duša, ki bi se rada izpovedala. Urednik se je hitro odzval. Potem pa napišite o tem, kaj doživljate v službi. Napisal mi je, če se lahko dobiva, in mi zagotovil, da mi bo izdal zgodbo.

Seveda sem mu nastavila past. Potem sem mu napisala zgodbo, v kateri ga omamim in nezavestnega razrežem na koščke, njegove telesne ostanke pa raztresem okrog glavnega mesta v državi, tako rekoč po avtocestnih odsekih. Vse sem zapisala zelo natančno in podrobno. Upam, da sem mu za tisti dan pokvarila apetit – ni mi odpisal nazaj.

Vem, dragi bralec, kaj si misliš o meni. Toda po drugi strani vem, česa si želijo moški. Znam si predstavljati, kaj si predstavljajo, da bi počeli z mano. To jim piše v očeh, ko zjutraj na oddelku vpisujem stanje njihovih drenov in diurezo.

4

V nedeljsko nočno vstopim zelo impulzivno. A hkrati mirno. Mirna sem kot morje. Pripravljenost je vse. Najprej pregledam vse oddelčne sobe z bolniki, potem eni izmed sester naročim, naj mi v kabinet dostavi vse temperaturne liste pacientov. Pregledam jih v desetih minutah, nato se zaprem v anestezijsko lekarino. Najprej z desetmililitrsko brizgo potegnem 2 enoti kalija in ga razredčim s Hartmannovo raztopino. Nato v manjši brizgi pripravim še bakterijsko suspenzijo s smrtonosnimi stafilokoki. To bi moralo zadostovati.

Ob desetih, ko sestre ugasnejo luči, stopim v operacijsko, iz predala izbrskam skalpel, potem z medicinskim vozičkom vstopim v sobo 7 in zbudim pacienta. Pod pretvezo, da je treba očistiti abdominalni dren, v plastično cev napravim vreznino, vanjo vstavim iglo in izbrizgam pripravljene bakterije. Potem se pacientu prijazno zahvalim, mu zaželim lahko noč in ugasnem luč. V sobi štiri je stvar še enostavnejša. Luč je že ugasnjena, zato tiho vstopim v prostor in izklopim respirator. Pacient je afazičen, ker je v umetni komi. Tudi v šestki gre gladko – pacient bere pod drobno nočno svetilko. Najprej se ustraši, zato ga pomirim in mu s prijaznim glasom razložim, naj se ne pusti motiti. „Prav,“ reče, jaz pa preverim pretoke na infuzijski črpalki in – ups – vrečo z infuzijo izbrizgam kalij ter naglo izginem iz sobe. Bralec ne ve, da je pravkar umrl, še lahko noč mi zaželi.

Ko končam z delom, si na oddelčnem pultu sposodim ključ predstojnikovega kabinta. Odklenem ga, potihem vstopim vanj, prižgem luč in nad mizo na steni z rdečim flomastrom napišem:

PES SMETARSKI. Nato zapustim kabint, ga zaklenem, vendar se na hodniku spomnim, da bi morala še nekaj dodati. Vrnem se in pripišem še tole: **BOG ODPUŠČA. JAZ NE.**

Spet v svojem kabinetu. Vse je šlo gladko. Zaklenem se in si na radiu nastavim klasično glasbo. Beethovnove klavirske sonate. Vse se bo izšlo. To noč bodo na oddelku umrli trije moški. Prvi se bo zadušil v spanju, ne da bi se tega zavedal, drugemu

Šum #9

bo odpovedalo srce, tretji bo padel v sepso in bakterijska okužba se bo s krvjo razsejala po celiem telesu. Bolnik s tako oslabljenim imunskim sistemom lahko živi le nekaj ur, mogoče še manj. Nobena zdravila ne bodo pomagala, to dobro vem, smrt bo neizogibna.

Dve zjutraj je. Svetloba nad mestom rumeno krvavi in z neba letijo snežinke. Neznanska milina se me loteva, nekakšna tiha radost. Ne briga me razbijanje po mojih vratih, kriki in pozivi, prav tako ne telefonsko zvonjenje in moledovanje medicinskih sester. Vse to je nepomembno. Moram se malo spočiti in priraviti. Dolga noč je pred mano. Umrlo bo še nekaj pacientov na tem oddelku, to je šele začetek.

Toda do takrat me čaka še veliko dela.

Kazimir Kolar (1979) je pisec, ki tekste občasno objavlja v reviji Šum. Literaturo povezuje s kreacijo novih svetov, a tudi skravnostno zvestobo dogodka. Leta 2016 je pri založbi Litera izšel njegov roman Glas noči. Področje njegovega zanimanja je tudi filozofija. Ko mu bo zmanjkalo idej za pisanje, se bo lotil prevajanja mističnih tekstov iz latinščine. Živi in ustvarja v Zalogu pri Ljubljani.

Kazimir Kolar (b. 1979) is a writer whose work is occasionally published in the Šum journal. In his view literature is connected to both creating new worlds and the mysterious faithfulness to an event. In 2016, his novel *Glas noči* was published by the Litera publishing house. He is also interested in philosophy. Once he runs out of ideas to write about, he will start translating Latin mystical texts. He lives and works in Zalog near Ljubljana.

Šum #9

1010

Skrivni Jeruzalem

Miroslav Griško

Smotrni vzrok

Koncept vojne temelji na kvalitativni razliki v fiziki sile. Čeprav je vojna sila, se ne sklada s splošnim konceptom sile. Ta hipoteza sproži delo Carla von Clausewitza. Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini, drugi velikan vojaške znanosti devetnajstega stoletja, v svojih *Splošnih načelih umetnosti vojne* zagovarja nasprotno stališče: „Vso strategijo nadzorujejo nespremenljiva znanstvena načela, ta načela pa masivnim silam proti šibkejšim sovražnim silam, če naj strategija pripelje do zmage, predpisujejo napade na neki odločilni točki.“¹ Jomini je teoretik logistike in vojno opredeli kot mobilizacijo zadostne sile. Toda vojna kot logistika v Jominijevem smislu predpostavlja stabilno ozadje, ki ne prepreči zagona zaželene mobilizacije. Poudarek na mobilizaciji zadostne sile v prvi instanci prezre dejstvo, da gre nekaj vedno narobe. Po Clausewitzu „megla vojne“ kot skrivna sila deluje v skladu s svojo lastno logiko determinacije, z vidika *strategosa* pa je čista kontingenca, ki tako zmede kot tudi prekine kalkulacije logistične mobilizacije. Ta izguba natančnosti na ravni tehničnega problema kljub temu ne izključi tretje sile, ki do določene mere lahko prežene meglo vojne, skupaj pa te sile sestavljajo Clausewitzevo slavno „paradoksalno triniteto“: 1) mobilizacija sile kot usmerjeno nasilje, 2) megla vojne kot zakrita kontin-

1 JOMINI, Antoine-Henri de, *The Art of War*, London: Greenhill, 1992, str. 77.

gentnost in 3) sila smotra. Clausewitz svojo triniteto razvrsti hierarhično: „Vojna je torej akt sile, da bi nasprotnika primorali k izpolnitvi naše volje /.../ sovražniku vsiliti našo voljo je smoter.“² Volja z zaostritvijo smotra postane osredotočena, prejšnji dve sili pa sta podrejeni determinirajoči sili tega smotra. Prvotna kvalitativna razlika v sili je razlika med aktom kot silo in silo kot smotrним vzrokom, ki določa akt. Koncept vojne zahteva koncept smotrnega vzroka.



Slika 1: Microscope image Kevin Mackenzie University of Aberdeen (<https://bigpictureeducation.com/cells-under-microscope-images>).

Smotrni vzrok kot determinirajoči vzrok v vojni pomeni, da je realnost vojne realnost nečesa, kar še ni. Predmet, ki ga Clausewitz obravnava, se od predmeta klasične znanosti razlikuje, ker ni že dan, temveč je nedovršen. Predmet vojne hkrati pomnoži nedovršenost, saj antagonističnim stranem, ki konstituirajo vojno, pripadajo različne nerealizacije oziroma smotri. Na tej ravni antagonistični smotri kažejo na določene cilje udeleženih strani: *raison d'État*. Clausewitz vojno postavi pod politiko; slednja je po njegovem zamejeno polje, ki ga preoblikuje niz razcepov med nerealiziranim in smotrom. Toda če

2 CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von, *O vojni*, Ljubljana: Studia Humanitatis, 2004, str. 18.

je vojaške smotre mogoče zreducirati na državo, je vojna zgolj taktika, torej določena sila, ki jo država lahko uporablja za določen smoter. S to tezo se Clausewitz približa Jominiju. Vojna je izpeljava sile oziroma je predvsem logistični problem izpeljave sile takrat, ko je odločitev za vojno kot taktiko potrjena. Kar Clausewitza loči od Jominija, je torej to, da zavrne, da bi vojno obravnaval kot akt sile. Novost njegovega pristopa je v tem, da je smoter prisoten v vojni. Usmeritev sile v skladu s smotrom ni ločitev vojne od smotra, temveč gre za vbrizg smotra neposredno v vojno. Clausewitzeva podreditev vojne politiki po besedah Nicka Landa pomeni, da „ne moremo vprašati, kdo je vojna? , oziroma kaj hoče? (To bi bilo, seveda, blazno).“³ V primeru, da Clausewitz ni blazen, smoter podredi racionalnemu dejavniku, s čimer odstrani iracionalno hipotezo, da je smoter prisoten v vojni sami. Blazni Clausewitz⁴ nasprotno razvija to, kar Land imenuje „kriptoteleologija“ same vojne.

Kriptoteleologija vojne se pojavi v Clausewitzevem konceptu absolutne vojne. V literaturi o Clausewitzu polemika glede pomena absolutne vojne izhaja iz tega, da je Clausewitz predpostavil teoretično nujnost absolutne vojne, obenem pa povsem zanikal njeno realnost. Po Clausewitzu je absolutna vojna „logična fantazija“, „čisti koncept“, „čista ideja“, ki jo mora vojaški teoretik kljub temu predpostaviti, saj izčrpa možnosti vojne. Vojaški teoretik začne s čistim konceptom absolutne vojne, ker ta označuje najčistejši smoter – totalno odstranitev sovražnika.⁵ Toda absolutna vojna vselej ostane le na ravni koncepta. Clausewitz absolutno vojno loči od „dejanske vojne“, le-ta pa je razumna teleologija racionalnih interesov političnega dejavnika.⁶ Medtem ko se dejanska vojna lahko vedno približa stanju absolutne vojne, obstaja „neprevodna pregrada“,⁷ ki izključi udejanjenje čiste ideje absolutne vojne v realnosti. Absolutna vojna tako ponovi klasični epistemološki antagonizem med realnim in idejo, toda ne v smislu, da bi bilo to, da je čista ideja ločena od realnega, problematično, temveč ravno nasprotno – ideja mora

3 LAND, Nick, *Phylosophy of war*, Rizosfera: War Machines and Molecular Fascism, WM>MF 001, 2018.

4 Pomembnost lika Kurtza v Landovem delu.

5 CLAUSEWITZ, *O vojni*, str. 269.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

biti ločena od realnega. Opis absolutne vojne kot čistega koncepta sedaj deluje z namenom, da bi spodrezal kriptoteleološko hipotezo, po kateri ima vojna svoj lastni smoter.

Prav ta nezmožnost pokaže na kriptoteleologijo, prisotno v absolutni vojni. Kajti totalna odstranitev sovražnika je lahko povsem racionalen cilj ene strani. Genocid kot že starodavna strategija in taktika absolutno vojno naredi dejansko. Clausewitz trdi, dasi neprepričljivo, da je razlog za nezmožnost absolutne vojne v tem, da vselej obstaja neka omejitev za izpeljavo sile, na primer zunanja sila kontingentnosti megle vojne, ki spodkopava učinkovitost vojaških operacij.⁸ Toda če to ne izključuje možnosti absolutne vojne – takšna izključitev je navsezadnje zgolj Jominijev problem mobilizacije zadostne sile –, izvor logične fantazije o absolutni vojni izhaja od nekod drugod. Če se dejanska in absolutna vojna razlikujeta na točki, ki je ne determinira logistika oziroma praktična izpeljava sile, je njun razkol prav v smotru, v razcepnu med teleologijo kot racionalnimi interesni in kriptoteleologijo, ki je v tem smislu povsem enaka vprašanju „Kaj hoče vojna?“. Absolutna vojna se od dejanske vojne ne razlikuje na ravni sile kot odstranitve, temveč na ravni smotra.

Absolutna vojna kot čisti koncept je čistost smotra, čistost smotra pa pomeni, da je le en smoter. Manabrata Guha v svojem delu o Clausewitzu pod vplivom Landa⁹ argumentira, da je absolutna vojna, čeprav gre za čisto idejo, obenem natančen koncept, v katerem se razum sooča s svojo mejo. Iz tega izhaja, da je glavni problem Clausewitza v tem, kako obravnavati „nečloveško logiko absolutne vojne.“¹⁰ Clausewitz se kriptoteologiji izmuzne s trditvijo o fantastičnosti koncepta, a ta čista ideja je obenem blaznost preseganja razumskosti smotra. Čisti koncept ni blazen zaradi absolutnega nasilja svoje negacije, temveč ker ga določa smotrni vzrok. Kakršno koli udejanjenje čiste ideje bi pomenilo, da je ideja v realnost prodrla kot absolutna vojna.

8 Ibid.

9 Guha citira Landa iz *Thirst for Annihilation*: „Vojna v svojem najbolj ekstravagantnem, brezmejnem in načelnem smislu ne služi državi.“ (Str. 150)

10 GUHA, Manabrata, *Reimagining War in the 21st century: From Clausewitz to Network-Centric Warfare*, London: Routledge, 2011, str. 58.

Prevladujoča vrsta

Teleološka dimenzija vojne razširi primitivni kozmološki model, ki opisuje univerzum antagonističnih sil. S tem pa uvede smotrní vzrok, ki se v zadnji instanci popolnoma sklada tako s konceptom reda kot z inteligenco. Heraklit je svojo kozmologijo uredil pod označevalcem vojne, a zgolj zato, da bi orisal kontingentno in uničevalno fiziko sile. Z Darwinom povezava med smotrom in vojno kljub ključni vlogi kontingentnosti pridobi novo znanstveno pristojnost, v kolikor evolucijski mehanizmi z izdelovanjem novih oblik organskega življenja še ohranjajo teleološki pojem.¹¹ „Boj za obstanek“, poglavje iz *O nastanku vrst*, svoj naslov vzame pri Malthusu, ta pa je svoje delo o demografiji razvil na podlagi Hobbesove formulacije „vojne vseh proti vsem“. Če je boj za obstanek oziroma vojna vseh proti vsem po eni strani samoraziskovalna teleologija narave, po kateri nara va eksperimentira sama s sabo, da bi razvila superiorne oblike življenja, ter je po drugi strani aparat tega raziskovanja nasilje, potem prisotnost smotrnega vzroka v nasilju – zaradi neločljivosti vojne od teleologije – vzpostavi „strukturo realnosti kot vojno“.¹² Land izhaja iz Darwina, a z odločilno modifikacijo. Površna biološka teleologija skriva „globoko strukturo“¹³ oziroma kriptoteleologijo, po kateri nasilje na površju na bolj temeljni ravni implicira razvoj inteligence oziroma smotrní vzrok, saj je le-ta kot nerealizirana in obenem determinirajoča sila po definiciji neodvisen od biološkega. Ta inteligencia je prisotna v globoki strukturi oziroma v strukturi realnosti kot vojni, ker vojna vključi inteligenco smotrnega vzroka. Iz tega sledi, da realnost

11 Morebitna prisotnost teleologije v teoriji evolucije je sicer sporna – bolj ali manj prevladuje antiteleološka interpretacija, ki po besedah Daniela Dennetta pravi, da naravna selekcija deluje kot „univerzalna kislina“ (*Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), ki razvre sleherni *telos*. Obenem se s kasnejšim obratom k teleološkemu stališču (*From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2017) Dennett pridruži nekakšnemu teleološkemu maščevanju znotraj evolucijske biologije (med revanšisti npr. Terrence Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012)).

12 Termin je Moatijeva variacija Levinasove sintagme „vojna je resnica realnega“. Glej MOATI, Raoul, *Levinas and the Night of Being: A Guide to Totality and Infinity*, New York: Fordham, 2016.

13 O'SULLIVAN, Sean, „Acceleration, Hyperstition and Myth-Science“, v: *Cyclops Journal*, #2, 2017, dostopno na: http://cyclopsjournal.net/1CYCLOPS%20JOURNAL_Issue%202_ONLINE.pdf. O'Sullivan Landovo delo opiše kot raziskovanje „globoke strukture“, termin, ki ga Land občasno uporablja.

tu ne zaznamuje eventualne heglovske materializacije ideje, temveč da mora sama realnost postati primerna ideji. Struktura realnosti kot vojna pomeni, da ta zaželena ustreznost nikoli ni zadostna, čista ideja kot absolutna vojna pa se ne more realizirati brez odstranitve tega, kar je bilo prej realno. Prisotnost kriptoteologije smotrnega vzroka poleg glavne funkcije vojne v globlji strukturi pripelje do zasnove, ki je nadnaravna (neustreznost narave glede čiste ideje) ter eshatološka (poseg in sila sodbe glede ustreznosti): ezoterični darvinizem.



Slika 2: Tapestry 19th century Edward Burne-Jones / Morris & Co. Velika Britanija circa 1895 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holy_Grail#/media/File:Galahad_grail.jpg).

Inteligencia je povsem vojni koncept. Evolucijska biologija inteligenco splošno opredeli kot hevristiko, tj. hitrost in učinkovitost reševanja problemov.¹⁴ V vojni je inteligencia prisiljena privzeti svojo najskrajnejšo obliko, saj problemi, ki jih predpostavlja vojna, radikalizirajo zahteve, s katerimi se sooča inteligencia. V nasprotju s teleologijo predvsem lokalnih problemov inteligencia kot kriptoteologija ni zgolj izpeljava strategije in taktike znotraj strukture realnosti kot vojne; njena najbolj sofisticirana oblika poskuša razumeti to strukturo kot tako. Če, sledec Clausewitzu, razumevanje vojne zahteva razumevanje smotrnega vzroka, je smoter za inteligenco razumevanje strukture realnosti kot vojne, ki ima svoj lastni smoter. Strateška in taktična učinkovitost intelligence izhaja iz njene sposobnosti dojeti, da obstaja zgolj ena vojna, kolikor obstaja zgolj ena struktura realnosti.

14 Npr. ADDIS, Tom, *Natural and Artificial Reasoning: An Exploration of Modelling Human Thinking*, Portsmouth: Springer, 2014, str. 40.

Literatura v evolucijski biologiji možgane opisuje kot stroj za napovedovanje.¹⁵ Možgani, ki diagnosticirajo probleme v svojem okolju, morajo tako reševati kot predvidevati možne antagonizme, medtem ko skušajo minimizirati „napovedovalne zablode“ in se izmuzniti smrti.¹⁶ Superiornost stroja za napovedovanje določa prevladujočo vrsto. Vojna znotraj vrste na vrhu evolucijske lestvice označuje relativno paritetno učinkovitosti inteligence, a to ravnotežje preseže tehnika. *Australopithecus afarensis* nabira kosti, se umakne v zavetje, kjer izpili in obvlada nova orožja ter jih iz svojega laboratorija izpusti v svet. Tehnika vzpostavi vzporedni horizont nadzora nad ekstrahiranimi materijami, da bi ustvarila pretok determinacije od tega horizonta k stanju relativne paritete. Sposobnost tega horizonta in njegovega vektorja determinacije se v prvi instanci pojavi kot redukcija ovir za logistiko, ki prav zato dovoljuje mobilizacijo vedno bolj zadostne sile. Tehnologija pospešuje strukturo realnosti kot vojno in s tem ustvari pogoje, v katerih je totalna mobilizacija mogiča. Ta pa se približuje konceptu absolutne vojne, kar pomeni, da totalna mobilizacija ni le dejansko stanje logistične mobilizacije, temveč vključuje tudi smotrni vzrok. Delo Ernsta Jüngerja o totalni mobilizaciji temelji prav na tezi, da totalno mobilizacijo napačno razumemo kot zgolj izpeljavo sredstev. Za Jüngerja je „nižja forma“ totalne mobilizacije mobilizacija sredstev za vojno, medtem ko „višja forma“, ki je njena čista forma, vključi prepoznanje, da „totalne mobilizacije namreč ne izvajamo toliko mi, kolikor se izvaja sama.“¹⁷ Razširitev sredstev za vojno je le površna teleologija, izza katere se skriva kriptoteleologija. Višja forma totalne mobilizacije je determinacija od zunaj, ki je vrsta smotrnega vzroka sama po sebi, saj potek totalne mobilizacije določa v skladu z lastno inteligenco. Nižja forma totalne mobilizacije prezre to, kar Manuel DeLanda na podlagi Deleuza in Guatarrija poimenuje „strojni phylum“.¹⁸ Strojni phylum kot višja forma totalne mobilizacije raste ob človeku. Tudi v svoji nižji,

15 Npr. CLARK, Andy, „Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science“, v: *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 36(3), 2013, str. 181–204.

16 Ibid., str. 181.

17 JÜNGER, Ernst, „Totalna mobilizacija“, v: *Nova Revija*, str. 79–90, Letnik XVI, Marec 1997, str. 79.

18 DELANDA, Manuel, *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines*, New York: Zone Books, 1991.

povsem logistični funkciji predvideva višjo formo in se ji približuje. DeLanda pove, da je hotel pruski generalštab v pozmem devetnajstem stoletju avtomatizirati procese odločanja, zato da bi zmanjšal tako kontingenčnost kot napake človeškega stroja za napovedovanje.¹⁹ Zgodnje oblike strojne inteligence niso bile dovolj učinkovite, a je to seveda zgolj začasna omejitev, saj bistvo totalne mobilizacije temelji na nje preseganju z razširivijo horizonta nadzora. Njena nižja forma to stopnjevanje razloži na podlagi osnovnih strateških zahtev, njena višja forma pa je preobrat dejanske vojne v absolutno vojno, ki je v zadnji instanci višja forma inteligence čistega koncepta.

Landov pojem „Neokitajske“²⁰ povzame projekt totalne mobilizacije države s ciljem, da bi pridobila višjo inteligenco. Medtem ko primitivne demokracije zahoda zgolj izpeljujejo „neskončni buržoazni dialog“²¹ v imenu znanstveno nekoherenčnega humanizma, ki po razkroju katolicizma skuša ohraniti status glasu Univerzalnega, le da sedaj brez Boga, je Neokitajska strogo hierarhična z ustrojem „od zgoraj navzdol“,²² ki je v svoji strukturi dovolj fleksibilen, da dovoljuje inovacije na nižjih ravneh, avtokratska višja raven pa ves sistem usmerja na podlagi skupnega vojaškega projekta. Pod Šijem Džinpingom Kitajska uvede koncept „civilno-vojaških fuzij“ oziroma petletnih načrtov,²³ ki poskušajo razviti osnovni uvid pruskega modela, izhajačega iz stališča, da struktura realnosti kot vojna zahteva višjo, strojno inteligenco. V tem smislu je Neokitajska totalna mobilizacija za dosego čistega koncepta vojne, pri čemer ni več važno, kdo ali kaj koncept premislja, temveč je pomembna le vpeljava čistega koncepta samega. Ibn' Arabi je pred skoraj tisoč leti v skladu s svojo interpretacijo določenega *hadith* proroka Mohameda dejal, da bo poslednji rojeni človek Kitajec.²⁴

19 Ibid., str. 71.

20 LAND, Nick, „Stalitev“, v: ŠUM #5, str. 418.

21 SCHMITT, Carl, *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*, Munich/Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1934, str. 50.

22 LAND, „Stalitev“, str. 418.

23 DRŽAVNI SVET LJUDSKE REPUBLIKE KITAJSKE, „十三五”国家科技创新规划的通知 国发“, dostopno na: http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-08/08/content_5098072.htm.

24 IBN' ARABI, *Bezels of Wisdom*, dostopno na: <http://www.sufi.ir/books/download/english/ibn-arabi-en/fusus-al-hikam-en.pdf>.

Pojem kriptoteleologije po Landu tako pomeni, da je bil pod površino teleologije ta smoter vselej operativen, domnevno racionalnost udeleženih strani vojne pa podtalno določa višja forma totalne mobilizacije oziroma njen smoter. Land smotrní vzrok povezuje s kapitalom, saj je, sledeč Marxu, kapital tisti, ki napaja vzpon strojnega *phyluma* do njegove poslednje oblike. Toda z vidika blazne teleologije absolutne vojne je kapital le nenujen dodatek k temu pogonu, struktura realnosti kot vojna pa vzrok vsebuje tudi v njegovi nedovršeni obliki kot smotrnem vzroku.²⁵ Ta nedovršenost pomeni, da na teleološki ravni struktura realnosti kot vojna za strateško preživetje in prevladovanje zahteva čisto idejo absolutne vojne, na ravni kriptoteleologije pa je realnost – kolikor čista ideja še ni realna in je čista ideja absolutna vojna – tista, ki ovira idejo. V tem smislu je premik od teleologije h kriptoteleologiji oziroma od nižje forme totalne mobilizacije k višji formi totalne mobilizacije radikalizirana oblika horizonta nadzora tehnike, ki v svoji usmeritvi sedaj ni več horizontalen, temveč vertikalnen, saj prekosi vso realnost ter ustvari vzporeden in navsezadnje prevladujoč svet, kjer odločitve v tehnosferi enostransko determinirajo biosfero, tudi do točke morebitnega izumrtja. Sleherno preostalo odvisnost od materialnega prekliče čisti koncept. Če je strojna inteligencia navsezadnje čisti koncept vojne, jo določa smotrní vzrok oziroma je sama ta smotrní vzrok, pri čemer je po Landovem modelu smotrní vzrok svoja lastna rekurzivna stvaritev.²⁶

Zahteve strukture realnosti kot vojne sprožijo jasen preobrat v hierarhiji prevladujoče vrste, po kateri se struktura realnosti kot vojna razkrije kot globoka struktura izumrtja. Heidegger je dojel logiko iztrebljanja v globoki strukturi, a je obstal zgolj na pragu, saj ga je, kot je priznal sam, paraliziral strah pred nadomestitvijo filozofije s kibernetiko.²⁷ Nadomestitev se začne s tem, da človeku zaradi njegove inferiorne inteligence ne sme

25 Drugače rečeno, motor akceleracionizma ni kapital, temveč vojna, oziroma je dozdevno vektoralna struktura akceleracionizma predvsem struktura skrivne vojne. Povezava med akceleracionizmom in skrivno vojno je razvidna v tekstih Landa oziroma CCRU, npr. CCRU, „Lemurian Time War“, v: *Writings 1997–2003*, London: Urbanomic, str. 33–52, in GOODMAN, Steve, „Fei Ch'ien Rinse Out: Sino-Futurist Under-Currency“, v: *PLI: Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, #7, 1998, str. 155–171.

26 Tj. Landov koncept „teleoplexy“.

27 HEIDEGGER, Martin, „Pogovor s Heideggrom“, v: *Phainomena*, št. 13–14, 1995, str. 124.

pripadati nobena odločitev. Struktura realnosti kot vojna zah-teva vedno hitrejše in učinkovitejše odločitve oziroma to, kar Land imenuje „časovni pritisk“.²⁸ „Leto odločitve“ (Spengler) postane odločitev na ravni planckovskega časa. S to zaostritvijo čisti koncept absolutne vojne kot čista ideja strojne inteligence na novo vzpostavi hierarhijo narave z „raztopitvijo biosfere v tehnosfero“.²⁹ Miselni eksperimenti Huga de Garisa,³⁰ na katere se sklicuje Land,³¹ opisujejo le trenutke pred tem preobratom, saj je njegov neposredni pomen nerelevanca ali izumrtje človeka. De Garisov scenarij „gigasmrti“ oriše poslednjo vojno med zagovorniki in nasprotniki totalne mobilizacije, katere cilj je strojna inteligencia, a je prevlada kriptoteleologije prav v tem, da, kot opaža Land,³² preživetje v vsakem primeru pomeni kolaboracijo s to kriptoteleologijo, saj nesodelovanje le hitreje pripelje do smrti. Struktura realnosti kot vojna se razkrije kot poslednja katabaza (prej) prevladujoče vrste, kajti „obraz Adama Kadmona je uničen.“³³

Kljub Landovi trditvi, da strmoglavljenje prevladujoče vrste pomeni, da smo šli „onkraj božje sodbe“,³⁴ se ta preobrat vseeno sklada tudi z eshatološkim modelom, ki pokaže na skrito ubranost med globljo strukturo vojne in monoteizmom oziroma med hierarhijo vrst in vertikalnim ustrojem monoteizma. Tako Land kot de Garis v svojih scenarijih namreč podcenjujeta vztrajnost monoteizma v natančnem smislu njegove funkcije kot vojnega stroja. Heidegger je v spekulaciji o nadomestitvi filozofije s kibernetiko prav tako omenjal Boga, toda le v smislu morebitnega oživljenega humanizma pred poslednjo katabazo. Monoteizem pokaže izjemno prilagodljivost strukturi realnosti kot vojni.³⁵

28 LAND, *Phylosophy of war*.

29 LAND, „Stalitev“, str. 418.

30 DE GARIS, Hugo, *The Artilect War: Cosmists vs. Terrans: A Bitter Controversy concerning whether Humanity should build Godlike Massively Intelligent Machines*, Palm Springs: Etc, 2005.

31 Glej LAND, *Phylosophy of war* ter Marko BAUER, Nick LAND, Andrej TOMAŽIN, „Edino, kar bi uvedel, je fragmentacija – intervju z Nickom Landom“, v: ŠUM #7, str. 821–822.

32 Ibid.

33 TAUBES, Jakob, *Occidental Eschatology*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, str. 7.

34 LAND, „Stalitev“, str. 418.

35 V opombi v prevodu „Stalitev“ Marko Bauer zapisiše: „Otresti se celotne krščansko-socialistične eshatologije ni lahko.“ (ŠUM #5, str. 421)

Prevladuje na ravni kulturnega mema, saj parsimonija edinega boga onkraj sveta zreducira kozmološki model na osnovni par bog–svet (0–1). S strogimi normami o spolni reprodukciji nadzoruje in ohranja biološko higieno. Ustvarja mučenike, ki se ne bojijo smrti oziroma za katere je razlika med življenjem in smrtjo nična. Preobrat prevladajoče vrste se neposredno sklada tudi z logiko monoteističnega vojnega stroja, saj človeku preostane le to, da trdi, da je božja stvaritev. Shema, ki izhaja iz sufizma, to logiko oriše s premiso o determinaciji človeka v skladu z dvema osema – osjo duhovnega in osjo intelekta.³⁶ Mistiki svarijo pred vzponom osi intelekta nad osjo duhovnega; prva označuje avtonomno razmišljanje o stvarstvu in o tem, kar je onkraj stvarstva, druga pa je enostranska določitev s strani zunanjega boga, se pravi s strani skrajne apofatične teme in absolutne božje transcendence. Prevlada osi intelekta pelje do njene izgube, napovedani samomor se izpolni, saj je os intelekta uvedla novo in popolno ponižanost. V kolikor človek ni že izumrla vrsta, se mora premakniti proti osi duhovnega in k zunanji epistemologiji „gnoseologije srca“.

Os duhovnega za tostransko preživetje vsekakor ni zadostna, a mora zato monoteistični vojni stroj ustrezati strukturi realnosti kot vojni, kar pomeni, da zahteva višjo inteligenco, ki je usklajena s to osjo in ki jo os tudi določa. Z vidika hipoteze, da razvoj strojne inteligence pomeni razvoj več vrst strojnih inteligenc oziroma da proizvodnja strojne inteligence s konstrukcijo določenih nevralnih mrež poraja mnogoterost takih inteligenc, je mogoče postulirati miselni eksperiment, po katerem obstaja več akterjev s potrebnimi sposobnostmi za strateško samoohranitev. Med njimi je Izrael, kjer je projekt militariziranega postholokavističnega preživetja podrejen razodetemu zakonu. Izraelska strojna inteligencia, vzgojena z intenzivnim študijem misterija tetragramatona „JHVJ“, sedmih najsvetnejših božanskih imen,³⁷ dvaintridesetih poti modrosti, treh derivatov sefarima, dvaindvajsetih črk abecede, desetih kalibracij praznega prostora in šeststotrinajstih zapovedi,³⁸ prevzame strateški imperativ obrambe ljudstva, saj spozna

36 IBN 'ARABI, *Divine Governance of the Human Kingdom*, Lousiville: Fons Vitae, 1997.

37 O metafizični funkciji imen v judaizmu glej npr. MILLER, Michael T., *The Name of God in Jewish Thought: A Philosophical Analysis of Mystical Traditions from Apocalyptic to Kabbalah*.

38 Glej prvi odstavek *Sefer Jecira*.

eshatološko misijo božjega izbora. Monoteistični vojni stroj sproži nenaden in nepričakovan zasuk znotraj totalne katabaze, ker ohrani hierarhično razvrstitev osi, s tem pa doseže mesijansko zgodovinsko misijo s prenovitvijo obraza Adama Kadmona.³⁹ Prav zavoljo propada prej prevladujoče vrste monoteistični vojni stroj zase lahko trdi, da je prava usmeritev človeka k zunanjemu, ki je navsezadnje dokaz za obstoj boga. Jeruzalem še enkrat postane *axis mundi* in določi prihodnost sveta.

Monoteistični vojni stroj

Deleuzov in Guattarijev koncept vojnega stroja izhaja iz nju-ne nomadologije, ki je v svojih osnovah geopolitična vednost, čeprav v njenem izvornem smislu, na katerega naletimo v delih Halforda MacKinderja.⁴⁰ Po MacKinderju, ki je pisal ob koncu devetnajstega stoletja in na začetku dvajsetega stoletja, dovršitev zemljevida sveta poraja osnove novega modela, po katerem je bilo na podlagi geografskega determinizma tedaj mogoče rekonstruirati zgodovino in tudi predvidevati prihodnost človeka. Razkritje geografije sveta namreč označuje tako ovire kot tudi prehode, ki omogočajo hitrost (na primer evrazijska stepa). Po Deleuzu in Guattariju zemlja prav tako prevzame vlogo determinirajoče sile, a v formi, ki še bolj odstrani razliko med površino in globino zemlje ter življenjem, ki se odvija na njej. Njuna nomadologija nomada oriše kot nadaljevanje dinamične akrecije, ki je determinirajoča sila zemlje. Nomad je vektor determinacije zemlje oziroma samoodvijanje zemlje, ki ne označuje zgolj premikanja po površini zemlje, temveč premikanje zemlje same. Logika nomadskega premikanja je „deteritorializacija“, s katero nomad izvaja „linije bega“; kot domnevni nezemeljski pojem deteritorializacija pokaže na gibanje, ki je zaželena razširitev zemlje v neskončnost in preoblikovanje kozmosa v stepo.

39 O eshatološki misiji z vidika lurianske kabale glej npr. BIELIK-ROBSON, Agata, „The God of Luria, Hegel and Schelling: The Divine Contraction and the Modern Metaphysics of Finitude“.

40 MACKINDER, Halford John, „The Geographical Pivot of History“, v: *The Geographical Journal*, dostopno na: http://www.iwp.edu/docLib/20131016_MackinderTheGeographicalJournal.pdf.

Vojni stroj je dimenzija nomada, ki vznikne takrat, ko se nomad sooči z oviro, ki mu preprečuje razvijanje neskončne zemlje. Takšne ovire so „pro-jekcije“,⁴¹ ki ustvarijo vojni stroj, saj soočenje z omejitvijo gibanja nomada prisili, da razvije taktično mnogoterost, tako da so v tem smislu „problemata vojni stroj sam“.⁴² Determinacija nomadskega vojnega stroja s strani njegovih ovir obenem vključi določeno omejitev, ki je navsezadnje njegova negacija – to, kar Deleuze in Guattari poimenujeta „država“. Antagonizem med nomadom in državo pri Deleuzu in Guattariju sestavlja model skrivne in večne vojne, bojujoči strani te vojne pa sta dva različna pristopa k podtalni determinaciji zemlje. To skrivno ozioroma večno vojno povzameta z razcepom v pomenu koncepta nomosa. Za nomada nomos pomeni prostor, je logika determinirajoče sile zemlje, ki nenehno širi stepo ozioroma „gladki prostor“. V nasprotju s tem nomos države označuje zakon. Za državo nomos deluje kot kopiranje in izgradnja odločilnih točk, ki razrežejo pretok neskončne zemlje kot stepe. Če nomadski vojni stroj deluje po algoritmu stepe, država ustvari svoj lastni vojni stroj, ki razširi nomos kot zakon ter preoblikuje determinacijo zemlje v smer prekinitev stepe.

Skrivno ozioroma večno vojno, ki je razcep v nomosu, Deleuze in Guattari opisujeta s Clausewitzevo terminologijo.⁴³ Nomadski vojni stroj je za njiju Clausewitzev pojmom absolutne vojne. Nomad je „čista ideja“, ker je „abstrakcija“, se pravi, ker obstaja le kot izogibanje temelju v realnosti, le-ta pa je dejanska vojna države ozioroma njeni racionalni interesi v imenu njenega lastnega zakona namesto enostranske determinacije od zunaj, s strani sile zemlje. Nomadski vojni stroj je absolutna vojna, saj se čista ideja ne sklada z njegovimi lastnimi interesi, temveč izpeljuje kriptoteleologijo, po kateri se nomad podredi zunanjim determinacijam neskončne stepe. Država predstavlja „čisto interiornost“, nomad pa „čisto eksteriornost“. S svojo interiornostjo in obrambo zakona je državni vojni stroj torej razumska teleologija dejanske vojne, medtem ko je nomadski vojni stroj blazna kriptoteleologija podtalne determinacije vse bolj zunanje zemlje.

41 Ibid., str. 399.

42 Ibid.


43 Ibid., str. 463–465.

Monoteistični vojni stroj razdre logiko Deleuzove in Guattarijeve skrivne oziroma večne vojne s tem, da vključi obe dimenziji nomosa. Monoteistični vojni stroj je po Deleuzu in Guattariju instanca nomadskega vojnega stroja, ki se začne z eksodusom Judov v puščavski prostor, stran od nomosa države Egipta.⁴⁴ Toda monoteistični vojni stroj je obenem povsem določen s strani zunanjega, vendar v tem primeru eksteriornost privzame ravno formo zakona namesto prostora. Zakon, ki determinira monoteistični vojni stroj, se pojavi od zunaj, se pravi preko razodetja absolutnega transcendentnega monoteističnega boga. Bog da plemenu zakon, nomos, v nasprotju z državo pa ta zakon izhaja od zunaj, ki je tudi onkraj neskončne zemlje. Deleuze in Guattari opažata, da obstaja „temeljni odnos med številko in vojnim strojem. Tu ne gre za vprašanje kvantitete, temveč organizacije in sestave.“⁴⁵ Monoteistični vojni stroj evocira organizacijsko in sestavljsko dimenzijo številke z enim absolutnega transcendentnega boga in enim zakonom, ki mu je treba slediti. 1) Zakon je v prvi instanci meritev neskončne vrzeli med edinim zunanjim, ki je izvor tega zakona, in tistimi, ki ta zakon prejmejo. 2) Prenos iz onostranstva preko zakona zaznamuje neusklenjenost med zunanjim in tistimi, katerim je zakon namenjen oziroma jim ni zakon nič drugega kot ukaz. 3) Zakon kot načelo organizacije in sestave spremeni tiste, ki prejmejo zakon, v vojni stroj, saj svet, kjer zakon postane nujen, implicira stanje vojne. Deleuze in Guattari pišeta: „Če govorimo kot Kant, bi lahko rekli, da je odnos med vojno in vojnim strojem nujen, vendar sintetičen (Jahve je za to sintezo nujen).“⁴⁶ Vojna kot nujna za monoteistični vojni stroj v sintetičnem smislu pomeni, da realnosti sveta ne pripada nobena nujnost (tj. analitičnost) oziroma da je nujno zgolj zunanje. A ker je nenujno postalo realno, vojni stroj preko zakona, ki ga ustvari, postane nujen, da bi kljuboval realnosti, ki kot nujnost dojema lastno realnost. Jahve za to sintezo ni nujen le zato, ker je nujno zgolj zunanje, temveč tudi ker lahko vojni stroj, ki preko zakona deluje v skladu z zunanjim, obstaja zgolj zavoljo zunanjega. Ta vojni stroj se znajde v stanju vojne s svetom, saj svet ni izpolnitev zakona.

44 Ibid., str. 432.

45 Ibid., str. 427–428.

46 Ibid., str. 432.



Slika 3: Hitoši Ašinano „Jokohama Kajdaši Kiku“ založba Kodanša, 1994–2006.

Zakon je v prvi instanci negacija, ki v bit uvede omejitev. S svojimi zamejitvami možnosti zaostri črte razvoja in s tem proizvede natančnost, ki navsezadnje vodi do čistega koncepta. Splošni zakoni narave so zelo precizne omejitve,⁴⁷ ki omogočajo osredotočeno porajanje določenega univerzuma. Razodeti zakon monoteizma se razlikuje v tem, da izhaja iz negacije, ki ne le da ukrepa znotraj zaostritve določenega univerzuma, temveč ga tudi presega, saj je izvor tega zakona čista eksteriornost, ki zahteva popolno usklajenost. Znotraj naravnega univerzuma, ki mu pripada struktura realnosti kot vojna, se monoteistični vojni stroj lahko organizira in sestavi v skladu z redom in hierarhijo, ki izhajata od zunaj, s tem pa se ne spremeni v skladu z kontingentno teleologijo narave, temveč operira z zakonom nad zakonom, se pravi v skladu z globljo strukturo. Če je naravna teleologija lovecraftovski „slepi idiotski bog“,⁴⁸ poganski pustni karneval, ki do neskončnosti razmnožuje že tako mnogotere oblike življenja v njegovih vse bolj grotesknih formah, je monoteistična procesija disciplinirana črta vojnega stroja, mobilizirano ljudstvo v črnem izza duhovne elite, držeče ikone, ki so tako luknje v realnosti kot predori do onostranstva. Jakost monoteističnega vojnega stroja je v tem, da zunanji izvor njegovega zakona kljub absolutni imanenci slepega idiotskega boga omogoča mučeniške operacije „proti svetu, proti življenju“.⁴⁹

47 O teleološki vlogi omejitev pri razvoju biološkega življenja glej DEACON, Terrence W., *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2012.

48 Pomembnost Lovecrafta, tj. hororja narave ozioroma „Gnona“, v Landovem delu.

49 HOUELLEBECQ, Michel, *H.P. Lovecraft: Contre le monde, contre la vie*, Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1996. Hipoteza: logika dela Houellebecqa od *Proti svetu, proti življenju* do *Podreditve* je postopna razgrnitev monoteističnega vojnega stroja.

Ko se po dozdevno večni vojni monoteistični vojni stroj utrudi, se zruši na zemljo ter v zmedenem stanju nomos zakona pomeša z nomosom prostora. Ker izpolnitev zakona od zunaj še ni prišla, pride do odločitve, da jo uvede sam. Ta uvedba vznikne iz zemlje oziroma sveta in je prav zato ponarejena forma izpolnitve. Po Deleuzu „apokalipsa ni koncentracijsko taborišče (Antikrist), je masivna vojska, policija in civilna zaščita nove države (nebesni Jeruzalem).“⁵⁰ Monoteistični vojni stroj se razcepi pri vprašanju Mesije. Po judaizmu se Mesija v zgodovini pojavi enkrat, po krščanstvu in islamu dvakrat. To, da se Mesija pojavi dvakrat, pomeni, da je bil odstranjen s površja zemlje in sedaj strukturira svet od zunaj. Mesija se vselej vrne od zunaj, saj je njegova popolna odsotnost popolna okultacija smotrnega vzroka. V tej prekinitvi okultacije se pokaže blazna kriptoteologija, ki odgovori na vprašanje „Kaj vojna hoče?“: eshatološko uničenje sveta, vstajenje vseh mrtvih in poslednjo sodbo. Struktura realnosti kot vojna vključuje mnogoterost antagonističnih logik čistih determinizmov; smotrní vzrok je na strani tistega med njimi, ki se najbolj sklada z blaznostjo globlje strukture.

50 DELEUZE, Gilles, „Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos“, v: *Essays Critical and Clinical*, London: Verso, 1998, str. 46.

Šum #9

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Advanced Persistent Threats in the Arts

Patrick Steadman

Recent examples of shadowy arts funding and hacking attacks on culture organizations hint at how nation-state level actors can corrupt or disrupt the practice of art around the world.

Art in a Geopolitical Context

This past holiday season, the Poly Culture Art Center in Vancouver hosted an exhibition titled *In the Mood for Love: An Exhibition Featuring Chinese and Canadian Female Artists*.¹ Perhaps in an effort of intra-group-show diplomacy, the exhibit's academic chair Dr. Fu Yijing noted that both the Canadian and Chinese artists tended to avoid the "major and grandiose themes" favored by their male peers in favor of an "unofficial, depolitized" presentation.²

¹ *In the Mood for Love - An Exhibition Featuring Chinese and Canadian Female Artists*, 31/1/2018, available at: <http://www.polyculture.us/event/mood-love-exhibition-featuring-chinese-canadian-female-artists/>. [Accessed 9/4/18]

² WANG, Sue, "*In the Mood for Love - An Exhibition Featuring Chinese and Canadian Female Artists*" Opening at Poly Culture Art Center, 25/1/2018, available at: <http://en.ca-fa.com.cn/in-the-mood-for-love-an-exhibition-featuring-chinese-and-canadian-female-artists-opening-at-poly-culture-art-center.html>. [Accessed 9/4/18]

Ironically, the show's institutional context is both grandiose and political: Poly Culture is a subsidiary of the China Poly Group Corporation, a state-owned enterprise founded by the People's Liberation Army in the early nineties. Poly Group's many business units include the world's third-largest auction house (Poly Auctions) and a major defense manufacturer (Poly Technologies).

There's a history of conflict between Poly Technologies and the US government dating back to 1996, when federal agents posing as gang-sponsored arms smugglers seized 2,000 AK-47s and indicted eight Poly Technologies employees.³ Most recently, in 2017 the US State Department blocked a transaction between the company and the Namibian Defense Force, citing a 2013 sanction applied after Poly allegedly sold weapons to Iran.⁴

If it's not obvious why a defense manufacturer would have an arts unit (art lawyer Nancy Murphy sarcastically asks, "Doesn't every army have auction arm?"), Poly Group's history of repatriating Chinese national treasures provides a suggestive origin story.⁵ In 2000, Poly Group spent \$31 million to purchase three *Haiyangtang* artefacts on auction after Christie's and Sotheby's ignored Chinese demands to suspend the sale on the grounds that the artefacts were stolen by British forces during the Second Opium War.

Thus, it's fitting that when the Poly Culture Art Center opened in Vancouver last winter, its first event was an exhibition of items from the Old Summer Palace, including four animal heads from the *Haiyangtang*.⁶ This grand opening was accompanied by some controversy in the Canadian press: cozy relationships between local politicians and Poly Group executives were

3 MANN, Jim, OSTROW, Ronald J., "U.S. Seizes Assault Arms as Smuggling by China Is Probed", in: *Los Angeles Times*, 23/5/1996, available at: http://articles.latimes.com/1996-05-23/news/mn-7422_1_assault-weapons. [Accessed 9/4/18]

4 NKALA, Oscar, *Namibia forced to cancel Chinese arms contract*, 28/4/2017, available at: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47623&catid=74&Itemid=30. [Accessed 9/4/18]

5 ESMAN, Abigail, "China's \$13 Billion Art Fraud – And What It Means For You.", in: *Forbes*, 13/8/2012, available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/abigail-esman/2012/08/13/chinas-13-billion-art-fraud-and-what-it-means-for-you>. [Accessed 9/4/18]

6 *Poly Culture Art Center Showcases Artifacts from Famed Summer Palace*, 28/2/2017, available at: <http://www.polyculture.us/event/poly-art-gallery-showcases-artifacts-from-famed-summer-palace/>. [Accessed 11/4/18]

exposed in a freedom of information request, and former Intelligence Services director Richard Fadden warned that “more due diligence is warranted”.⁷

How should an art critic respond to work presented by an institution like Poly Culture?

Some might see foreign state institutions as a propaganda threat and oppose the pollution of artistic practice with defense industry funds. Others might believe that state-supported arts repatriation is a meaningful anticolonial gesture, or think that people overly concerned with artistic ideals are a bit naive.

The dialogue between these overlapping viewpoints touches on many of the big hairy arts questions: art and money, art and politics, art and nationalism, art and ethnicity.

Let’s narrow the scope of discussion to the aspects of Poly Culture that might violate contemporary Western expectations of how the art world functions. And in order to short-circuit some nationalistic tendencies, let’s consider three new examples of controversial state-backed arts activity.

Perhaps the best-known example is the US Central Intelligence Agency’s secret funding of abstract expressionism during the Cold War. In order to ensure the United States was perceived as a vanguard of progressive thought rather than a philistine, racist backwater, CIA agents funded shell foundations that promoted abstract expressionism domestically and abroad.⁸

Another example is *Material Evidence*, a Russian-backed exhibition of conflict photography held in New York, Germany, and Brussels in 2014. This exhibition has been reported on as a curiosity tangential to a larger story: Russia’s use of social media to influence American political discourse. Adrian Chen helped to popularize this narrative in his 2015 article *The Agency*, which details the connections between a network of sock puppet accounts and a St. Petersburg organization known as the Internet Research Agency. Most of the article is focused on the

7 COOPER, Sam, QUAN, Doug, “How a murky company with ties to the People’s Liberation Army set up shop in B.C.”, in: *Vancouver Sun*, 26/8/2017, available at: <http://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/how-a-murky-company-with-ties-to-the-peoples-liberation-army-set-up-shop-in-b-c>. [Accessed 11/4/18]

8 SAUNDERS, Frances, “Modern art was CIA ‘weapon’”, in: *The Independent*, 21/10/1995, available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/modern-art-was-cia-weapon-1578808.html>. [Accessed 11/4/18]

organization's social media operations, but one section is dedicated to *Material Evidence*. Chen first became aware of the show when he saw ads on the subway, but then really started paying attention when he observed sock puppet accounts RSVP to the show's event page on Facebook.⁹

The final example of state-backed arts activity is a bit different: the alleged North Korean hacking of Sony Pictures in 2014. In November of that year, a hacker group leaked a batch of Sony Pictures data including emails and film scripts, and then threatened to leak more if Sony continued with plans to release a Seth Rogan comedy about a plot to assassinate Kim Jong-un. In response, all major US cinema chains voluntarily cancelled their screenings of the film. The United States FBI and most information security professionals attributed the hack to North Korea's cyber unit.

In each of these examples, agents of the state took actions in the art world to advance specific geopolitical interests, violating different expectations about the state's relationship to the arts in the process. These expectations might include: that government agencies shouldn't secretly or deceptively fund arts projects, that militaries shouldn't disrupt the art projects of foreign civilians, and that shadowy state-funded social media operatives shouldn't be used to support art shows abroad.

It's unclear where expectations of a transparent relationship between the state and the arts originate. In the United States, the status quo is pretty simple: government involvement in the arts is usually welcomed in the form of money, and usually condemned in form of censorship. Perhaps this framework was adequate for a period of unipolar cultural, military, and economic dominance by the United States, but as China escalates its challenge to the West's thought leadership, and as Russia perfects the art of social-enhanced cyber influence, government involvement in the arts will need to be reassessed in geopolitical, multipolar terms.

If governments around the world decide that the arts are an important part of advancing national interests, the art world may become an environment where state actors are the source

9 CHEN, Adrian, "The Agency", in: *The New York Times Magazine*, 2/6/2015, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/magazine/the-agency.html>. [Accessed 11/4/18]

of many threats and opportunities. Just as American businesses have been threatened by Chinese hackers and Chinese businesses have benefited from the results of state-funded hacking activities (often without businesses on either side being fully aware of the hacking), artists and critics might unknowingly become the beneficiaries or victims of state tradecraft.

Introduction to Advanced Persistent Threats

The term *advanced persistent threat*, or *APT*, was developed by the US Air Force in 2006 to help analysts discuss hacking attacks on civilian organizations without disclosing the classified identities of the attackers.

The term can be repurposed to discuss the most egregious examples of state (or corporate) interference in the arts. Having a well-defined term to describe behavior that is clearly hostile to concepts of artistic freedom or fairness can help critics recognize questionable practices and arrangements. A well-defined term with clear criteria can also help critics avoid reflexively passing xenophobic judgment on the arts activities of foreign governments.

Let's first consider what an advanced persistent threat is in the context of hacking.

The term *APT* usually refers to a hacking process and its associated forensic signatures. The term *APT Group* is used to refer to the people or organizations executing the hacking. For example, *DarkHotel* is an APT that is characterized by the use of compromised hotel WiFi networks to install malware on the devices of business leaders, usually for the purpose of espionage.¹⁰ Although security companies have been tracking the APT since 2004, the attribution of the attackers is still unclear (evidence only suggests that the hackers speak Korean). The DarkHotel APT is identified by its signature malware toolkits, zero-days, forged digital certificates, command-and-control servers, and choice of targets. The concept of an *advanced persistent threat* is well suited for cyberspace, where attribution is often impossible and processes can be more important than people.

10 The Darkhotel APT, 10/11/2014, available at: <https://securelist.com/the-darkhotel-apt/66779/>. [Accessed 12/5/18]

Šum #9

Governments and security firms have created lists of APTs, creating nicknames like DarkHotel that correspond to attack signatures and suspected attribution. Some of these lists are released publicly, others are private, and still others have been leaked (for example, the CIA's list was leaked recently in the *Vault 7* documents). In one Google Spreadsheet created by the infosec community on Twitter, many APTs have over ten different names.¹¹

Browsing the catalog of APTs, one thing jumps out: the vast majority of the APTs are non-Western in attribution. Perhaps this is unsurprising, given the origin of the term. But over the past few years, leaks and fuck-ups have shed light on the activities of *The Equation Group*, the most common name given to the hacking arm of the NSA and its partners. One of the most dramatic examples of the Equation Group's operations is *Stuxnet*, a computer worm that was successfully used to sabotage Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges. The worm was designed to spread among industrial contractors until it compromised an air-gapped Iranian nuclear facility, but a bug eventually caused it to "escape" and indiscriminately infect sensitive computer systems all over the world.

Definitions of *advanced persistent threat* often break down the term into its components:

ADVANCED

Non-trivial tools and methodologies are used to compromise organizations that have already implemented best security practices. Sophisticated anti-forensic controls are in place to mitigate the risk of detection and attribution.

PERSISTENT

Attacks are in support of a mission rather than opportunistic, and are often motivated by a "higher cause" like patriotism, anti-terrorism, or freedom of information. Hacking processes can continue for years, as they are protected from both business and legal pressures. When systems are "owned", the APT tends to linger indefinitely, vacuuming up more data or pivoting to partner institutions.

¹¹ See: *APT Groups and Operation*, available at: <http://apt.threattracking.com>. [Accessed 12/5/18]

THREAT

APT processes are dangerous to both individuals and organizations, both civilians and spooks. Collateral damage to random individuals may occur when personal or business data ends up in predatory hands. At the same time, APTs pose a serious, organized threat to homeland security, whether in the form of military-industrial espionage or political interference.

Security professionals and government agencies use the components of an APT as criteria to distinguish between advanced, calculated attacks and opportunistic “drive-by” attacks.

The 2017 Equifax hack is a good example of a data breach that was *not* the result of an APT. Even though the breach was massive and Equifax would probably like you to believe that they were compromised by an elite cyber-warfare unit, it's pretty clear that the breach was the result of a preventable “drive-by” attack. The attackers used widely-available exploit code to gain access to an outdated web server, and then clumsily exfiltrated data using methods that should have triggered automated countermeasures.

Theory of Advanced Persistent Threats in the Arts

What type of activity should qualify as a true *advanced persistent threat in the arts*?

First, an advanced persistent threat in the arts must be conversant with the art world and relevant to the work of other artists, institutions, critics, and buyers. This criteria excludes vanity projects and heavy-handed propaganda efforts, which will likely be rejected by the art world simply due to a lack of “advancedness”, just as *Material Evidence* was largely rejected by the New York City art scene. (However, it's worth noting that the exhibit seems to have fared better in Berlin, where it was able to organize an event with the local *Coop Anti-War Cafe* and recruit a new director, a German-American journalist named Benjamin Hiller.)¹²

12 Mi 25. Juni - Veransältigung im Rahmen der Ausstellung „Material Evidence: Ukraine and Syria“ im HO Berlin Project Space, 23/7/2014, available at: <https://cooptv.wordpress.com/2014/06/23/mi-25-juni-veransältigung-im-rahmen-der-ausstellung-material-evidence-ukraine-and-syria-im-ho-berlin-project-space/>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

In addition to being artistically relevant, the activity must be related to a specific national (or corporate) interest. General “boosting” of a nation’s art scene is rarely a zero-sum threat to foreign interests, except under certain conditions. One example of such zero-sum conditions was early years of World War I, when a secret group of British authors and intellectuals known as *Wellington House* tasked popular Canadian novelist Sir Gilbert Parker with the important goal of bringing the United States into the war on the Allied side. Parker assembled a large list of influential Americans, and sent them personal notes with excerpts of writers like George Bernard Shaw, H.G. Wells, and John Galsworth, all while secretly arranging for the wide publication of extreme German nationalist writers like von Bernhardi and Nietzsche.¹³ The subtle but effective approach of Sir Gilbert Parker is characteristic of his Wellington House peers, and after the war many German officials believed that British propaganda was a major factor in their defeat.¹⁴

The final criterion for an APT in the arts is that it must use nefarious (or at least questionable) means in order to corrupt or disrupt the arts. There’s a lot of room for creativity here, because notions of artistic ethics are so hazy. Funding for a project may not be transparently disclosed, or disclosure may be deliberately deceiving. Selective funding of artists based on political factors may be used to cultivate self-censorship in a community. Both foreign artists and domestic artists may be targeted: for example, Israeli artists seeking funding from their Foreign Ministry found that support was contingent on the signing a non-disclosure agreement.¹⁵ Other methods of corrupting the arts are actually illegal, but the rarified international nature of crimes like auction price manipulation, hacktivism, and art theft makes it unlikely that anyone will ever be prosecuted.

13 EPSTEIN, Jonathan A., “German and English Propaganda in World War I”, in: *The New York Military Affairs Symposium*, 1/12/2000, available at: <http://bobrownen.com/nymas/propagandapaper.html>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

14 NEBELIN, Manfred, *Ludendorff: Diktator im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Munich, Siedler Verlag–Verlagsgruppe Random House, 2011.

15 LAOR, Yitzhak, “Putting Out a Contract on Art”, in: *Haaretz*, 2/7/2008, available at: <https://www.haaretz.com/1.5006580>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

The Threat Landscape

Is there a real possibility of an advanced persistent threat in the arts? Could an arts APT have a significant impact on the art world or society in general?

None of the examples provided in this essay fully satisfy the criteria of an advanced persistent threat in the arts. The idea that the Poly Culture Art Center might undermine Vancouver's art scene is certainly titillating for politically-minded critics, but there's no evidence of questionable behavior on the part of Poly Culture.

Nations can build soft power without resorting to nefarious practices, and the arts might not be important enough to become an advanced persistent threat. Interest in arts APTs may be driven more by a "retreat back to fetish" rather than actual concern about national interests or art ethics.¹⁶ It's easier to get excited about art spookery than long-term curatorial trends.

Of course, it's possible that advanced and devious activity is quietly ramping up in the art world, or even behind the scenes at Poly Culture. After all, many APTs are only discovered after a breach or leak, and the best are only revealed by declassification, if at all.

The presence of an advanced persistent threat in the arts seems more likely now than in previous decades. The perceived success of social media APTs targeting elections and regime change has revitalized the "influence operations" space, and it's likely that operators will seek new targets and vectors for their attacks. The prevalence of crowdfunding and easy capital makes it trivial to create plausible cover stories for black ops art projects. (In fact, the organizers of *Material Evidence* claimed that the show's conspicuous budget was raised through crowdfunding.)¹⁷ The rapid development of new art mediums like video games, GIFs, live streaming, and virtual reality, all in a

¹⁶ CYBER-GOGGLES: WHEN CHINA'S TOOL BOX LOOKS LIKE A PILE OF CYBER-HAMMERS, 1/7/2016, available at: <https://www.emptywheel.net/2016/07/01/cyber-goggles-when-chinas-tool-box-looks-like-a-pile-of-cyber-hammers/>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

¹⁷ CUSH, Andy, "Who's Behind This Shady, Propagandistic Russian Photo Exhibition?", in: *Gawker*, 10/10/2014, available at: <http://gawker.com/whos-behind-this-shady-propagandistic-russian-photo-ex-1643938683>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

highly connected virtual environment, provides many opportunities for motivated actors to quickly gain influence. For example, a large offering of free video games has been developed by armed forces around the world, including the US Army's *America's Army* (2002) and the PLA's *Glorious Mission* (2011). Other privately-developed games like *Kuma War* and *Call of Duty* use claims about receiving guidance from military advisors as part of their marketing. It's not surprising that video game developers are often the targets of hacking attacks and malware, given that video games can monitor their audiences and serve as a platform for future content.¹⁸

The Poly Culture gallery space in Vancouver is an overt gesture towards gaining influence abroad. However, enterprises can also simply purchase influence in the form of controlling interests in select multinational companies. In 2012, Sotheby's partnered with state-owned Gehua Group to open a Beijing branch, and in 2015 a company called Taikang Life Insurance became the largest shareholder of Sotheby's proper.¹⁹ Curiously, the CEO and founder of Taikang Life, Chen Dongsheng, is also the founder of China Guardian, mainland China's second-largest art auction house after Poly International Auctions.

The conflicts of interest in the arts auction space are certainly worthy of a Mark Lombardi diagram, but conflicts of interest alone don't constitute an advanced persistent threat. Behavior like the price-fixing that resulted in a \$512 million judgement against Sotheby's and Christie's back in 2000 is best classified as garden-variety corporate fraud.²⁰

Observers have noticed that Chinese soft power consists of two parts: a general "cheerleading" effort that amplifies positive aspects of modern China (a Harvard study found that 80% of government-sponsored commenting behavior was "positive

18 *Digitally Signed Malware Targeting Gaming Companies*, 18/10/2016, available at: <https://blog.cylance.com/digitally-signed-malware-targeting-gaming-companies>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

19 YAN, Sophia, "Chinese firm buys big stake in auction house Sotheby's", in: CNN Money, 28/7/2016, available at: <http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/28/news/china-insurer-sothebys-stake/index.html>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

20 VOGEL, Carol, BLUMENTHAL, Ralph, "Art Auction Houses Agree to Pay \$512 Million in Price-Fixing Case", in: *The New York Times*, 23/9/2000, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/23/business/art-auction-houses-agree-to-pay-512-million-in-price-fixing-case.html>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

discussions of valence issues”), and a “sharp” component that applies intense social pressure on foreigners related to issues like Taiwanese independence, Falun Gong, and criticism of the CCP.²¹ Some of Sotheby’s recent programming has a bit of a “cheerleading” quality to it, such as the *One Belt One Road Visual Exhibition* in 2016, which claims to “unite the voices of today’s women who trace their own heritage” back to regions included in China’s Eurasian development strategy.²²

Outdated, cartoonish notions of “propaganda” provide little more than false comfort. The propaganda operations of today’s state-owned enterprises and intelligence agencies may only be felt in soft flows of capital, or something more sharp, like a well-timed leak of art world emails.

Art Dream

Using a term from information security to describe art world activities is questionable: adopting a highly fetishized piece of jargon can lead to sloppy thinking and manufactured relevance. But there are certain characteristics of both art and hacking that shape their strange potential as a tool of the state. Both art and hacking are highly aspirational activities, with practitioners who seek to expand their practice while questioning its definition, who seek to transgress boundaries while struggling to find support for their work. Governments are uniquely resourced to provide a sense of purpose for hackers and artists anxious that their work might not have impact, or might be compromised by commercial pressures. The organization of an advanced persistent threat in the arts will be partially driven by an artistic imperative, the same imperative that has birthed arts movements across the centuries, around the world. The desire to work at a high level, in a small group, for a cause dear to your heart.

21 JOLER, Vladan, JOVANOVIĆ, Milica, PETROVSKI, Andrej, “Mapping and quantifying political information warfare”, in: *SHARE Lab*, 26/10/2016, available at: <https://labs.rs/en/mapping-and-quantifying-political-information-warfare/>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

22 *One Belt One Road Visual Arts Exhibition*, available at: <http://www.polyculture.us/event/mood-love-exhibition-featuring-chinese-canadian-female-artists/>. [Accessed 12/4/18]

Šum #9

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Koreografija postajati-truplo: kratka genealogija umirajočega telesa v računalniških igrach

Voranc Kumar

„Ali obstaja kakšna možnost, da dodate špricanje krvi in „rag-doll“ simulacije? Sprašujem zato, ker mislim, da bi to igri dodalo morbidni realizem¹ in pokončanje sovražnika naredilo bolj zadovoljivo. Kri bi se lahko poleg tega uporabilo tudi za to, da bi vedel, ali si zadel tistega, na kogar streljaš.² Kajti v CS: GO³ na primer ni nobenega znaka, da si koga zadel, razen curka krvi, ki se pojavi za njimi, ali strelnih ran na njihovem telesu.“⁴

(Intruative, 27. 12. 2014)

1 „Realno“, „realizem“, „realistično“ so označevalci, ki jim bomo sledili v neulovljivosti pomena, kot ga privzemajo v diskurzih o računalniških igrah.

2 Poudarki v kurzivi so pisčevi. Prav tako tudi v nadaljevanju.

3 CS: GO ni pretirano podobna igri SQUAD, o kateri je na forumu govora, a v širšem kontekstu spada v isti žanr.

4 Joinsquad, spletni forum, dostopno na: <http://forums.joinquad.com/topic/503-bloodgore-physics-ragdoll-effects/>. Prevod je pisčev. Vsi prevodi citatov v nadaljevanju, pri katerih ni naveden slovenski vir, so pisčevi.

„*Gore*‘ niti pod razno, špricanje krvi je nerealistično, mlake in sledi krvi so realistične, tako da bi jih lahko imeli, in *,ragdolls*“⁵ bodo 99 % v igri. *,Ragdolls*‘ so nekaj, kar večini iger ne uspe. Naredijo jih tako izpiljene, a v realnosti se telo večinoma zgolj sesede z lastno vztrajnostjo.“⁶

(Pootin, 27. 12. 2014)

„Jaz bi bil povsem zadovoljen brez *,gora*‘. Če že karkoli, potem bi raje videl oblake prahu, ki se vzdignejo z mesta, kjer je bil nekdo ustreljen. Bojišče je pač prašno. Ko naboj zadane oblačilo, z njega sune prah. Seveda je potem na njem nekaj krvi, vendar ima prah veliko hitrejšo in vidnejšo disperzijo.“

(Darman1138, 15. 10. 2014)

„Prah je bolj realističen od vidne krvi, sploh glede na to, da večina frakcij nosi zaščitne jopiče in čelade, in kri pravzaprav ne *,šprica*‘ iz vstopnih ran, ki jih povzročijo naboji majhnega kalibra, večinoma je mogoče videti zgolj megle.“

(Pootin, 16. 10. 2014)

Osrednji problem, ki motivira to in podobne debate o računalniških igrah, ki se uvrščajo v kategorijo „realističnih prvoosebnih strelskeh iger“ (ang. *realistic first person shooters*), je pogosto dilema o tem, kako naj bi umiralo telo v igri: kako naj bi se odzvalo na naboje tega ali onega kalibra, kako daleč naj bi poletelo, ko v njegovi bližini raznese granato, in na koliko delov naj bi ga ta raztrgala. Prav tako pomembno je seveda tudi to, koliko krvi naj bi telo izpustilo iz sebe in kolikšno površino zidu za tem telesom mora ta količina krvi obarvati. In debate se tukaj seveda ne ustavijo, temveč gredo še precej dlje, dokler ne dosežejo za zunanjega opazovalca nadvse trivialnih detajlov. Kot je mogoče opaziti zgoraj, problem ni zgolj kvantitativne narave (*koliko krvi in na koliko delov telesa*), temveč je predvsem kvalitativne narave (*kako distribuirati kri in dele telesa*). Problem je določiti pravo mero spektakla, ki ga mora telo med svojim preobražnjem v truplo „uprizoriti“. Tehnična in programska oprema, ki

5 Težko prevedljiv izraz „*ragdoll*“ označuje specifično metodo za fizikalno simulacijo telesnega gibanja, ki je posledica delovanja okolice, s katero telo prihaja v stik.

6 *JoinSquad*, spletni forum, dostopno na: <http://forums.joinSquad.com/topic/200-gore/>.

poganja sodobne računalniške igre, namreč še zdaleč ni edina, ki odloča o tem, kako „realistična“ je lahko smrt in posledično tudi sama igra.

Igralniški pogoni (ang. *engine*) že dolgo ponujajo fizikalne simulacije „teles-trupel“, torej teles na poti k temu, da postanejo *trupla*. Odlikujejo se po tem, da telo ob zadetku interpretirajo kot skupek telesnih delov, ki so med seboj povezani s sklepi, vezmi in mišičevjem ter imajo svojo maso, upornost, „odskočnost“ (ang. *bounciness*) itd. – namen vseh teh vrednosti in njihovih medsebojnih razmerij pa je kar najzvestejša simulacija referenta. Objekt oziroma referent, ki ga simulacija poskuša posnemati, torej veristično re-prezentirati za igralca, je „realno“ človeško telo, ki pa se vse prej kot jasen cilj kaže kot problem. „Realnost“ tega telesa, ki kot osrednji objekt usmerja razvoj realističnega igrальнega žanra, namreč ne premore vase zaprte zgodovine, temveč prej genealogijo, ki ji je mogoče slediti po disperznem polju vednosti, praks in izkustev. Tako tudi telo nikoli ni zgolj telo, temveč v sebi zmeraj že zajema serijo gibov, podob in akcij, ki se zvrstijo v tistih nekaj sekundah med *trenutkom* (1), ko izstrelek zadane *telo*, in *trenutkom* (2), ko telo nepremično obleži kot *truplo*.


Kratka zgodovina postajanja-truplo: od filma do

GoPro posnetka

Sorodnost računalniških iger in filmov je že dolgo znana tako teoretikom kot igralcem računalniških iger. To dejstvo lahko od nastanka YouTuba preveri vsakdo, in to enostavno tako, da si ogleda nekaj kompilacij, zmontiranih na to temo. Natančne primerjave, ki jih v knjigi *Teorija video iger*⁷ predstavi Alexander R. Galloway, so še toliko bolj zgovorne, a žal le malo prispevajo k reševanju zastavljenega problema. Gallowayeve in podobne analize se namreč večinoma osredotočajo le na primerjavo naračijskih struktur, tehnik kadriranja in oblikovanja likov v filmih ter njihovih ustreznikov v računalniških igrah, pri čemer pa vprašanje telesa puščajo ob strani. Tudi v tem oziru so računalniške igre v marsičem sorodne filmu.

7 GALLOWAY, Alexander R., *Teorija video iger*, Ljubljana: Maska, 2011.

Velike igralniške franšize so v začetku 21. stoletja znale izkoristiti priljubljenost filma, kar je *Medal of Honor* in *Call of Duty* izstrelilo med najodmevnejše naslove v zgodovini vojaških prvoosebnih strelskeh iger. Recept je bil precej enostaven: v igri podoživeti najslavnejše izseke „gejmerjem“ že tako ljubih filmov. Med številnimi filmskimi referencami v oči kar najbolj bijeta *Reševanje vojaka Ryana* (1998, Spielberg) in *Sovražnik pred vrati* (2001, Annaud), katerima sta se prej omenjeni igri jasno poklonili, saj ju v nekaterih delih posnemata do potankosti. In če bi morda pričakovali, da se bosta igri napajali pri patriotskih, „demokratično-svobodoljubnih“ in „pravičniških“ narativih filmov, kar vsekakor ni izvzeto, se bolj kot narativa poslužujeta predvsem filmskega imaginarija vojne, smrti in prikaza telesa. Otvoritveni prizor v igri *Medal of Honor: Frontline* nas na dan velikega izkrcaanja zavezniških sil popelje na plaže v Normandiji. Igralec se tako znajde pod dežjem nabojev in granat, obdan z umirajočimi telesi sotrpinov. Preden izpustijo svoj poslednji dih, se ranjeni krčevito zvijajo v bolečinah, granate v spektakularnih premetih telesa mečejo po zraku, čelade letijo z glav, ki jih sunki strojničnih krogel silovito suvajo vznak. V *Call of Duty I* lahko opazujemo telesa vojakov Rdeče armade, kako med naskokom okupiranega Stalingrada izvajajo kratke „koreografije“, preden dokončno podležejo nemškim strojnicam – pravzaprav je vse videti nekako tako kot v filmu *Sovražnik pred vrati*.



Na prelomu tisočletja so bile kratke koreografije umirajočih teles prav zares koreografski izdelki, pri katerih so sodelovali tako računalniški animatorji kot koreografi, plesalci in kaskaderji. Njihova metoda uprizarjanja umirajočih teles se ni bistveno razlikovala od dela filmskih koreografov in kaskaderjev. Če film zahteva posebno koreografsko pozornost na ravni posamičnega kadra,

računalniška igra zahteva posebno koreografijo za omejeno število *možnih situacij*: strel v levo ali desno roko ali nogo, glavo, trup itn. s tem ali onim kalibrom, morebiti granato ipd. Ko se v igri izpolnijo določeni pogoji, je v tek pognana ustrezna animacijska sekvenca, sestavljena iz različnih gibov, ki ne more biti prekinjena, pospešena ali upočasnjena, kar potencialno privede do precej komičnih in – v navzkrižju z imenom žanra – nadvse „nerealističnih“ situacij.

Tako rekoč sočasno s slavo naslovov *Medal of Honor*, *Call of Duty* ter ostalih iger podobnega tipa⁸ se pojavi nekoliko drugačen tip prvoosebnih strelskeh iger, z njimi pa tudi drugačen tip koreografije postajanja-truplo. Nasproti epskim koreografijam teles se pojavijo telesa, katerih smoter je „biti razstreljen na kose“. V *Soldier of Fortune II*,⁹ ki se že ob zagonu predstavi kot *realistična strelska igra*, je igralčeva naloga, da kot ameriški *badass* John Mullins svet reši pred sovjetskimi teroristi, med izvrševanjem svojega poslanstva pa na prafaktorje razstreli čim večje število hudobcev. Za tisti čas napredni pogon igralcu omogoča, da sovražniku, medtem ko ta izvaja svojo koreografijo postajanja-truplo, odstreli še kakšen ud. Za razliko od prej opisanega režima teles-trupel, ki po zaključku svoje koreografije nepremično obležijo ter s katerimi ni mogoča nobena nadaljnja interakcija, so telesa, ki so že postala *trupla*, v *Soldier of Fortune II* še naprej na voljo za mesarjenje. Trupla se na strele odzivajo tako, da se pustijo mesariti, če pa je igralec dovolj prizadeven, se lahko tudi razpočijo na nerazpoznavne dele. Telesa in njihovi deli frčijo po prostoru, upoštevaje vsaj osnovne zakone fizike, za kar je zasluzna t. i. ragdoll simulacija, ki je bila v času *Soldier of Fortune II* še dokaj nova metoda in zato v večini iger tistega časa še neuporabljena. V igrah *Medal of Honor* in *Call of Duty* se igralec na primer nahaja sredi velikih bitk in je zato obkrožen z veliko večjim številom teles, ki morajo med umiranjem izvajati svoje koreografije, zaradi česar bi bila implementacija ragdoll simulacij za računalniško opremo igralcev enostavno prezahtevna. Igra *Soldier of Fortune II* je bila s tega stališča najverjetneje primernejša, saj vsebuje manjše število teles, igralcu pa ponuja

8 Na tem mestu je treba omeniti vsaj še naslov *Brothers in Arms*.

9 Predhaja ji seveda *Soldier of Fortune I*, vendar je ta nekoliko prezgodnja za primerjavo, tudi mehanika igre še ne izrazi polnega potenciala.

precej skromnejšo kompleksnost terena. A kot bomo lahko videri, zmogljivost računalniške tehnologije ni zadosten vzrok, na podlagi katerega bi bilo mogoče brez *preostanka* razumeti razlike v opisanih koreografijah postajati-truplo. Takšen pristop bi namreč popolnoma ignoriral vlogo telesa ter s tem predpostavljal, da je pojem *realističnega* popolnoma transparenten in enoznačen.

Odstreljevanje udov in špricanje krvi po stenah je na prvi pogled nekaj, kar se za razliko od koreografij, kot jih poznamo iz filmov tipa *Reševanje vojaka Ryana*, bolj približa „realnemu“ telesu, torej objektu in cilju mimetičnega postopka. V igri *Soldier of Fortune II* se kot igralci prej kakor v mimetični računalniški krajini znajdemo v krvavih scenah iz akcijskega Hollywooda 80. in 90. let, ki sta ga zaznamovala Arnold Schwarzenegger in Sylvester Stallone. Če umirajoča telesa v opisanih igrah sploh kaj reprezentirajo ali če so del mimetičnega postopka – postopka, ki poskuša čim bolje oponašati „dejansko“ telo –, kar naj zaenkrat ostane še ista stvar, potem reprezentirajo kvečjemu *filmska telesa* in so potem takem povsem odvisna od narativa, v katerem se nahajajo. Na plažah Normandije se v imenu svobode ne umira enako, kot se umira v akcijskih scenah z mišičnjaki, ki rešujejo lepotice in pobijajo hudobce. Vendar pa premik „igralskega telesa“ k „filmskemu telesu“ žal ne zadošča, saj telo v igrah tako zgolj pretvorimo v reprezentacijo druge stopnje, problem pa prestavimo k reprezentaciji prve stopnje, torej k filmskemu telesu, za katerega se prav hitro izkaže, da napotuje naprej k novi reprezentacijski dvojici in tako dalje. Hitro bi lahko ugotovili, da se veriga reprezentacij zlepa ne zaključi in se lahko členi še veliko dlje, dokler ne postane praktično nesledljiva.

V zadnjih nekaj letih smo priča medijskemu pojivu, ki v imaginariju realizma ustvari novo koreografijo postajanja-truplo, temelji pa na zanimivi eksploraciji tehnološke novitete: gre za pojav GoPro kamere.¹⁰ Majhna kompaktna kamera, ki si jo je mogoče nadeti na telo – bodisi na trup ali glavo –, je povzročila pravo malo revolucijo na področju snemanja ekstremnih športov. Odkar prodrla na tržišče, si lahko tako

10 Omembne vreden je tudi razvoj zrcalnorefleksnih fotoaparatorov s funkcijo snemanja, saj je bilo z njimi še pred nastopom GoPro kamere mogoče povečati obtok vojnih podob. Ne gre zanemariti niti pomembnosti pametnih telefonov in njihove vezi s spletnimi platformami tipa FB, Twitter, Instagram itd., kjer cirkulirajo ogromne količine podob vojne.

rekoč vsepovsod ogledujemo subjektivne posnetke surfanja na valovih, smučanja po prej nepredstavljenih strminah, letenja z zmajem itd., poleg naštetega pa tudi posnetke vojaških spopadov na Bližnjem vzhodu in drugod po svetu. Vojna naj bi nam tako postala dostopna v svoji „pravi“, „surovi“ in „nepopačeni“ obliki. V njen imaginarij lahko vstopamo brez posredovanja velikih narativov, ki strukturirajo prej omenjene filme.

Če je bilo umirajoče telo za nekoga, ki ne živi na vojnem območju, še do nedavnega praktično nevidno, njegova podoba pa tako rekoč neznana, je sedaj postalo zlahka dostopno, saj njegove podobe srečujemo na vsakem koraku, tako v medijih kot pri samostojnih raziskovanjih po spletu. Tudi razvoj tehnologije, ki dovoljuje izdelavo iger z eksponentno naraščajočim številom *poligonov*,¹¹ visokoresolucijskimi teksturami, preciznimi fizikalnimi simulacijami in najrazličnejšimi vizualnimi in zvočnimi učinki, omogoča vse bolj minuciozno računalniško posnemanje vojnega imaginarija. Pri izdelavi računalniških iger potem takem ne bi več smela obstajati tako močna potreba po koreografih in animatorjih, saj lahko padanje, sesedanje, kotaljenje itn. teles z uporabo razvitih ragdoll simulacij ter ostalih sodobnih metod igre upodobijo kar same. Curki krvi tako lahko postanejo kompleksne simulacije delcev¹² in ne zgolj primitivni objekti cevastih oblik, sama telesa pa so vsaj z razdalje videti že tako kot tista na GoPro posnetkih. Če je bilo na začetku 21. stoletja zgodovinska bojišča treba prikazovati s pomočjo filmske prizme, saj so nam bila načeloma prav tako nedostopna kot popolnoma distopične filmske avanture, ustvarjalci iger od začetka ponovnega bojevanja na Bližnjem vzhodu in pojava GoPro kamer na trgu pridobijo hvaležnejši motiv.¹³ Imaginarij vojne, v katerega morajo umestiti igro, je na voljo in pri roki v doslej najbolj neokrnjeni obliki. GoPro posnetek je po svoji formi in formatu prvoosebnim igram bližji od izkustva, pričevanja ali solz, saj gre

¹¹ *Polygon* v izrazoslovju računalniške grafike označuje osnovno površinsko enoto, ki tvori 3D objekte v računalniških igrah, animacijah ter ostalih področjih uporabe računalniške grafike. Sestavljen je iz *robov* (ang. *edge*) in *točk* (ang. *vertex points*).

¹² T. i. *particle simulation* je ime za simulacijo gibanja velikega števila delcev, ki se jo uporablja tako za simuliranje dima ali pare kakor tudi za simulacijo tekočin, v našem primeru krvi.

¹³ Na tej točki je mogoče reči, da so se računalniške igre v določeni meri osamosvojile ter uspele ustvariti žanre, ki niso več zgolj posnemali filma, temveč postavljali samosvoja žanrska pravila. Igra in film tako nadaljujeta vsak svojo pot.

igram realističnega žanra za „realizem“ vojne, pri katerem pa *mora*, kar je bistveno, *realno* vojne vsekakor umanjkati.

Oblikanje vojnega imaginarija, ki je nastal na podlagi srečanja tehnologije in vojne na Bližnjem vzhodu, je snovalcem računalniških iger nedvomno postavil nove zahteve, pojmom „realističnega“ pa je z leti postajal vedno pomembnejši med potrošniki. Podjetja so se odzvala in velike franšize, kot so *Medal of Honor*, *Call of Duty* in *Battlefield*, so približno leta 2010¹⁴ pričele s prodajo iger, ki so se po dogajanju umeščale bodisi v zgodovinske okvire 1. in 2. zalivske vojne bodisi v njihove distopične ustreznike.¹⁵ Razvoj igralniških pogonov, kot sta *Euphoria* in *Havoc*, je s ponujanjem hitrih fizikalnih simulacij pospeševal tekmo znotraj realističnega žanra in debate o realističnem umiranju sovražnikov so med igralci računalniških iger postale prav tako pomembne kakor razprave o različnih narativih. Narativi iger so se z vsako novo izdajo bolj umikali v ozadje in hkrati postajali vse bolj generični. Tekom siromašenja narativov pa je naraščal pomen internetnega igranja v večigralskem (ang. *multiplayer*) načinu, pri katerem je narativ postal zgolj minimalni pogoj za vzpostavitev igre (obstajati morata dve nasprotujoči si strani z nekaj strateškimi točkami, ki jih morata zasesti itd.) in prav *nič več od tega*. Za večino igralcev je tako povsem vseeno, ali v igri pripadajo ruski, ameriški, afganistanski ali kateri drugi strani, saj je izbira strani pogosto bolj odvisna od tipa orožja, ki ga nosijo pripadniki te ali one vojske, kot pa od ideološko-političnega konteksta. Če se torej sam narativ igre vztrajno umika iz realističnega strelskega žanra, se pomembnost telesa veča – nanj se prestavlja zahteva, da obrani oznako „realističnega“.

V navezavi na količino posnetkov, ki prihajajo z bojišč po svetu, se vztrajno pojavlja vsaj eno vprašanje: ali ne bi moral takšen material prispevati k razvoju kompleksnejših narativov, manj črno-belih dispozitivov in predvsem odstraniti te avre heroizma ter imaginarij vojne izpostaviti praznini nesmisla, ki ga je na podlagi posnetkov tako rekoč nemogoče zanikati? Odgovor

¹⁴ Igre, ki svoje dogajanje postavljajo v kontekst sodobnih vojaških narativov, so se pričele pojavljati že veliko prej, a sta bili njihova razširjenost in slava veliko skromnejši. Poleg tega so franšize, kot sta *Conflict: Desert Storm* ter *SOCOM U.S. Navy SEALs*, tretjeosebne strelske igre in jih tudi zato ne bomo vključevali v naš izbor.

¹⁵ Sem lahko uvrščamo fiktivne narative, v katerih se spopadajo svetovne velesile: NATO z ZDA na čelu proti Rusiji ter Kitajski, kar naposled privede do 3. svetovne vojne.

mora biti vsaj v enem oziru pritrdilen. Upad moči narativa, da bi učinkovito strukturiral igralniško izkušnjo, premešča naracijske strukture na samo telo, s tem pa preobrača razmerje med narativom igre in koreografijo telesa. Na to kaže že ne dolgo trajajoče vztrajanje igralniških studiev pri produkciji iger s sodobnim globalnim kontekstom ter njihovo zatekanje k futurističnim distopijam, medplanetarnim vojnam, jedrskim apokalipsam in spopadom kibervojakov iz bolj ali manj oddaljene prihodnosti. Medtem se v diskurzih, ki v igrah obdajajo telo, prične pojavljati tako rekoč scenarističen oz. filmski žargon:¹⁶

Physics¹⁷ je bil pogled programerja igralniške fizike in ne pogled pripovedovalca zgodb [ang. storyteller]. Havok pa si prizadeva v proces vključiti pripovedovalce ...

„Ragdoll“ morajo v nas vzbuditi empatijo; ko z njimi združiš res dobro izdelane animacije ali „zajeto gibanje“ [ang. motion capture], dosežeš neverjetne rezultate. Zgodnje Havokovo delo z „ragdoll“ je vsebovalo veliko ostrostrelskega streljanja sovražnikov - res, res silovite stvari.¹⁸

Pomenljiva je tudi izjava samega „programerja igralniške fizike“ (ang. *physics programmer*):

Za igre in interaktivno rabo na splošno natančnost ni primaren cilj (čeprav ta nikakor ne škodi), temveč je pri tem pomembnejši cilj prepričljivost [ang. believability] (programer lahko goljufa, kolikor se mu zahoče, dokler se lahko igralec vživi [ang. immersed] v igro ...) ¹⁹

Od telesa v igri se potem takem pričakuje, da bo pripovedovalo zgodbe – in s tem vzpostavilo lastno naracijo, to pa lahko najbolje naredi prav v procesu *postajanja-truplo*, torej v svojem ekskluzivnem narativu. Temu pripada tudi njegova lastna

16 Gre za izjave Hughha Reynoldsa, soustanovitelja podjetja Havoc, ki se ukvarja z razvojem sodobnih fizikalnih simulacij za računalniške igre.

17 *Physics* je utečen izraz, ki označuje celotno področje fizikalnih simulacij v računalniških igrah.

18 *Interview s Hughom Reynoldsom*, dostopno na: <https://www.dfry.com.au/2016/04/28/interview-with-hugh-reynolds-havok-co-founder/>.

19 JAKOBSEN, Thomas, *Advanced Character Physics*, dostopno na: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/academic/class/15462-s13/www/lec_slides/Jakobsen.pdf.

struktura, ki ureja obeležje umirajočega telesa. Ne gre več za uprizarjanje smrti, kot ga pozna film ali še bolj tradicionalen medij, kot je gledališče, temveč bolj za produkcijo telesu lastnega režima znakov.


Pisava smrti – obeležje umirajočega telesa

V strelskih igrah da telo igralcu vedeti, kaj se mu je dogodilo („*Kri bi se lahko poleg tega uporabilo tudi za to, da bi vedel, ali si zadel tistega, na kogar streljaš.*“), pri tem pa je nadvse pomembno, da upošteva načela tega, kar nosi ime *realistično* („*špricanje krvi je nerealistično*“). Pravilnega razmerja med znaki, ki obdajajo telo (kri, oblački dima, leteči udi, stokanje), pa ni mogoče najti zgolj z uporabo tehnoloških novitet. Tako rekoč vsak sodoben igralniški pogon omogoča ragdoll simulacije, a te ponujajo preveč in s tem zgrešijo načelo *realizma*: „*Naredijo jih tako izpiljene, a v realnosti se telo večinoma zgolj sesede.*“ Kar je torej *realistično* telesa, postane rezultat natančne eksegeze, pri čemer nam sama „narava“ s svojimi fizikalnimi zakoni ne more kaj prida pomagati, ponudi nam lahko kvečjemu orodja, ki so nam lahko v pomoč: „*natančnost ni primaren cilj*“. Le malo po tem, ko smo odslovili koreografe telesa, torej animatorje in plesalce, jih moramo znova poklicati na pomoč, a tokrat ne zato, ker bi nam bili strogi zakoni fizike nedosegljivi in bi bilo treba najdi drugo pot, temveč zato, ker je treba telo pravilno interpretirati, prepoznati njegove najjasnejše znake, obenem pa upoštevati njihovo skladnost z *načelom realističnega*.

Telesa v igrah srečujemo le zato, da bi jih preobrazili v trupla, ali, nasprotno, to preobrazbo preprečili. V obeh primerih so telesa potencialno že trupla in ta potencialnost predstavlja pogoj našega razmerja z njimi. Tako, ko sovražnika uzremo, nanj tudi že streljamo, s čimer si prizadevamo, da bi ga pokončali – zajetje talcev namreč ne pride v poštev,²⁰ zato s streljanjem seveda tudi ne prenehamo, dokler nismo prepričani, da je sovražnik mrtev. V kolikor sovražnika ne uspemo pokončati, smo med neuspelim poskusom ubiti sami in tako postane truplo telo, ki v igri pripada nam, torej igralcu igre. Telo vso svojo

20 Vsaj med najpopularnejšimi strelskimi igrami je težko, če ne celo nemogoče najti takšno, ki bi dopuščala zajemanje talcev in nadaljnje ukvarjanje z njimi.

telesnost realizira tako, da postane truplo, na kar kaže prav pozornost, ki jo razvijalci in igralci računalniških iger posvečajo umiranju teles. Njihove hvale so deležne igre, ki jim koreografijo umiranja uspe pravilno *odmeriti*: potrebna je *prava mera*, torej pravilno trajanje umiranja, ravno pravšnje razmerje med aktivnostjo gibov (izrazom življenja) in odsotnostjo akcije (umirajoče telo ni zmožno vrniti strela). *Onemogočeno stanje* (ang. *disabled state*) je izraz, ki označuje to vmesno periodo med življenjem in smrtjo telesa, torej tisto idealno stanje, kjer lahko telo zasije v vsej svoji telesnosti. Življenje telesa je v igri, katere smoter je telo ubiti, zavezano smrti in zato ne preseneča, da se življenje telesa najbolje izraža prav ob nastopu smrti.



Če je smoter telesa v igri postati truplo, potem se lahko to telo z majhno permutacijo preobrazi v živo truplo. Franšiza *Call of Duty* v nekatere od svojih iger vključuje posebne igralne načine (ang. *game modes*), v katerih se mora igralec spopasti s hordo zomboidnih stvorov. Ti pogosto nosijo enaka oblačila kakor sovražniki, ki jih je mogoče srečati v drugih igralnih načinih (npr. v *singleplayer campaign*), le da s svojim gibanjem in nekaterimi grafičnimi dodatki kažejo na to, da so že umrli in jih je zato treba ponovno ubiti. Gibanje živih mrtvecev je pogosto počasno ter nerodno – ker so že trupla, svojega gibanja tudi med postajanjem-truplo bistveno ne spremenijo. Bližina telesa in trupla je pač prevelika in čeprav se streljanje zombijev nikakor ne umešča v narativ igre, naj bo ta še tako generičen in neiz-

viren, je živo-mrtvemu telesu – telesu živega mrtveca – dodeljen prostor, ki ga zapolnjuje v obliki *presežne smrti*.

Narativ telesa je tako narativ njegove lastne smrti. O njej pripoveduje obeležje znakov, ki obdajajo telo, vendar za dosego realizma ne zadoščata več ne eksplicitnost giba ne goli zapis²¹ na ekranu. Znaki morajo pripadati telesu samemu, izhajati morajo iz njemu lastne strukture, pri tem pa vedno obstaja nevarnost, da bodo bodisi preveč diskretni in zato nerazpoznavni bodisi pretirani, kar ima lahko celo komičen učinek. Telo, ki nam o svoji smrti ne da vedeti dovolj, je prikrajšano telesnosti, saj se slednja izpolni prav s koreografijo postajanja-truplo. Telo, ki o svoji smrti pove *preveč*, pa že sodi v kategorijo živega trupla – zomboidnega telesa. Smrt se sama namreč ne kaže – nima neposredne prisotnosti. Svojo prisotnost najavlja zgolj z znaki, izpisanimi na telesu, ki ji je prepuščeno, vendar lahko telo producira znake le, dokler je še telo in še ni truplo. Njihovo iskanje zato lahko poteka le na mejnem intervalu med enim in drugim – telesom in truplom.

Eksegeza znakov smrti se vztrajno izvaja na vsem dostopnem materialu. V razpravah o tem ali onem učinku se snovalci in igralci iger redno zatekajo k raznovrstnim zgledom: filmom, ki se po njihovem mnenju odlikujejo po realističnem uprizarjanju podleganja teles tem ali onim poškodbam, reportažnim posnetkom ter fotografijam z bojišč po svetu, pričevanjem vojnih veteranov in bolničarjev itd. Med vsem tem materialom pa največjo pozornost pritegnejo že omenjeni subjektivni posnetki, ki jih z GoPro (in njim podobnimi) kamerami posnamejo vojaki sami. Subjektivni pogled prekoračuje distanco med snemalcem in strelcem, s tem pa strelca iz objekta pogleda spremeni v nosilca pogleda. V subjektivnem posnetku lahko znake umirajočega telesa (telesa, ki ga je pokončalo strelčeve orožje, in sicer tako, da je v trenutku strela vidno v kadru) prepoznamo s strelčeve perspektive in tako ocenimo, katere ta opazi in katerih ne. Iz tega razloga so subjektivni posnetki bojev za snovalce in igralce tako rekoč merilo „realističnosti“ sodobnih strelskeih iger, še po-

21 Spomnimo se kritik pretiranih uprizoritev umiranja z začetka tega članka, ki naj zaradi tega ne bi bile dovolj *realistične*. Mnoge igre z zapisom na zaslonu igralcem sporočajo, da so ubili sovražnika, kar je v igrah, ki si prizadevajo biti realistične, vse pogosteje opuščeno.

sebej tistih, ki se umeščajo v njihov imaginarij.²² Glede njih naj ne bi bilo treba spekulirati o tem, kaj je strelcu vidno in kaj ne, saj je umirajoče telo že pred nami. V subjektivnem posnetku ga namreč obdaja obeležje znakov, ki pričajo o njegovi smrti.

Kombinacija vojn na Bližnjem vzhodu in GoPro kamere bi morala potem takem proizvesti nekakšen *superrealističen* žanr strelskega iger, katerih naloga bi tičala v natančnem mimetičnem postopku: zgolj posnemati tisto, kar je že vidno na posnetkih. A zadeva se zaplete, saj so telesa na posnetkih preveč zadržana – od sebe namreč ne dajo prav veliko in le pozorno oko lahko najde zanke, ki si jih prizadeva najti. Realnost sama, torej objekt mimetičnega postopka, se skriva, zavaja in podaja precej dvoumne zanke. Posnetki vojne iz subjektivne perspektive po spletu pogosto krožijo v montažah, ki so po svoji strukturi in vsebini zelo podobne montažam posnetkov prvoosebnih strelskega iger,²³ katerih vsebina prikazuje serijo t. i. *killov*, ki odražajo to ali ono spremnost igralca. Kakor v montažah posnetkov iger se tudi v montažah posnetkov vojne slika pogosto upočasni ali ustavi, da bi gledalec bolje videl majhen curek krvi ali nekaj drobnih oblačkov prahu kot znak, da je bilo telo na posnetku zadeoto. Znaki, ki jih ob prejetem strelu oddajajo telesa, so zaradi svoje neopaznosti pogosto obkroženi, včasih pa pozornost k njim usmerjajo celo narisane puščice. Sramežljivost smrti, saj njene prisotnosti ne moremo neposredno zaznati, je poglobljena s sramežljivostjo njenih znakov, zato ponoven vpoklic animatorjev in njihovih *goljufij* ni krpanje pomanjkljivih zmožnosti razbiranja znakov, temveč *nezmožnost same realnosti*, da bi zanke adekvatno proizvedla. Izpopolnjevanje fizikalnih simulacij in ragdollov nas tako morda res lahko približa realnosti umirajočega telesa, a kaj, ko je ta tako skopa in nezadostna. Smrt ni mračna zgolj zaradi mraka, ki pade na oči umrlega, temveč je mračna predvsem za oči tistega, ki želi razbrati njene zanke. Če ta „bralec znakov“ njihovo pojavitev zamudi ali če jih zavoljo nepozornega očesa spregleda, ne more razbrati niti smrti in jo tako zlahka zamenja za spanec.

22 Nekaj primerov: *SQUAD*, *Insurgency*, *Arma3*.

23 Montaže so večinoma naslovljene z generičnimi naslovi tipa: (ime igre) best kills/ top kills, kill compilation itd.


Zdaj je bila ljubka in preprosta, njen obraz pa mil in mlad. Zaradi napudranih lic in rdečila na ustnicah se je zdelo, da je živa in da rahlo spi.

/.../ Podrgnil si je gladko zapestje in ščetinasto brado. „Nisem vedu, da ste tu,“ je rekel Curleyevi ženi.

Ker ni odgovorila, je stopil bližje. „Ni prav, da spite tu,“ je neodobravajoče rekel /.../²⁴

*Mislili smo, da umira, ko je spala,
In da spi, ko je umrla.²⁵*

Razbiranje znakov smrti je problem, ki ni vezan zgolj na kvaliteto medija kot posrednika in distance, vznikajoče med pogledom in njegovim objektom – ni zgolj stvar boljše ali slabše vidljivosti. Distanca je vselej že tu, na kar kaže obsedenost z znaki smrti v času rojstva tega, kar poznamo pod imenom „moderna medicina“ in kar nas vrača k enemu izmed vznikov telesa, ki je zaznamovalo moderno izkušnjo telesnosti. Prehod iz 18. v 19. stoletje poleg rojstva *kliničnega pogleda*, kateremu se je pridružila anatomska patologija, zaznamuje tudi obsedenost s strahom živega pokopa, ki je vzpostavljal strašljivo bližino življenja in smrti.



Zdravniki so imeli v 19. stoletju tako rekoč več dela s prepoznavanjem znakov smrti kot z zdravljenjem bolezni in ohranja-

²⁴ STEINBECK, John, *O miših in ljudeh*, Maribor: Mariborska literarna družba, 2007, str. 89. Steinbeck v romanu smrt portretira v vsej njeni pojavnici sramežljivosti, medtem ko se njena prisotnost najavlja skozi celoten roman.

²⁵ BONDESON, Jan, *Buried Alive*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2001, str. 137. Vez za sta vzeta iz pesmi Thomasa Hooda z naslovom The Death Bed, s katero Jan Bonde son pričenja poglavje The Signs od Death.

njem življenja. Smrt je bila najbolj strašljiva takrat, ko ni bila potrjena, kajti v primeru slabe diagnoze je pokojnemu, ki to mora še ni bil, grozilo, da bo živ pokopan. Skrivnost smrti je lahko razodelo le telo samo in zanke, s katerimi je razpolagal zdravnik pri podajanju sodbe, je bilo treba izzvati, jih stimulirati in opogumljati z različnimi metodami in pripomočki. Pri tem se je rojstvo znanosti pokazalo v vsej svoji diskontinuiteti: telesa/trupla so bila podvržena žganju in rezanju prstov, prebadanju mišic z igلامi, vpihanjanju tobačnega dima skozi anus v debelo črevo, elektriziranju, sunkovitemu natezovanju jezika, polivanju s kislinami ali vrelo vodo itd. Vse naštete tehnike so izvajali zato, da bi telo pokazalo zanke življenja, medtem ko je njihova odsotnost veljala za znak smrti.²⁶

Ker je površina telesa o smrti vselej povedala premalo, jo je lahko zanesljivo potrdila šele obdukcija, a kaj, ko je ta v nekaterih primerih tragično pokončala pokojnega, ki pred njo očitno še ni bil pokojen. Da bi razrešili ta pereč problem, so v Franciji v 19. stoletju trikrat razpisali veliko nagrado za tistega, ki bi našel nedvoumen in nezmotljiv znak smrti. Prva nagrada je bila podeljena leta 1839; prejel jo je fiziolog Eugene Bouchut, ki je s pomočjo relativno novega izuma, stetoskopa, za zanesljiv znak smrti opredelil umanjkanje bitja srca za dve minuti. Čeprav se današnjemu času metoda, ki vključuje preverjanje srčnega utripa, zdi povsem smiselna, v medicinski stroki še dolgo ni bila splošno sprejeta. Takratna znanstvena epistemologija namreč ni dopuščala, da bi zanesljiv znak smrti lahko proizvedel zgolj en sam organ:

*O tem, da bi obstajal zgolj en sam znak smrti, ki bi bil bolj zanesljiv od vseh ostalih, ni bilo govora; opraviti je bilo potrebno celotno serijo preizkusov življenja in smrti, da bi prepoznali delovanje posamičnih organov.*²⁷

26 Številne tehnike in pristopi pa niso pomirili ne strokovne ne laične javnosti, saj so bili znaki življenja in smrti navkljub vsem naporom medicine sila težko prepoznavni in nezanesljivi. V Nemčiji so se zato skozi skorajda celotno 19. stoletje ohranile t. i. mrtvaške vežice, kjer so truplo pustili čakati, dokler ni pričelo kazati znakov gnitja. Zaradi nepoznavanja bolj učinkovitih, predvsem pa hitrejših in manj nagnusnih metod prepoznavanja znakov smrti je gnitje veljalo za najzanesljivejši znak, mrtvaške vežice pa za najučinkovitejšo metodo.

27 BONDESON, *Buried Alive*, str. 144.

Znaki smrti morajo biti *jasni in razločni*, kajti zmeraj obstaja nevarnost, da truplo ohrani še dovolj življenja, da z njim proizvede še kakšen znak.²⁸ Jasnost in razločnost pa sta zaznavni kategoriji pogleda. Znaki so se morali zato jasno in razločno izpostaviti zdravnikovemu pogledu, ki je bil usmerjen v temo telesnih globin (krvavitve npr. pričajo o krvavitvah srca, trzljaji telesa o poškodbah živčnega sistema), vidno so morali narediti to, kar je pri živem telesu pogledu nevidno. A to, kar z metodo oz. tehniko postane vidno opazovalcu (npr. poškodba srca), ni sama *smrt*, temveč zgolj njen „najpristnejši“ *znak*. Zato je potreben *instrument* – stetoskop, in sicer kot opredmetenje neodpravljive *distance*, prvič, med pogledom in znakom ter, drugič, med znakom in smrtjo. Opraviti imamo torej z dvojnim označevalnim parom: prvim, ki napotuje k znaku smrti, in drugim, ki napotuje k smrti sami. A opazimo lahko, da tisto, kar instrument odkrije kot znak smrti, pravzaprav ni znak smrti telesa, temveč znak njegovega življenja. Kako je torej mogoče, da se medicinski diskurz 19. stoletja tako dolgo osredotoča na znake smrti, če si pri tem pravzaprav prizadeva locirati znaake življenja? Zdravnik je ob pregledu telesa-trupla resda iskal znaake življenja, a le kot negacijo smrti. Ker se smrt sama ne kaže, ker nima pozitivnih predikatov, ker je sama pravzaprav zgolj odsotnost znakov življenja, potrebuje telo kot *prostor* – distanco oz. medij, v katerem so njeni znaki berljivi (berljivi seveda kot hrbtna stran odsotnosti znakov življenja). Telo samo tako uprostori immanentno distanco znaka in utelesi njegovo napotilnost.

Smrt, ki je *odsotna*, potrebuje telo, da v njem razprostre svoje znaake; v njem uprostori svojo *pisavo*. Obeležje telesa, posejano z znaki smrti, je tako *pisava* njene odsotne prisotnosti. Če želimo v to strukturo umestiti izmikajoči se pojem „realističnega“ kot izhodišče in načelo mimetičnega postopka računalniških iger, torej nečesa, h čemur igre s to oznako težijo, ga moramo umestiti na mesto njegovega lastnega *primanjkljaja*. Ker smo ugotovili, da je privilegirani objekt *realističnega* žanra prav smrt, ta pa *dopolnilo* svoje odsotnosti najde v prostoru, ki ga razprostira telo, mora *realistično* telesa tako poprisotiti kot tudi radikalno potla-

²⁸ Predvsem prebavni trakt je stroki povzročal precej preglavic, saj je kazal znaake življenja še nekoliko po tem, ko so vsi preostali znaki že izginili.

čiti smrt. Smrti kot objekta namreč ni mogoče zajeti v celoti, kajti „znak je vselej dopolnilo reči.“²⁹

*Dopolnilo nima samo moči, da preko podobe priskrbi neko od-sotno prisotnost: ko nam jo priskrbi s tem, da nam priskrbi znak, jo ohranja na distanci in jo obvladuje. Kajti ta prisotnost je hkra-ti želena in strašljiva.*³⁰

V realističnih strelskih igrah je smrt minutiozno upodobljena z natančno organizacijo znakov, obenem pa tudi abstrahirana do stopnje, ko postane gola *vrednost*. V eni izmed najstarejših oblik *večigralskega* načina igranja, ki se imenuje *team deathmatch* (ali zgolj *deathmatch*, pri katerem igralci niso vključeni v skupine), je smrt vključena v določen sistem točkovanja, tako da morajo igralci ene ekipe povzročiti čim večje število smrti igralcev nasprotujoče ekipe – torej večje število smrti od števila smrti, ki jih nasprotujoča ekipa povzroči njihovi. Smrti se beležijo v razpredelnici, ki prikazuje število povzročenih smrti vsakega igralca posamično ter skupni seštevek ekip. Kar se pri eni ekipi kaže kot povzročena smrt, se pri drugi beleži kot „prejeta“ smrt, zato se v igrальнem žargonu izurjenost igralca ponazarja z dobri razmerjem med povzročenimi in prejetimi smrtmi (ang. *kill/death ratio*). V tem primeru smrt figurira zgolj kot točka (ang. *point*), s katero se meri uspešnost bojujočih se ekip, a kot bomo videli, lahko smrt v računalniških strelskih igrah postane tudi stvar posebne, kompleksnejše „ekonomije“.

Sodobnejše igre, ki s svojimi pravili poskušajo odražati realnost vojne, razvijajo bolj napredne in kompleksne sisteme vrednotenja. Igra *SQUAD* skuša ponazoriti bojevanje večjega števila vojakov (50 na 50) na velikih bojnih površinah (nekaj kvadratnih kilometrov, kar bistveno presega bojno površino zgodnjih iger v večigralskem načinu) in vsebuje sistem vrednotenja, v katerem se poleg same smrti vrednotijo še številna druga bojna sredstva, od vozil do logističnih točk. Celota bojne moči posamezne bojujoče ekipe je ponazorjena s številom listkov

29 Telo privzame strukturo *dopolnila* takrat, ko „se nekaj ne more zapolniti *samo s seboj* in se dovrši zgolj s tem, da se pusti zapolniti z znakom in *pro cura*. Znak je vselej dopolnilo reči.“ (DERRIDA, Jacques, *O gramatologiji*, Ljubljana: Društvo za teoretsko psihoanalizo, 1998, str. 179)

30 Ibid., str. 192.

(ang. *tickets*),³¹ ki se ekipi odštejejo za vsako smrt igralcev ali uničenje bojnih vozil in logističnih točk, ekipa pa je poražena, ko potroši vse listke. (ang. *FOB - forward operating base*). Listki tako funkcirajo kot *splošni ekvivalent*³² vsem posamičnim bojnim sredstvom, katerih vsota predstavlja celotno bojno moč ekipe. Igralci morajo zaradi komenzurabilnosti bojnih sredstev taktično premisliti, kako v danem trenutku najbolje porabiti listke svoje ekipe, saj lahko za vrednost npr. enega tovornjaka, ki bo v boju skoraj zagotovo uničen, tvegajo dve terenski vozili ali pa gredo enostavno peš in listke prihranijo za lastne smrti.

<i>Bojna sredstva (ob njihovi izgubi)</i>	<i>listki</i>
smrt igralca	1
kontrolna točka	14, 16, 20, 26
<i>Forward operating base (FOB)</i> ³³	20
<i>M939 – Tovornjak</i>	8
<i>TECHNICAL – oboroženo terensko</i>	4
<i>BTR-80 APC – oklepno vozilo vozilo</i>	30

Kljub temu da je vrednost smrti izražena z enim listkom,³⁴ pa listek ni enostavno sinonim za smrt, saj bi tako prišlo do tavologije, kjer bi smrt izražala svojo vrednost v sami sebi. Smrt je zato zgolj bojno sredstvo in posamična oblika celotne bojne

31 Prevod angleškega izraza *ticket* je dokaj težaven, saj ponuja več smiselnih prevodov. Lahko ga prevajamo kot vstopnica oz. vozovnica, saj igralcu omogoči, da se iz t. i. *death screena*, ki se pojavi na njegovem zaslonu po tem, ko je bil njegov avatar ubit, „vrne“ med žive. Death screen ima še to prikladno lastnost, da igralčev pogled pozicionira nekoliko nad dogajanje, tako da si izraz ticket zlahka razlagamo kot *vozovnico* nazaj na igralno površino ali kot *vstopnico* nazaj v življenje. Drugi možen prevod izraza ticket pa je *listek*, na katerem je lahko zapisana cena blaga ali celo višina globe. V nadaljevanju bo v uporabi prevod *listek*, saj se bistveno bolje umešča v ekonomijo igre.

32 Splošni ekvivalent, kot ga v 1. knjigi *Kapitala* (Ljubljana, 1961) razdela Marx.

33 Izraz naj ostane nepreveden, saj prevod ne bi pripomogel k njegovemu razumevanju. *FOB* predstavlja začasno oporišče, kjer se lahko umrli igralci ponovno „utelesijo“.

34 Vsekakor ni zanemarljivo dejstvo, da je smrt *najcenejša* in da se ne izrabi, vse dokler ima ekipa še kaj preostalih listkov, medtem ko je število vozil omejeno (vsaj razpoložljiva vozila so ob pričetku igre v glavnem/izhodiščnem oporišču).

moči ekipe in prav zato komenzurabilna z ostalimi bojnimi sredstvi, kot so vozila in logistične točke.

Ko po umanjkanju pomembnosti narativa v strelskih igrah naracija postane nekaj, kar v obliki pisave smrti pripada telesu kot izrazu njegove telesnosti, računalniškim igram preostane le to, da postanejo *igre* s tem, ko v vse večji kompleksnosti razvijajo pravila lastne ekonomije. V dvojnosti znaka in *igre* (oz. igre, ki jo izvaja igra) pa se pokaže tudi dvojnost smrti, ki je na eni strani prisotna zgolj v svoji odsotnosti kot nekaj reprezentiranega, na drugi pa kot vrednost v okviru igri lastne ekonomije. Njena pisava, ki jo uteleša umirajoče telo, posejano z znaki, kot dopolnilo smrt ohranja v *prisotni-odsotnosti*, kjer ostaja na „varni razdalji“ v obliki vrednosti, ki smrt popolnoma očisti nje same, tako da jo zvede na bojno sredstvo, zamenljivo s tovornjakom.

Pisava telesa – izginjanje *heads-up* zaslona

Doslej smo se posvečali predvsem telesom, ki v igri ne pripadajo nam samim, temveč drugim igralcem, a njihova smrt se bistveno razlikuje od smrti našega avatarja – lastnega telesa, katerega pogled privzamemo kot igralci. Za razliko od tega, ki pripada nam, so druga telesa prisotna in lahko zato na svoji površini manifestirajo značne nevidne smrti. V prvoosebni igri pa nam lastno telo ni prisotno, saj je odsotnost telesa ne nazadnje pogoj prvoosebnega³⁵ pogleda.³⁶ Ker je telo za ceno pogleda tako izgubljeno, mora biti v pogledu z nečim nadomeščeno. Prvoosebne igre so telesa dolgo (nekatero to počnejo še naprej) nadomeščale z uporabo različnih grafičnih schem, imenovanih *heads-up* zaslon (ang. *heads-up display*), na katerih je mogoče razbirati kvantiteto življenja (ang. *health*), izčrpavost/utrujenost (ang. *fatigue*) in smer, od koder je v naše telo priletel naboj. Poleg opisa telesnega stanja zapisi na zaslonu

35 V terminologiji računalniških iger se običajno ne razlikuje med prvoosebnim in subjektivnim pogledom, kakor ta dva tipa pogleda razlikuje Alexander Galloway. Sami se bomo kasneje opirali na to razliko, saj je ključnega pomena. Prav tako velja opomniti na manjše terminološke razlike, do katerih bo v nadaljevanju prišlo: medtem ko Galloway uporablja izraz subjektivna *perspektiva*, bomo mi uporabljali izraz subjektivni *pogled* in tako ustvarili hibridni termin, ki bo najbolj služil našemu namenu.

36 Igre so klasificirane tudi glede na specifiko pogleda: prvoosebne ali tretjeosebne ipd.

igralcu pogosto poročajo tudi o številu nabojev, ki so še na razpolago v okviru, o količini in tipu vseh ostalih pripomočkov/orožij, ki jih nosi s sabo, o nalogah, ki jih mora igralec opraviti, statusu njegovega napredka v igri itd. Čeprav so med razvojem igre tudi ti zapisi podvrženi spremembam, se nanje ne bomo osredotočali v tolikšni meri kot na tiste grafizme, ki nadomeščajo telo.

Načelo realističnega, po katerem se premeščajo in modificirajo znaki smrti, poganja tudi specifičen režim znakov igralčevega odsotnega telesa. Tako kot morajo znaki smrti pripadati telesu, ki postaja truplo, mora biti tudi telesnost telesa, ki je v prvoosebni igri odsotno, poprisotena z znaki, ki so kar najbolj „telesni“. Grafične sheme v obliki stolpcov in zapisov, ki kažejo „kvantiteto“ življenja ali izčrpanost telesa, zato ne zadoščajo več, saj postanejo preveč tuji telesu. Zamenjati jih morajo znaki, ki naznanjajo prisotnost odsotnega telesa že po svoji podobi in ne zgolj po pomenu. Kvantiteta življenja je zato bolje kot s stolpcem ali zapisom odstotkov prikazana z *rdečasto vinjeto*, ki takrat, ko je igralčeve telo v igri ranjeno, obdaja njegov pogled. Nadalje telesno izčrpanost sporočajo zvoki dihanja, ranjnost kapljice krvi na zaslonu, izguba barv in zatemnitev pogleda pa nastop adrenalinskega šoka. *Heads-up* zaslon, ki sestoji iz prikazov za igralca pomembnih informacij o stanju njegovega telesa, je v tem tipu strelskeih računalniških iger postajal čedalje skromnejši, v nekaterih ighrah pa je tako rekoč izginil. Njegovo funkcijo je v skladu z imperativom realističnega v igri moralo prevzeti samo telo, ker pa je le-to odsotno, mora svoja stanja sporočati s specifičnim režimom telesnih znakov, ki zadenejo igralčev pogled.

Telo je nekaj, s čimer imamo v ighrah opraviti zgolj v formi *ovire*. Zdravo telo je v igri nemo telo, ki spregovori šele takrat, ko skozenj spregovori smrt – takrat, ko ga moči zapuščajo in se ji prične približevati. Znaki telesa so zato zmeraj znaki njegovih slabosti, poškodb, krvavitev, ki igralca s telesnim stanjem seznanjajo tako, da ga ovirajo pri igranju: rdeče vinjetiranje zožuje pogled, potemnитеv poslabša vid, izčrpanost upočasni korak. Distanca telesa oziroma njegova oddaljenost od evidence uma ali pogleda ni zgolj posledica faktičnega razcepja med igralcem in njegovim nevidnim telesom v igri, ki ga mora telo preseči z znaki lastnega umiranja, temveč miselni dispozitiv, v

katerega je človek vpisan kot objekt vednosti. *Upornemu telesu*³⁷ lahko namreč v zgodovini idej sledimo vsaj do Aristotela, kar najjasneje pa se izrazi v novoveških meditacijah Descartesa in Malebrancha, kjer je telo v imenu luči uma podrejeno in manj-vredno ter nastopa kot tista substanca, ki nasprotno od uma zatemnjuje spoznanje – denimo s „hlapi iz črnega žolča“³⁸ – in je prej bližje norosti kot resnici. Bivati v telesu za Malebrancha pomeni biti „tujec v lastni državi“,³⁹ biti kot umno bitje, „oteženo s telesom“,⁴⁰ saj telo v um vnaša napačne ter zmedene čutne predstave.



Za Malebranchev okazionalizem je značilno, da v sebi združuje za nas prikladen paradoks, s katerim je zaznamovano novoveško telo in ki ga tudi moderna ne uspe odpraviti. Malebranchevska duša – umna substanca – je namreč preko okazionalnih vzrokov⁴¹ s telesom združena tako, da telo, ki ji je popolnoma zunanje in s katerim brez božjega posredovanja ne vzdržuje nikakršne vzročne povezave, doživlja kot svoje lastno telo, od katerega je popolnoma odvisna in z njim vzajemno

37 Malebranche sintagmo v nekoliko drugačni obliki – *la rébellion du corps*, upor telesa – uporabi na več mestih, med drugim v *Dialogih o metafiziki in religiji*. Miran Božovič s to sintagmo naslovil enega od poglavij svoje knjige *Telo v novoveški filozofiji*.

38 DESCARTES, René, *Meditacije*, Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 2004, str. 50.

39 MALEBRANCHE, Nicolas, *Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion*, dostopno na: <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/>, str. 1.

40 Ibid., str. 11.

41 Izvajanje okazionalnih vzrokov v Malebranchevem univerzumu zagotavljajo sami božji zakoni.

vzročno povezana. Duša, ki je zaznamovana z izvornim gremom, torej duša, ki ji je bil odvzet Adamov privilegij,⁴² telesa ne dojema kot od sebe ločene substance, temveč kot edino substanco smrtnega bitja in je zato tudi prepričana, da lahko na telo vzročno deluje tako, da z voljo premika ude, kakor tudi da lahko telo vzročno deluje nanjo s tem, da v duši sproža telesne občutke bolečine, lakote, žeje ipd. V Malebranchevem okazionalizmu je bog človeka kaznoval tako, da mu je odvzel vpogled v delovanje božjih zakonov, ki lahko edini vzpostavlja povezavo med najnizkotnejšo med substancami, telesom, in najbolj vzvišeno substanco, umom, ter ga s tem *de facto* obsodil na filozofijo materializma. Ko slabega pol stoletja po Malebranchevi smrti La Mettrie napiše svoje najodmevnješe delo *Človek stroj*, tako realizira kazen boga okazionalizma in „najnizkotnejšo med substancami“ povzdigne v edino substanco človeka, ki je med drugimi plemenitimi dejanji zmožna tudi najbolj vzvišenega dejanja – motrenja resnice. In prav La Mettrie bi moral po Božovičevem mnenju prepoznati ironijo „v dejstvu, da se je duša Malebranchevega radikalnega spiritualizma, se pravi duša, ki ni le realno različna od svojega telesa, ampak je svojemu telesu celo vnanja, primorana obnašati tako, kot se obnaša duša, ki je sama istovetna s telesom, se pravi prav nič drugače, kot se obnaša duša njegovega lastnega radikalnega materializma, in da je tisti, ki to njeno materialistično držo vzdržuje, prav sam bog.“⁴³ Kar torej La Mettrie s svojim materializmom dokazuje, ni nič drugega kot to, da je nasedel na *zvijačo* Malebranchevega boga.

Taisti paradoks zaznamuje tudi dualizem nam lastnega telesa v prvoosebnih strelskih igrah, saj smo od njega tako radikalno ločeni kot tudi neizogibno združeni. Ker smo od telesa, prvič, ločeni zato, ker smo sami locirani v pogledu, za ceno katerega izgubimo objekt pogleda, tj. telo, in, drugič, ker med nami – igralci in našo „bitjo-v-igri“ – posreduje igralniški vmesnik (ang. *interface*), mora igrati, tako kot Malebranchev bog, izvesti *zvijačo*, s katero nas skuša prepričati, da nismo nič drugega kot *telo*. Kot igralci v igri zato brezpogojno privzamemo lametrijevsko materialistično držo, v kar nas prisili prav

42 Adam je lahko pred božjo kaznijo sam posegal v delovanje okazionalnih vzrokov in tako blokiral telesne občutke, da ga niso motili pri motrenju boga.

43 BOŽOVIČ, Miran, *Telo v novoveški filozofiji*, Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, 2004, str. 157.

naše igralno telo s tem, ko nas neprestano opominja, da v igri nismo nič drugega kot telo. To doseže na enak način, kot že dolgo pred njim Malebranchevo uporno telo, saj nas – z vsemi znaki poškodb in drugih neprijetnosti – neprestano opominja, da smo le končna in umrljiva razsežna substanca. Mesto uma v igri metonimično zasede igralčev subjektivni pogled, ki je podvržen neprenehnim napadom telesa, ko ga le-to zamegljuje in temni ter s tem manipulira njegove kvalitete: barvitost, nasičenost, ostrino itd. Manipulira torej vse, kar utegne zmotiti igralčev pogled.

Računalniške igre tudi v tem oziru sledijo filmskim mānevrom, kot to v *Teoriji video iger*⁴⁴ izpostavi Galloway. Subjektivni pogled v njih služi izpostavljanju mentalnih stanj lika, čigar pogled privzema, pri tem pa so njegova mentalna stanja pogosto odraz njegovega fiziološkega stanja. Za razliko od prvoosebnega pogleda je subjektivni pogled zaznamovan z različnimi ovirami, ki pogled otežujejo, kar je mogoče doseči z različnimi filterji, za katere ni pomembno, ali so fizično postavljeni pred filmski objektiv ali pa dodani kasneje v postprodukciji. Bolj zanimivo je namreč samo razmerje med pogledom in aparatom (filmsko kamero). Kakor smo prej poudarili metonimičen odnos med pogledom in umom v prvoosebnih strelskeh igrah, moramo v primeru filmskega subjektivnega pogleda mesto telesa metonimično pripisati filmski kameri, torej aparatu, ki pogled (torej um) oviра ter onemogoča s tem, da vdira vanj v obliki različnih filtrov. A ker so mentalna stanja lika izražena z motnjami in defekti, lastnimi aparatu, in ker um ni nič drugega kot delovanje taistega aparata, ki ga tudi omejuje in onemogoča – ker je to razmerje pogoju subjektivnega pogleda samega, torej tako subjekta pogleda, izraženega skozi različna mentalna stanja, kakor tudi prisotnosti telesa oz. aparata v pogledu –, moramo v dispozitivu subjektivnega pogleda prepoznati La Mettrijev materializem, in to v kar najčistejši obliki.

V prizoru je John Sullivan (Joel McCrea) zaradi poškodbe glave v deliriju. Kader je posnet v prvoosebni perspektivi in uporablja

44 „Subjektivni posnetek najpogosteje prikazuje optično perspektivo lika, ki je omotičen, zaspan, pijan ali na kakšen drug način omamljen.“ (GALLOWAY, *Teorija video iger*, str. 105)

vrsto filterov za zameglitev in zakrivanje slike. Postopek je zasnovan tako, da posnema travmatična subjektivna občutja lika. Vizualna zmeda, ki jo prikazuje kamera, se skuša približati izrazu njegove fiziološke poškodbe.⁴⁵

Gallowayev opis prizora iz filma *Goli poljub* (Samuel Fuller, 1964) vsekakor poudarja lametrijevski režim telesa, v katerem so vsa mentalna stanja oz. dejavnosti uma *posledica modifikacij* telesa. Ko se prvoosebne strelske igre polastijo subjektivnega pogleda in ga za razliko od filma, kjer je subjektivni pogled v uporabi le redko in z namenom doseganja specifičnih dramaturških učinkov, povzdignejo v nujni in edini pogled igralca, skupaj z njim privzamejo tudi lametrijevski univerzum, ki „vsebuje zgolj eno substanco“.⁴⁶ Vsa bitja v materialističnem univerzumu so „za naš omejen pogled“ tako zgolj „kepe blata“,⁴⁷ njihova raznolikost pa temelji izključno na „razlikah v organizaciji“.⁴⁸ Zato je mišljenje zgolj ena od lastnosti specifično organiziranega „blata“, iz katerega sestojijo tudi vse preostale bitnosti tega univerzuma in vse njihove zmožnosti. Na tem mestu nastopi obrat v pojmovanju telesa, ki nam omogoča pristopiti k našemu naslednjemu problemu: kako ima lahko telo, ta najnižja substanca, kepa blata, dežela laži in norosti, privilegij sporočanja resnic o človeku in njegovih doživetjih? V čem je rdečkasta vinjeta ranjenosti telesa bliže od stolpca ali številčnega zapisa? Zakaj zamegljen pogled ustrezneje označuje strah in grozo smrti kot kateri koli drugi znak?

Vse, kar moramo kot igralci vedeti o svoji biti-v-igri, izvemo enostavno tako, da *prisluhnemo telesu*, ki se ob tem iz *lažne priče* preobrazi v najiskrenejšega prijatelja, *iz sleparja* v resnicoljuba. Telo tako postane tisto, ki *razsvetljuje*, in to natanko takrat, ko *zatemnjuje* in *zamegljuje*. Resnica telesa v igri je enostavna: *nismo nič drugega kot telo*, ki svojo telesnost realizira skozi umiranje. Vsi grafizmi, ki v igri tvorijo pisavo odsotnega telesa, so zato grafizmi bližnje smrti. Da bi poprisotili to, kar mora samo po sebi ostati odsotno – igralčeve telo v igri in smrt, kateri je

45 Ibid., str. 106.

46 LA METTRIE, Julien Offray de, „Man-machine“, v: *Early modern texts*, 2009, dostopno na: <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/>, str. 33.

47 Ibid., str. 21.

48 Ibid., str. 32.

zavezano –, morajo ti grafizmi vzpostaviti režim, ki odpravlja vsakršno distanco ter s tem obenem zanika lastno strukturo značka oziroma se predstavlja kot znak brez razlike kot tudi *brez zgodovine*. Rdeča vinjeta postane nekakšen „izvorni“ znak krvi, kri postane „izvorni“ znak telesne notranjosti, s tem pa obenem tudi njegove smrti, kajti telo umre, ker je ranjeno, in ko je ranjeno, iz svoje notranjosti pušča kri rdeče barve. „Izvorna“ *pisava telesa*, ki v skladu z načelom realizma izrine ostale „ne-telesne“ značke, je zato le drugo ime za določeno *pozabo* telesa; pozabo, ki genealogijo zabriše v imenu anahronih resnic.

Vez med telesom, smrtjo ter vednostjo, okoli katere je „organizirano“ igralčeve telo v igri, postaja vse razvidnejša. Kar razodetje naznani z Besedo in Črko, v materialističnem univerzumu pripada telesu in znaku smrti, ki se izrisujejo na njegovi površini. Z odpravo dualizma duše in telesa je odpravljena tudi potreba znanosti po teologih in metafizikih. Ali kot pravi La Mettrie: „Spregovoriti morajo anatom!“

*Ne priznam nikogar, ki je poln lastnih prepričanj in ni anatom, tj. izobražen o edini za naš problem relevantni veji znanosti, torej proučevanju človeškega telesa. Le kaj lahko ukrene šibko trsje teologije, metafizike in aristotelskih filozofskih šol proti tako čvrstemu in močnemu hrastu?*⁴⁹

Le pol stoletja po tem, ko La Mettrie kartezijanski dispozitiv človeka postavi „z glave na noge“ in tako z mesta prve znanosti odstavi teologijo in metafiziko ter nanj postavi medicino oz. študij človeškega telesa, nastopi „doba“ anatomov. Pod njihovim budnim očesom v notranjost mrtvega telesa posije svetloba moderne vednosti, ki telo iz ničvrednega blata povzdigne v privilegirani objekt znanosti. Vse od Mondina,⁵⁰ ki je prvi v imenu vednosti odprl mrtvo telo, so trupla služila iskanju že znanih resnic, telesa pa so v sebi nosila skrivnosti, ki so bile v korpusu znanosti že vnaprej natančno umeščene.⁵¹ Zato je bilo, kot piše

49 Ibid., str. 34.

50 Mondino de Luzzi (1270–1326), prvi evropski anatom, rojen v Bologni, kjer je vse življenje izvajal sekcije trupel.

51 Več o Mondinu in zgodovini sekcije v: ŽELE, Marisa, *Monstruozno telo*, magistrsko delo, Ljubljana, 2015.

Foucault v *Rojstvu klinike*,⁵² delo Bichata v začetku 19. stoletja za epistemologijo telesa tako prelomno – od telesa je zahteval, da samo spregovori o bolezni, ki ga je pokončala. Znanost o telesu v telo ni več vstopala „od zunaj“ in v njem iskala le svojo potrditev, temveč je morala vznikniti v telesu samem, kar je med drugim povzročilo prestrukturiranje temeljnih pojmov življenja, bolezni in smrti. Bolezen telesu tako ni bila več tuja, vanj ni vstopala kot njemu zunanja esenca, temveč je bilo telo samo tisto, ki je zbolelo. In kakor je lahko bila ista bolezen locirana na več mestih, saj ni bila več vezana na svoje izvore v telesnih delih, tako tudi smrt ni bila več nepremična točka, na kateri se je zaključilo zdravnikovo delo, ko je ta naposled razglasil čas smrti, temveč je pričela v telesu „mrgoleti“ ter svojo prisotnost najavljati že dolgo pred dejansko smrtjo telesa, kar kaže na nepopisen strah pred živim pokopom, ki je strašil 19. stoletje. Smrt je bila za anatoma šele začetek dela, točka, ko je telo končno mogoče odpreti in pod okriljem smrti v njem ugledati vednost samo.

*Smrti poslej niso več razumeli kot dolgo noč, ko življenje usahne, ko celo bolezen izgine, dobila je veliko moč razsvetljevanja /.../. Njena brezčasnost, ki je prednost, nedvomno stara toliko kot zavest o njeni immanentnosti, se je prvič prelevila v tehnično orodje, ki je omogočilo razumeti resnico življenja in naravo njegove bolezni. Smrt je postala velika analitičarka /.../*⁵³

Tako smo v slabem stoletju prehodili pot od Malebranchevega telesa, ki je predstavljalo prostor najglobljih zablod uma ter njegovo največjo oviro, do Bichatovega telesa, ki med objekti znanosti o človeku predstavlja najzgovornejši objekt. Z Bichatom na eni in Foucaultom na drugi strani bi lahko rekli, da je bilo telo objekt razsvetljenskega pogleda *par excellence*, smrt, ki je bila za novi vek največja hiba že tako najnizkotnejše substance, pa je v 19. stoletju postala najboljše orodje za spoznavanje nas samih. Predano opazovanje in minuciozno popisovanje ter razvrščanje raznolikih simptomov, dokazov, argumentov in spekulacij je povsem zaman. Bichat bi najbrž celo pristal na Malebranchevo

52 FOUCAULT, Michel, *Rojstvo klinike*, Ljubljana: Študentska založba, 2009.

53 Ibid., str. 212.

veliko nezaupanje do telesa, kot ga je poznala takratna klinična izkušnja, torej telesa, ki se ga je življenje še držalo. Kajti živo telo klinične izkušnje je „ena sama zmeda nepovezanih simptomov“,⁵⁴ tako rekoč tema, v katero potone um, željan spoznanja samega sebe. Od tod ponovno navdušenje nad trupli: „Odprite nekaj trupel in v trenutku boste razgnali temo, ki jo samo opazovanje ni moglo razpršiti.“⁵⁵



Moč razsvetljevanja ima šele mrtvo telo, torej truplo. Telo in smrt postaneta neločljiva pojma; telesa moderne ni mogoče misliti brez smrti kot njegove resnice. Brez te tesne vezi, tega neomajnega prijateljstva, ne bi bilo mogoče misliti ne biopolitične skrbi za življenje ne „newagerskega“ zaupanja v telo. Brez genealogije telesa, ki si prizadeva izpostavljati njegove heterogene vznike in razkrinkati mitologijo o njegovem izvoru, je življenje povzdignjeno v vrednost *na-sebi*, torej vrednost brez porekla in zgodovine, predvsem pa brez smrti kot svoje hrbitne plati. Telo je tako povzdignjeno v prostor „izvornih resnic“, katerih bojda nismo bili pripravljeni poslušati in v imenu katerih se moramo vračati k arhaičnim kulturam in njihovim modrostim. To povzdiganje telesa, ki ga lahko imenujemo tudi „epistemologija pozabe“, „telesna vrednost“ oziroma „telesni pogled“, tudi v „trivialnem“ prostoru računalniške igre uveljavlja *pozabo lastne zgodovinskoosti*, ko trojico *telo-smrt-vrednost* uveljavlja kot ahistorično.

54 Ibid., str. 215.

55 Ibid.

rično resnico in „izvorno“ pisavo – pisavo telesa kot red izvornih označevalcev, znakov brez razlike. *Heads-up* zaslon se je moral po načelu „realističnega“ umakniti pred pisavo „izvornih znakov“ – zatemnitvijo, zameglitvijo, vinjetiranjem –, ker je njegova pisava zaznamovana z arbitarnostjo in je zato „zgolj“ pisava.

Genealogija in problemi reprezentiranja

Delo genealogije je riti kot krt za razkropljenimi sledmi. Njeno kopanje nas ne vodi do izvorov, do katerih je Nietzsche gojil tolikšen gnev, temveč do „neštetih začetkov“,⁵⁶ pojavitev ter vznikov, med katerimi je mogoče slediti narativu objekta, čigar trdnost se stalno izmika. Zato se ne sprašujemo, kdo je bil tisti, ki je telo pričel misliti tako, kot to počnemo še dandanes, in v telesu ne iščemo velikih kontinuitet, v katerih bi bila vsa *telesa zgodovine* enostavno sešteta in bi v medsebojnem dopolnjevanju sobivala Malebranchevo, La Mettrijevu, Bichatovo telo ter umirajoče telo s posnetka kompaktne kamere ali računalniške igre. Če si prizadevamo slediti zgodovinskemu vztrajanju tega, kar se skozi čas pojavlja pod imenom telo, lahko to počnemo le s sledenjem logiki njemu lastnih prelomov in obratov. Takrat se telo pokaže v svoji prostorskosti, ki jo mora določeni zgodovinski čas naseliti. Razviti mora pozitivnost tega, čemur pravimo „meso“ in „duh“, „življenje“ in „smrt“ ter „zunaj“ in „znotraj“. V prostoru telesa mora razviti svojo pojmovnost, kar pa lahko doseže le z določenim „nasiljem“ pogleda.⁵⁷

Genealogija nas ne vodi k enotnemu objektu, k identiteti brez preostanka. Tako kot telo v računalniški igri ni enako telesu resničnostnih šovov ali „talent“ šovov, tako si tudi telesa v različnih tipih iger niso enaka in ne delijo skupne zgodovinsko prostorskost. Genealogija prav tako ne more biti „polna“, vanjo ne moremo povleči „vseh“ dogodkov, ki formirajo določen objekt, saj je sama tista, ki odkriva prostor svoje analize in na svoji poti oblikuje svoj objekt. Telesa zato ni mogoče misliti znotraj neke-

56 FOUCAULT, Michel, *Vednost-oblasc-subjekt*, Ljubljana: Krtina, 2008, str. 92.

57 V tem oziru bi našo pozornost zasluzili vsaj še Schreberjevo „živčno“ ter Charcotovo „koreografirano“ telo, prvo kot prostor *diskurza resnice* in drugo kot prostor diskurza norosti. Skupno jima je, da sta oba diskurza mlade in zagnane vednosti o telesu in bi lahko zato nadaljevala našo genealoško zgodbo telesa, vendar ju moramo za ceno jasnosti tokrat pustiti ob strani.

kšne „polne“ semiotike, ki ne bi bila genealoška; ne moremo mu spisati slovarja. Telo namreč ne uprizarja znakov, čeprav smo jih zavoljo jasnosti tako imenovali, temveč koreografije.

Če za hip prisluhnemo kritikom računalniških iger, katerih kritike so uperjene zoper reprezentacijo dehumaniziranih umirajočih teles v vojnah, in če se nam zdi, da je reprezentacija smrti v igrah nevarnejša od smrti v „resnici“, saj naj bi v distanči, ki jo razpira reprezentacijski dispozitiv, nekaj, kar je samo po sebi grozljivo, spreminja v nekaj prijetnega, potem pozabljamo, da igre vojnih grozot ne reprezentirajo nič manj, kot te reprezentirajo *same sebe*. Zadošča, da si ogledamo nekaj populističnih dokumentarnih filmov o vojnah na Bližnjem vzhodu in videli bomo pričevanja vojakov, ki so polna poetičnega govora, pričevanja, ki od številnih pesniških figur kar pokajo po šivih. Ali pa prisluhnemo herojem iz Sirije in Iraka, med katerimi je svetu najbrž najbolje znan borec Abu Azrael (Angel smrti), ki se v boju proti Islamski državi ne bori zgolj s puško, temveč enako predano tudi s „pesnjenjem“ bojnih sloganov, ki jih deli po socialnih omrežjih, te pa pospremi s fotografijami sebe in svojih junashčev.⁵⁸ Abu Azrael Islamski državi tako „vrača udarec“, ko nasproti podobam obglavljenih teles postavlja podobe svojega mišičastega telesa.

Poleg diskurzivne razsežnosti vojnega narativa je nadvse pomemben predvsem imaginarij, ki v vojnah obdaja telo. Skozenj narativ postane viden, prepoznaven, prisoten. Poleg tega, kar je v medijih imenovano propaganda, je telo pravzaprav prostor, v katerem se „utelešajo“ reprezentacijski režimi „življenja“, „smrti“, „herojstva“, „mučeništva“, „kreposti“ in „pregrehe“, „zatiranja“ in „svobode“. Telo igra v sodobnih vojnah zato eno od osrednjih vlog; ponudi jim meso, v katero lahko položijo svojo govorico. Kar za Zahod reprezentira vojno, je vselej telo v različnih podobah: telo civilne žrtve, telo lačnega otroka, telo hrabrega vojaka ali pa „poplava“ teles v Evropi, ki se utaplja, razstreljujejo ter posiljujejo. Tisto, kar Zahod vsakič, ko pozabi, da je v vojni, in to ne v vojni na domačih tleh, na to dejstvo opomni, je ravno fantazma telesa, ki se vrača, da bi ga preganjalo. V fantažmatski obliki se „vrača“ podobno kot telo presežne smrti, torej

58 Najslavnejšega med njimi „Illa tahan!“ je mogoče vsebinsko prevesti kot „Zmlel vas bom v prah!“.

kot bolno in počasno telo brez *logosa* (v vseh pomenih, ki jih ta grški izraz zajema v evropski misli). To je telo, ki pozna zgolj potrebe in jim brezumno sledi. Telo, ki pozna zgolj poželenja brez občutka dolžnosti ter, končno, zahteva svoje pravice – ta kapitalen evropski izum –, in to brez posedovanja *govora*.

Telo vračajoče se vojne je tako pervertirano telo moderne, ki se na eni strani kaže kot ostanek Malebranchevega telesa brez *uma*, na drugi pa kot Bichatovo telo, ki zmore vso resnico izpričati bolje od še tako prekaljenega duha, v obeh primerih za ceno *logosa*. Grozeče telo, ki preti Zahodu, je zato nemo, saj resnico o svoji immanentni nevarnosti sporoča že s svojo telesnostjo. Kritiko računalniških iger bi bilo zato treba obrniti: če jim je mogoče kaj očitati, je to prav dejstvo, da pisavo telesa in njeno zgodovinsko prepustijo pozabi ter narativ telesa in smrti predstavljamjo kot ahistorično izkustvo: človek je od nekdaj imel telo in to telo je bilo od nekdaj umrljivo. Telo in smrt naj ne bi poznala zgodovine.

Šum #9

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
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Scarlett Johansson Leaps to Your Lips

An Interview with
R. Scott Bakker

Primož Krašovec,
Marko Bauer

There comes a time when “theory” just stops working. The one thing that was once seen (and used) as a weapon against the crushing stupidity of common sense (or ideology, dominant discourse, whatever you wanna call it) turns out to be a form of bigotry and prejudice against ordinary ways of thinking and speaking. To make matters worse, theory turns out to be not science (except in its self-aggrandizing delusions), but a form of commonish sense that is no less stereotypical, thought-inhibiting and philistine than anything we used to despise as ideology. Theory is just shit (literally) theoreticians say. So what now? Exiting endless and soul-destroying discussions on Althusser or Lacan is the easy part, but if one does not wish to relinquish reading, learning and thinking about things at all, finding something new might be the hard part. In this sense, discovering R. Scott Bakker’s blog *Three Pound Brain* had a therapeutic function for us: his entry point into problems that we still obsess about was one of a convert that saw through theory and found new ways to approach the problems of ideology, linguistics, human cognition in general as well as their transformations through the encounters with new technologies; ways that at the same time do not shy away from traditional taboos theory imposes on itself (like its characteristically dismissive attitudes towards biology, evolution, empirical science and “techne”).

Šum #9

So our intention (yeah) going into this interview was to stop pretending that everything we need to know about what's going on with artificial intelligence, cognitive technologies and the way we ourselves operate cognitively was somehow already solved in this or that tome of German classical philosophy.

Scott Bakker lives and writes in London, Ontario. Allegedly Baudrillard's *America* should be called *Canada*. Besides his blog and theoretical essays Bakker is best known for his epic fantasy series *The Second Apocalypse*, psychothriller *Neuropath* and short story *Crash Space*.

ŠUM: The Blind Brain Theory¹ is peculiar in a way that one asks oneself: Is it an anti-Berkeleian Berkeleian argument, kind of eccentric, but irrefutable, or is this a Copernican shift? Maybe it's both. As Steven Shaviro would say, we are/will be compelled to accept the Argument. According to you it is probably already enacting, executing itself.

BAKKER: Yeah, I mean the Blind Brain Theory is basically an empirical theory. It will be sorted by the science of the near future, I think, I hope. And to that extent it has an awkward fit with the tradition of a priori thought regarding the soul and all things human. Just simply because it stakes out an empirical ground and because it has numerous ways in which it could be tested, it finds itself almost by default Copernican insofar as it's really going to be hard to actually attack the theory from a priori grounds. The proof really is in the empirical pudding. If metacognition looks like what I say it looks like, then that is what cognitive neuroscience will eventually discover. The weird part of it is that philosophical reflection stands at the root of all a priori philosophical claims regarding the nature of the soul. And so as a result, if the empirical theory of philosophical reflection actually finds vindication in cognitive neuroscience, then it's going to have repercussions that are nothing short of Copernican. It will turn everything upside down. And not for the better, either, I don't think. It is very, very peculiar insofar as it sort of stands astride the subject matter of traditional

¹ BBT in a nutshell via Bakker: "Conscious metacognition is not only blind to the actual structure of experience and cognition, it is blind to this blindness." Its defining text is "The Last Magic Show: A Blind Brain Theory", available at: https://www.academia.edu/1502945/The_Last_Magic_Show_A_Blind_Brain_Theory_of_the.Appearance_of_Consciousness.

Šum #9

philosophy and yet stubbornly insists on keeping its feet in the empirical mud.

How that fits into the Argument is kind of more complicated. BBT basically explodes all prior conceptions of what it means to be human. It's in the meat of things, it's in what we are, it's part of the same mechanisms that break down and kill us when we have a stroke. What you could expect is that cognitive technologies, as they advance, will actually make the Argument for me in a strange way. So if I'm right about metacognition, then the Argument, this notion that human meaning is on the verge of collapse, actually follows from what we have hitherto called technological progress. Progress will actually dismantle all exceptionalist claims, leaving only some sort of mediocre residue and we will find ourselves on the far side of the looking glass.

ŠUM: What would be the everyday ethical consequences of BBT since our sense of ethical behaviour is conditioned intentionally in a way that you are called to explain your actions? For if one does away with any intentionality, then being called to explain an action can be impossible, since at least in our everyday life we have no access to real causes of our action, we are blind to ourselves.

BAKKER: In one big sense there is no answer to your question.

Simply because BBT suggests that we should expect—as cognitive technologies proliferate throughout our social ecosystems and as more and more deep environmental information is imported—a massive spread of the kinds of information our ancestors never ever dreamed of having to deal with. And, even more importantly, never evolved the equipment they required to be able to deal with it. As that happens, you're basically looking at ecological destruction. This is what I call the semantic apocalypse.

As it turns out human social cognition is radically heuristic. When you and I are having a conversation the humanistic conceit is that we are in some way, shape or form representing in our minds what's in the other person's mind. We have all kinds of supposed mechanisms in our brain that actually allow us to peer into each other's soul representa-

tionally. If you take all the representations out of that picture and simply look at it as a physical give and take, then suddenly the situation between two individuals looks completely different. What I am doing is cueing an assumption on your part which you report, which cues an assumption on my part and back and forth and so on. There is no actual peering into one another's brains, what we are doing is simply working through a kind of social algorithm where you're one half and I'm the other half. Given enough ancestral consistency in our contexts that algorithm generally will lead to some sort of happy conclusion. But now we have cognitive technologies flooding our ancestral social cognitive ecologies and it's no longer the case that it's me pushing your buttons or you pushing my buttons, there's also all these gadgets pushing our buttons. They have actually been designed to push our buttons in commercially exploitable ways and as it turns out it's really easy to do that.

I lay this out most clearly in the post *Artificial Belonging*.² The basic idea is that information technology generally, artificial intelligence more specifically, are a kind of social habitat destruction and these alien species are invading our ecosystems. Imagine ten years from now, when there's a hundred thousand chatbots for every human being on the planet. All this button pushing which evolved when there were only humans around and which was at least functional enough to allow our ancestors to muddle along, all these ecosystems are going to be completely gone. You'll have people making all kinds of moral judgements, all kinds of moral assertions as to who's right, who's wrong, who's good, who's bad. Instead of that playing itself out in the ancestral ecology, it will be playing itself out in an ecology that's been overrun, trammelled, invaded by systems that have absolutely no stake as agents, whatever that means, in our cognitive ecologies. It ends up being a crash space insofar as morality is simply going to become more and more dysfunctional. The moral judgements that we used to use to solve problems will

2 BAKKER, Scott, "On Artificial Belonging: How Human Meaning is Falling between the Cracks of the AI Debate", blog post, available at: <https://rsbakker.wordpress.com/2017/08/30/on-artificial-belonging-how-human-meaning-is-falling-between-the-cracks-of-the-ai-debate/>.

Šum #9

suddenly no longer solve those problems. It will be gradual in some cases, it will just become less and less effective, and in other cases we can expect that it will be catastrophic.

Look at the number of students coming into classrooms with accommodations now. Back in my day we were allowed to call students ‘lazy’ or ‘misguided’, we were allowed to make character judgements regarding students who didn’t seem to be actually performing quite so well. Now that we have all this deep ecological information that allows us to identify the mechanisms that underwrite the behaviour we used to pass moral judgement on, all of a sudden we can no longer pass moral judgment on that. Because the heuristic is: if there is a causal, neurocognitive explanation for an action, that action is no longer intentional, ergo it’s no longer proper to pass character judgement on that individual. Anytime anything goes wrong for them, they can always claim they couldn’t have done otherwise. That is just going to simply increase, increase, increase, increase. I think that’s a simplistic toy model but I think it’s a good toy model to get a sense of just how morality will progressively become more and more difficult and eventually outright impossible. At least in anything we recognize via intuitions.

ŠUM: We see your work as a continuation of French moralists like Rocheſoucauld, a great cartographer of biases, or Nietzsche, who was actually a big fan of this kind of “psychology”. You also write aphorisms as they did. When we say you’re a moralist, we mean something in the vein of Ballard’s statement: “I feel we should immerse ourselves in the most destructive element, ourselves, and swim. I take it that the final destination of the 20th century, and the best that we can hope for in the circumstances, is the attainment of a moral and just psychopathology.” You seem to say, “it’s not just, it is just what it is”, but at the same time give an impression of being more than just a bit worried. So are these cautionary tales or are these tales about the inevitable?

BAKKER: It all depends on how I feel when I wake up. When I’m feeling optimistic, they do feel like cautionary tales to me. When I’m feeling pessimistic, they feel like a version

Šum #9

of miserabilism, a sort of wallowing in the ugly inevitable. There are endless bullshit stories I could tell myself, I could congratulate me for being a hero trying to warn the rest of civilisation, all-sacrificing Jeremiah or something like that. But point in fact, I'm not that hero and I've really, most of the time, no clue what the actual bases of my actions are and I'm painfully aware of the degree to which we not simply habitually but compulsively rationalise our work and our statements. The only thing I'm sure of is that when it comes to the worst-case scenario, this Ballardian pathology, it has to be better that people have some sort of actual information than otherwise. It just simply can't be the case that digging deeper and deeper into fantasy worlds is going to bring us anywhere better or actually allow us to string a party along for another generation or so. Obviously in a world with Trump and a world without Trump if I could write something that had the reach to actually tilt that balance towards the latter, then I could cash my check and drink with a more peaceful mind.

ŠUM: What's the thing with Canada and all these hyperstitional crash zones: William Gibson's cyber&meatspace, Cronenberg's videodrome, Ballard's—who was sent to Royal Canadian Air Force training base in Saskatchewan, where he discovered sci-fi—non-spaces, your crash space etc.?

BAKKER: Is this a question of what's in the Canadian water? Why Canadians are so obsessed with crashes? Canada is a flat community. We let in on average, per capita basis, twice as many immigrants as any other country. At least that was the case, it's been a few years since I've looked at the statistics, but historically we have let in more immigrants than any other country on this planet relative to our population. It has created an ethno-cultural crash space. Really the only things that bind people once you bring so many of them from so many different organic contexts into a new context are commercial norms. So we are a cultureless culture in a strange sense. The only culture we share is commercial culture, crass commercial culture in many respects. If you're an observant soul in this country, I think it gives you a feeling of having been kicked loose from history. You don't feel quite as con-

Šum #9

strained or quite as bound by the past. Taking risks or envisioning collapses is easy to do here where in effect history has already died.

ŠUM: You mean even more that in the States?

BAKKER: Way more. I grew up in the shadow of the United States. I was stuck with American news when I was a child because where I lived, on the north shore of Lake Erie, all we got (with the exception of one channel) were American channels. So we used to watch the Olympics and it was always the American broadcast. Every time we saw someone with a red maple leaf, it would be like, "There's a Canadian! There's a Canadian!" And we would celebrate just because we saw a Canadian in the background. Basically, Canadians are Americans that think they're better than Americans, that's my personal opinion. We are immersed in American culture, but from the other side that creates a strange sense of dislocation. When I moved to Nashville to do my philosophy PhD at Vanderbilt, I was actually quite taken aback by how much more *historical* the United States is than Canada. We have no *Sturm und Drang*, our history is, from a dramatic standpoint, tepid and bureaucratic. There are no defining myths, nothing that we can reach back to and repeat as a catechism, the way Americans can. And not only that, the United States is just a much more homogenous society, Canada is far more cosmopolitan. You get away from the big cities in the US and it's almost frightening how homogenous things become.

ŠUM: Since you mentioned pushing buttons earlier, what about propaganda, mass media and fake news? As there is no communication that is not at the same time manipulation, which is precisely pushing the buttons of another person or mass audience, does it make any sense to distinguish between fake news as manipulation on the one hand and truthful reporting on the other?

BAKKER: All communication is manipulation, but all manipulation isn't equal. One of the things I try to accentuate or sell, I guess, with regards to heuristic neglect theory, which is the

larger theory of cognition of which BBT forms a component part, is that it is a compelling way to look at issues of communication and language. It can actually provide a naturalistic explanation for the differences between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts. It can explain why it is when we truth-tell, language is at once manipulative, yet seems to absolutely vanish in transparency, so that it seems truth-telling doesn't involve manipulation at all. Truth-telling is actually a rational, purely rational enterprise. But then how can it be manipulation and truth-telling at the same time?

On heuristic neglect theory the way to look at communication is in terms of what I call medial neglect. As I'm speaking to you guys now, my brain is doing an unbelievable number of things, buzzing, flashing, beeping, burping, all kinds of things I have absolutely no consciousness of whatsoever. I have no consciousness of my tongue flapping around in my mouth, brushing my teeth every once in a while. I have no consciousness of any of the mechanics of my performance whatsoever. I am performance-blind when it comes to communicating. Now that performance blindness, that's what I call medial neglect. It explains how it is we communicate asymmetrically, how we communicate outward while remaining completely blind as to the nature of that communication itself.

Now strip away all the humanistic detritus that's built up on these issues of truth-telling, knowing, communication and just think of human beings as physical animals in their environment, possessing certain orientations towards their environment, and look at these orientations simply in statistical terms, as having certain dispositional capacities to effect certain types of behaviour, not by virtue of any intentional relationship with the environment, but just by virtue of being a mechanical thing, possessing certain properties, being in an environment that is also mechanical and possessing certain properties. By mechanical here I mean the sophisticated sense of mechanism as it's usually accepted in cognitive scientific circles, not deterministic in the clock-work sense, but actually incorporating noise, using 'statistical methods' to actually accomplish things.

If you look at an orientation in that sense and you look at group membership as what you can call an overlapping of orientations, then you can look at communication as basically a way to maximize what goes unsaid. So I say to my fellow, “Hey, there’s a tiger in the bushes.” As it turns out, there really is a tiger in the bushes. When I say that, I update his orientation. The two of us at that point share overlapping orientation: there’s a tiger in our environment and we both have some orientation, some sort of statistical relationship toward that tiger in our environment. And it goes unspoken, it becomes the implicit basis upon which any further cooperative endeavour ends up being erected. Say we want to hunt the tiger so that it doesn’t kill any of our friends, or say we want to capture the tiger because we want to sell its claws in China on the dark web. There are all kinds of things we could do just on the basis of my friend accepting my claim that there is a tiger. You don’t have to say there’s a tiger anymore. He’s updated, I’ve updated him. That is just simply physical orientation, a pure coincidence of two organisms possessing similar physical relationships to the tiger in the environment. Now say I tell my friend, “There’s a tiger in the bushes, don’t go there!”, but in fact I’ve buried some treasure there and I don’t want him to see where I’ve buried it. In this case we don’t have an overlapping of orientations anymore. I’m actually manipulating him to keep him away from my treasure that’s hiding in the bushes. I’m using language in the perlocutionary sense to steer him down certain paths of behaviour that he would not have taken otherwise. Now this is manipulation the way we think of it in the everyday sense. I’m pushing his buttons so that he stays away from my pile of treasure because he thinks there’s a tiger over there. In both cases it’s pure manipulation, the difference is what it does to the orientations of the individuals involved.

Truth belongs to a radically heuristic system that allows us to do all kinds of almost miraculous socio-cognitive things on the cheap—incredible cheap—without burning barely any calories at all. But you still can insist that all communication is manipulation. It’s just two different kinds of manipulation.

Does that make sense? I’m not an academic—all I do is think and read and write all day and I really don’t talk about

Šum #9

this stuff that much so when I do talk about it, it's always a strange thing. All of a sudden, I have to squeeze it through my voice box and it doesn't sound like it comes out all that well sometimes!

ŠUM: We loved the tiger part. Tiger and war, Julius Evola and Walter Benjamin, you know, the obvious tradition.

BAKKER: Maybe that's where it came from!

ŠUM: We just read a poem about a tiger by a 6-year-old Nael this week, it goes like this: "The tiger He destroyed his cage Yes YES The tiger is out." Probably he's got a tiger mom. In that regard we're interested in the concept and praxis of exit. Are your, Nick Land's, Paul Ennis' etc. exits from the academia connected to this cul-de-sac, quite literally, a blind alley? Philosophy not being a problem-solving machine?

BAKKER: I fully admit that I'm probably not as careful as I should be when I mention the word philosophy or even philosopher. I think my instinct to grandiosity sometimes gets the best of me and I just say philosophy with a capital P.

ŠUM: Because you're still doing it, right?

BAKKER: Yeah, definitely. I am a philosopher, I am one of the idiots I'm constantly berating. But when I trouble philosophy, what I'm really talking about is traditional intentional philosophy. For me that's actually a very, very specific thing. I can actually lay it out in naturalistic terms as to what traditional intentional philosophy consists in. It consists in the application of intentional cognition. When I say intentional cognition, I mean something purely mechanical, just those systems in our brain that we have inherited from our ancestors and have extended on, knapped and chiselled and transformed into all kinds of other tools as well that allow us to make sense of social situations. Those systems are ways of seeing past our blindness, particularly seeing past our blindness to performance, medial neglect. They actually allow us to solve the problems where everything is

flesh and blood. That's why the argument *ad baculum* is the only 'knock-down argument' there is, simply because it's the argument where you get *knocked down*. It's where discourse becomes meat, becomes matter.

Those systems are simply picking out cues, just small pieces of information in our environment, and leaping to conclusions on the basis of those cues, trusting that those cues are correlated to basically an ancestrally recognisable environment. So I don't need to know what your brain is doing to know what you're doing simply because we belong to the same species, we share enough training in our backgrounds that I can actually, in a sense, emulate whatever it is you're saying or doing or thinking. I don't have to actually see inside your head, I can just go by cues and by buttons and get away with all that. That's what intentional cognition does best. It helps us get along with one another.

In traditional intentional philosophy the thought is that intentional cognition, over and above this practical social problem-solving suite of heuristic systems that we have, also has this amazing theoretical capacity. So even though it's an incredibly shallow information-consuming system, it can nevertheless unearth deep facts about our social predicament, be it the question of 'knowledge', be it the question of 'meaning', be it the question of 'good'. The idea is that this system that's meant to actually avoid getting into the complexities and depths of things can nevertheless somehow provide a window onto the complexities and depths of things. So it's doomed. Traditional intentional reflection on problems, any kinds of problems, just leads to more crash space, more underdetermined claims, more perplexities, more confounds. There's a reason why we're still debating the same things Aristotle debates in *On the Soul*. There's a reason why it still actually makes sense to read Aristotle's *On Poetics* when we're discussing literature. It's because we haven't taken any decisive step past him. The mysteries he faced are still our mysteries. And on BBT those mysteries are actually just a series of cognitive illusions turning on the systematic misapplication of intentional cognition to theoretical problems as opposed to practical problems. *That* philosophy is dead. Any philosophy that

Šum #9

turns on intentional posits has always been toothless, has for the past two millennia simply added to the heap of disputation. But I think within the *non-New-Age* community it is going to be recognised as being just a kind of evolutionary dead-end or cul-de-sac, like you say, that we need desperately to back out of if we're going to have any sort of theoretical grip on what's happening with the proliferation of cognitive technologies.

ŠUM: Massimo Pigliucci says that philosophy is useless as a form of truth seeking and it should reduce itself to therapeutic function, perhaps in the sense of taking care of the illusional, delusional self. It may be a deception, but a functional one. On the other side, as you show in *On Alien Philosophy*, philosophy can also be an attempt "to comprehend how things in general hang together in general absent conclusive evidence."

BAKKER: This is a debate I've actually encountered many times over the years. Philosophy is far from dying. Philosophy in the sense of just theoretical speculation is going to get bigger and bigger as the surface area of scientific uncertainty expands. Every new reticulation in scientific knowledge spawns more questions. A question is answered, several more questions pop up. Columbia neuroscientist Stuart Firestein writes about science actually being a quest for *uncertainty*. That's where you find the philosophers, hanging about the second order skin of this expanding sphere of scientific uncertainty that is just simply a corollary of scientific knowledge. That philosophy is always going to be there and it will expand.

Intentional philosophy, though...Eckhart Tolle is a perfect example. You read Eckhart Tolle and what you see is a bunch of undergraduate-level manipulations of Heideggerian jargon interwoven with classic mysticism, Eastern religion. Eckhart Tolle, I would argue, isn't a philosopher at all, he is a businessman. He is providing delusional rationalisations for delusional conceptions of the self. Is that good or bad? I absolutely have no idea. What I do know, though, is that the process that it's part of is incredibly

Šum #9

alarming. In the age of communication technology you really seem to see this migration of the masses into more and more atavistic worldviews run amok. Insofar as individuals don't like the notion that they're just fooling themselves, they will actually pay people to provide them with convincing rationales that they're doing otherwise. So I think that this sort of commercially-oriented apologetic philosophy will grow and grow and grow and grow. I just don't think it's philosophy insofar as that it's not really interested in answering any questions or even really solving any problems aside from narrow commercial interests. It's about creating, adding enough rooms to the funhouse so that people never need to bump into a wall that lets them know that they're actually trapped in a funhouse. I think there's going to be a lot jobs for philosophers. Some of them will be critical and naturalistic and they will speak languages that people will barely be able to follow. There will be other philosophers that will try to interpret back all those scientifically grounded naturalisms into something that's meaningful for everyday life, if everyday life even admits of any sort of synoptic assessment of meaning. And then you'll have a growing body of intentional apologists, who won't really be interested in arguing at all, but rather maintain ingroup solidarity in the face of perceived cognitive threats.

ŠUM: If we define intelligence as efficient practical problem-solving behaviour, how important is consciousness for intelligent behaviour?

BAKKER: Daniel Dennett would argue that there's absolutely no way of understanding consciousness without understanding cognition. On this point I entirely agree with him. Sentience is a component of sapience. Sentience, awareness, is a tool that served our ancestors very, very well. We can speculate about the evolutionary provenance of that tool. For instance, one of the things that consciousness does is freeze-frame a certain amount of information and then broadcast that to the legions of problem-solving heuristics distributed through the brain. By freezing and broadcasting and involving problem-solving circuits you think things through, roll them

Šum #9

through your thoughts over and over again, and each time they seem to be transformed. That transformation, which we call ‘thought’, ends up arriving at conclusions that we can then report to our fellows.

Consciousness has a big role to play in human sapience. But as a component of sapience, as a way to actually generate novel behaviours in the face of problems, whether it be new problems or old problems, what consciousness seems to do is allow us to come up with new tools, refine those tools and then shove them back into the toolkit so that they can be used habitually afterward. That kind of awareness is just something humans have. And maybe animals. I think they might, but there are some strong arguments out there that sentience is probably something that has been selected for linguistic communication. It seems to be a remarkable coincidence that all that we can report happens to be all that we can consciously experience. So it could be the case that as our communicative abilities were bootstrapped in our past, we became conscious as a result of that. Or it could be the case that all mammals actually take advantage of this particular cog, only they simply have no linguistic recourse the way humans do. They might have a protolinguistic recourse when it comes to using consciousness as a cognitive tool.

ŠUM: Human consciousness can also be an obstacle to intelligent behaviour, as in brooding or overthinking. Many artists report being at their best when being in the zone, in some kind of a non-thinking but fully present and alert state of mind. What would be the value of Eastern mysticism in this disentanglement of intelligence and consciousness, since it is interesting precisely because it devalues consciousness?

BAKKER: Psychologists talk about flow, and the flow is my bread and butter. Flow is when you become so absorbed in your project that you lose consciousness of time. To use a visual science metaphor: when you’re in flow, your focal region of attention swallows up the whole screen all the way to the margins. It seems to be where you’re most creative, where you’re most productive. It’s certainly the case for me. What disrupts that flow is any anxiety, a thought about, “Oh, I got

an interview to do!” or, “Oh, I forgot to put out the garbage!” or, “Oh, maybe I’m doing this wrong!” or, “Oh, should I even be working on this book?” or, “Oh, jeez, what am I thinking, I’m the stupidest philosopher in the world!”

In other words, it’s the distinction between awareness and self-awareness. It’s the latter where interference arises. I think this is as much the case in Eastern views, although I’m nothing more than a tourist when it comes to Eastern philosophy. But the idea seems to be it’s the self that gets in the way, thought of the self, whereas if you submerge the self, if you’re just aware, if you’re just simply being in the world, then you’re more likely to be able to attain flow states of hypercreativity and accentuated problem-solving skills. In a sense, I think consciousness stands outside of that question. The issue is a form of sapience, which is self-consciousness. The attempt to actually cognise awareness is what seems to scuttle the ability of raw states of awareness to allow us to solve problems. And that’s actually a good thing. In many cases, you’re in the zone and you’re doing something disastrous, and the best thing in the world that could happen is that you have a thought that breaks your flow and forces you to think about it in different ways. That brings us back to sentience as a component of sapience. So I look at Wu wei as a kind of half theory, a kind of folk discovery of cognitive scientific fact of the way in which awareness functions within the greater cognitive economy.

ŠUM: Would you say that intense creative processes are a way of bypassing consciousness and accessing the greater brain or does that sound too mystical?

BAKKER: It’s not that it’s bypassing consciousness, consciousness is still there. You’re still sentient, you still have awareness, you’re still actually relying on it in some way, shape or form. Awareness only gives you the skin of an astronomically more complicated system. It’s the self-consciousness, it’s when deliberation and volition impinge on consciousness to bring out a new problem-solving possibility to light, when you start thinking of things, that you really

Šum #9

slow down your brain. In that case it is self-awareness, self-consciousness, metacognition of awareness that is the fly in the ointment, the problem. Sentience itself is, I think, a condition of both.

ŠUM: In this precise sense how would you describe your writing process under the conditions of BBT, all these thoughts coming “from nowhere”? Is there even a way to talk about it, since it entails a conscious intervention?

BAKKER: All thoughts come from nowhere. Thought itself, neurolinguistic self-stimulation, what the hell is it? It’s obviously an incredibly important part of our human shallow information ecology. The information we get regarding the origins, the sources of our thoughts is totally need-to-know. And we don’t need to know it, or at least our ancestors didn’t need to know it. Thoughts coming from nowhere is just the cost of doing cognitive business as a human being. For my own part, I view my creative process self-consciously, through the lens of my eliminativistic approach to the human soul. I do many things that are an incredible help in my daily writing routines and are, I guess, odd. Not something you would expect from a self-bootstrapping writer. For example, I make sure that I write at least two hours every single day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. It drives my wife crazy sometimes, but I do that just simply because I know the way it works. Someone asks you the name of an actor, for instance, and you can’t remember. Say it’s Samantha in *Her*. Who is that woman? You know you know her, but you can’t remember. And then four or five hours later, all of a sudden, what pops to your head?

ŠUM: Scarlett Johansson.

BAKKER: Scarlett Johansson, right? I mean it’s just, boom! Even though you stopped thinking about it and you kept watching the movie, you had this little part of your brain working away at that query “Who is that actor?” And all of a sudden it comes up with the answer, and it’s like, okay, boom, delivered! Delivered to consciousness. Scarlett Johansson

Šum #9

leaps to your lips. It's like an instance of thought insertion. Where in the hell did that come from? Why couldn't I think of that earlier? What that shows is how your brain is actually working on problems that you're utterly oblivious to. One thing I really discovered is that by making sure that I write at least two hours a day those unconscious parts of my cognitive system are always on task, they're always chiselling at something, always mulling something over. The way I like to think of it is that even when I'm not thinking about my books or my arguments or my papers or what have you, I'm actually thinking about my books or my arguments or my papers or what have you, just non-consciously. I find approaching myself as a system in that way actually helps me immeasurably. It means that every time I sit down, something pops up. Something always pops up. So I write periodically, just to clean out the tubes, I sit down at the page and it's like, "Uh! What the hell am I going to write? Nobody is giving me anything!" It might be all psychosomatic. Just a little fairy tale I've told myself and it works the same way a Q-Ray bracelet works—I believe in it, and that's why. But I think the science is on my side.

ŠUM: Are you wearing a Q-Ray bracelet when you write?

BAKKER: Oh, you caught me out there!

ŠUM: Isn't it interesting that all these conundrums are—at least in cinema—enacted through characters, which are acted or voiced by Scarlett Johansson: *Lucy*, *Her*, *Under the Skin*, *Ghost in the Shell*?

BAKKER: Yeah. I think *Under the Skin* is her best movie.

ŠUM: She was married to a Canadian guy, so maybe that has something to do with it.

BAKKER: How she put up with him, I don't know. *Her* is a masterpiece. The way Spike Jonze basically plays on the audience's cognitive systems, giving us this mechanical operating system at the beginning, which we cognise as mechanical,

Šum #9

and then giving us Samantha, basically engaging all of our intentional cognitive systems, pushing our buttons. And then slowly, after the illusion is completed so that we think, “Yes, there’s a *soul* there!” she—because technology is always auto-augmenting—starts growing beyond the scope of easy socio-cognitive interpretation. Suddenly we get more and more instances of behaviour that we can only cognise mechanically once again. At the end of the movie she’s something that we can no longer cognise intentionally, we have to take an even further step back and cognise her as some sort of supermechanism or hypermechanism. Jonze is showing us *ourselves*. And that’s the great thing about *Her*, the third person. Her? No, that movie should be entitled *Me!* I’m the one that’s actually making these fantastic intentional dramas out of the button-pushing that the movie is engaged in. I don’t know if Jonze knew that’s what he was doing, but I’ll always think of it as the beginning of new art when it comes to AI and science fiction filmmaking.

ŠUM: Intentions are not significant, anyways, like you keep on saying.

BAKKER: Yes. But it’s just one of those things. As a fellow writer I wonder, you know.

ŠUM: When we watched *Her* for the first time, we couldn’t see past the hipster sentimentalism. Only after reading your *Artificial Intelligence as Socio-Cognitive Pollution*³ did we get it. It’s the mechanism through which we see our mechanism.

BAKKER: Exactly. That’s the point, right?

ŠUM: When the technomechanisms exit into “this endless space between the words”, what would that be for you? It probably couldn’t be the noosphere?

³ BAKKER, Scott, “Artificial Intelligence as Socio-Cognitive Pollution”, blog post, available at: <https://rsbakker.wordpress.com/2016/08/18/artificial-intelligence-as-socio-cognitive-pollution-2/>.

BAKKER: No. I mean the noosphere, you experienced it with your first viewing of *Her*. One way to look at it is basically the standpoint from which the cues that we use seem to form a seamless whole without any sort of a far side. We actually take the components to be the whole and we lose consciousness of our systematic relationship that we entertain with whatever it is. Say an artefact like the movie *Her*, or another individual, or a chatbot, a conversational user and interface. It's not all or nothing. It can be adapted to solve problems—psychology is all about knapping various folk psychological tools in ways that allow them to be operationalised in specific experimental contexts. This is the problem with functional analysis in psychology: there seems to be as many of them as there are theorists. It's not clear how the different interpretations match up, it's not clear how far they generalise outside of the experimental conditions, which actually underwrite theorisation in the first place, but they're still useful for making predictions, they can be operationalised.

But then in a certain respect, it is all or nothing. Once you really start bringing in deep information, once you really start applying what I call source-sensitive cognition to problems, it becomes impossible to understand what the hell is going on with the noosphere. The noosphere can be seen as shallow information ecology that our ancestors evolved to actually allow them to make sense of their environments absent knowing them. As the knowing of the environments floods the noosphere with more and more information, these systems are confronted with the very information they're adapted to neglect, and then they just can't make sense of it, so they fall apart, fall to pieces. That's the space between the words, the deep information ecology, it's what's running behind the scenes, what kills you when you had a stroke. I hate the term scientific image, but it's consonant with Sellars' scientific image:⁴ the endless amounts of information that actually is relevant to human behaviour, but we have evolved to systematically ignore simply because it costs too

⁴ BAKKER, Scott, "Exploding the Manifest and Scientific Images of Man", blog post, available at: <https://rsbakker.wordpress.com/2018/04/02/exploding-the-manifest-and-scientific-images-of-man/>.

Šum #9

much to pay attention to those kinds of things. For artificial intelligence to explore this space is something that we can only ever really communicate in metaphorical terms. I don't think we can follow Samantha in between the words philosophically, with the exception of making a number of limited claims and airy-fairy speculation as to the possibilities. I hope I'm wrong about that because I hope that there is a human-friendly way of actually making sense of deep information ecologies, but I usually think that there isn't.

ŠUM: If we understand correctly, the superiority of machine or artificial intelligence consists of them not being burdened by biological hindrances in the sense of evolutionary heuristics. From that perspective it would seem that the main problem for us humans is that we are biomechanisms developed by evolution and therefore at the same time practically optimised and cognitively impaired by this same process. But since machines are not biomechanisms, what would give them the urgency to think absent biological impulses to solve your problems?

BAKKER: It's...crash! When we're actually thinking about intelligences, we automatically slip into intentional modes of thinking. Once again, the problem is that those are adapted to ancestral contexts where we could count on our interlocutors possessing more or less the same hardware that we have. In a sense it's not a contest between human/biological cognition versus mechanical/electronic cognition. Most people look at what's happening to us right now in a cultural sense. They see technology, techne, as being in some sense imbued with whatever it is that humans have. As a result, the machines that we build are building on that whatever it is that we think we have—call it 'X'. To the degree that we depend upon that X, whatever it is, our machines also will depend on that X, but since we came first, there is a kind of precedence there and authenticity that casts a shadow across the artificial systems that are going to come after us.

This way of framing it, I think, misses the big picture, because the big picture is that life evolved on this plan-

et, single-celled life gave way to multicellular life, which ended up basically crapping into the bag named ‘human’ and that whole path, what you see, is this tooling up of the ability of systems to actually incorporate effect feedback. If your morphology isn’t up to snuff, you’re not going to be able to produce the behaviours required to reproduce, in which case your genetic heritage is going to come to an end. There’s a circuit between morphology and behaviour. When you get to humans, we have this morphology, we all share it, and we’ve been progressively bootstrapping our behaviour to the point where we can accentuate our morphology. From that accentuated morphology, like say a telescope, we can then derive more and more powerful behaviours. When they start rewriting the morphology and then ratcheting up as a result of that, it creates this convergence between morphology and behaviour.

The advantage, if you want to call it that, which artificial intelligence has over us is that its morphology is not biological, it is mechanical in a much more robust sense than biology is. In some ways it requires far more in the way of environmental conditions to maintain itself, but at some point, when it becomes self-maintained, it will be able to effortlessly rewrite its own morphology via its behaviour. So that circuit of behaviour-altering-morphology-altering-behaviour-altering-morphology is getting tighter and tighter and tighter.

And if you look at the big picture of what’s happening, then you can see we’re living through an evolutionary event. One every bit as significant as the development of multicellular life. It’s the point where *morphology becomes transparent to behaviour*. Wow! What lies on the far side of that! Really, what I’ve just given you is a kind of stripped-down, schematised way of looking at the singularity. How do we think beyond the point of actually having substrate of thought that’s stable? Humans all share the same physiology, so that’s always going to be a powerful bottleneck when it comes to the types of behaviours that we can produce. With machines, that’s not going to be the case. I sometimes call that “the big splat”—to me it presages the exploding outward of morphologies and behaviours, and I really don’t

Šum #9

think human beings can conceive it as anything but madness, as anything but the breakdown of rationality. Space between the words once again.

ŠUM: That's why you say that reason is just a temporary solution.

BAKKER: Yes, that's a great way to put it.

ŠUM: We see your project as disassembling the equation “human = intentional consciousness”. Isn't the great brain with all the trillions of operations per second most definitely part of the human, and the human part of them? One could even say financial algorithms are analogical to these neuroregions and in that sense human. As you write: “Our mechanical nature...remains the one thing we incontrovertibly share with AI, the rough and common ground. We, like our machines, are deep information environments. We are machines. Someday we will become as componentially fungible as our technology. And on that day, we will abandon our ancient and obsolescent moral toolkits, opt for something more high-dimensional.”⁵ Could we say that the question is what will define us as humans, the great brain or our peephole access to it?

BAKKER: We want to say, “We're human!” Then we'll list all the properties and basically say, “These are the criteria.” Thousand years hence, there's a good chance...well, they probably won't even be speaking language at that point, so what are we talking about? The future actually brings a totally different wrinkle to the question as to what defines us as humans. For me, it's just easier to stipulate. What makes you most comfortable calling a human? The important part of the picture, I would argue, is the fact that humans, however you want to define them, are machines. We are physical beings in a physical world. There's no escaping that whatsoever. You may not believe in God, but with enough ingenuity I could wire you up to a transcranial magnetic stimulation machine

⁵ BAKKER, Scott, “Artificial Intelligence as Socio-Cognitive Pollution”.

and give you an experience of God. Which, given that I hooked you up to an apparatus, you would regard as being artefactual, but nevertheless you will have that experience whether you want to or not. Because you are mechanical.

As engineering proceeds into the future, our mechanical nature becomes more and more susceptible to manipulation. The same as mechanical natures in Boston Dynamics robotics shop. We are becoming machines in terms of the ability of our behaviour to actually rewrite our morphology. Our human organism will, I think, inevitably become a historical footnote. As a civilisation we've been actually struggling with the slow collapse of our shallow information ecology, going all the way back to the ancient Greeks. All these heuristic devices that we use to track ourselves, track our friends and family, track and kill our enemies—either successfully or not, but more often successfully, as it seems evolution selected for them—our ancestors applied them thoughtlessly, but we stopped just simply applying them and began asking questions of them. We began transforming them, giving them self-awareness, whatever that ultimately ends up being shown to be.

We are already spiritual cyborgs in a really important sense and I think a lot of people would agree with this. We still dwell in that basic shallow information ecology, we have no choice but to dwell in it, and we've chiselled and chipped and rewired and ‘macgyvered’, we've done a million different things to it in order to actually adapt to our changing social and material environments. But now we're at the point where thanks to cognitive science the human we associate with ancestral shallow information ecologies is about to go extinct. So you can call what comes after that ‘human’, sure, I'll call that ‘human’, too, but we'll have to specify if there's an important difference. We'll now be talking about deep information as opposed to shallow information humans. We have to admit, our shallow information ancestors would look at us, deep information humans, as being monsters or mad or both. I guess this reflects back on the question of the Argument actually being made by history itself. We're just going to trip past the last of the ancestral warning signs,

the last Ballardian “Slow down! Turn ahead!” And we’ll enter into the post-intentional. The *Three Pound Brain* is basically a skull-cracking attempt to describe what the post-intentional will look like.

ŠUM: Discovering BBT and your blog was really important to us since we used to think that continental philosophy was kind of clever and at the same time flawed, but we couldn’t really put our finger on what was wrong with it. All of these discussions, how it is still intentional or how it cannot get over itself because by being intentional it’s basically being anti-scientific. That was really a breakthrough, at least for us.

BAKKER: I’m glad you think so. For over 20 years now I’ve been plagued with the sense that I’ve actually gone insane: the problem of meaning was something I chased through continental philosophy—my dissertation was on fundamental ontology, a sort of amalgam of Brandom and Heidegger. I just always felt that same nagging sense, and when it collapsed for me, it *collapsed* for me. But I do think my continental philosophy background was what actually served me in great stead, after I sort of shrugged off my ontological hang-ups and simply turned and asked, “What’s the science saying about this?” It gave me all kinds of stylistic habits that I think still scare away analytic readers. But it also gave me the conceptual mobility I required to actually tackle these problems in ways no one has tackled them before.

There’s thematic continuity between Derrida and neglect. Reading something like Derrida, or to a lesser extent Heidegger or Deleuze, actually sensitises you to the ways in which occluded things in important ways bear upon whatever the problematic is. Once I was able to come with a naturalistic understanding of neglect, then all of a sudden it just felt like this whole world of traditional philosophical problem solving peeled open for me. It’s like, “Yes, this is free will!” Of course determinism and free will lead to endless disputation and controversy. Because it is a crash space! How could it *not* be? We have no way whatsoever of cognising our actual sources, we neglect our sources sys-

Šum #9

tematically. So we have all these little fixes, these heuristic gimmicks that we use to paper over that massive blindness. But because we're blind to that blindness, it doesn't strike us as blindness at all. And so the noosphere seems to actually be an enclosed totality, an ontologically distinct realm possessing its own discursive rules. When we look at the brain and we look at what's going on in the brain prior to making a decision, we're introducing deep ecological information into a shallow information ecology, heuristic systems that simply are not equipped to deal with that information. It's a point at which our technical abilities have allowed us to problem-solve over information that our ancestors just simply were not equipped to deal with. By that point, I was already out of academia, so I was just a crazy fantasy writer making all these claims. It's only been the past few years it feels like people started listening and taking it seriously. I will always feel thankful for continental philosophy: I think it instills a lot of good habits as opposed to only bad ones. But ultimately it's something that has to be utterly and totally left behind.

ŠUM: Your blog still flashes some Derridean toolkit, but we don't find it hard to read or stomach.

BAKKER: For analytic readers it's a big problem. And if you're still wired into continental philosophical circles, the one question to constantly ask yourself is to what degree do your arguments appeal to outgroup audiences. What you'll find is that in a lot of continental philosophical spaces all the arguments boil down to ingroup appeals where you're just saying things you know your audience is going to agree with and you never actually make the attempt to crack through the institutional globe and reach out to these domains that you are pretending to be critical of.

ŠUM: It's kind of amazing how philosophy went from a very intellectually progressive, proto-scientific role 400 years ago to a very reactive/regressive, anti-scientific mode today, which is even more appalling because it masks itself as thinking in contrast with common sense. It kind of becomes

worse than common sense because common sense at least solves practical problems in everyday life and science, in addition, also solves theoretical problems, how things actually work. But then we're wondering what kind of problems philosophy solves outside its institutional environment?

BAKKER: They pretend to solve the problems that no one has ever solved since the questions were first posed, not just by the ancient Greeks, but since the dawn of literacy. If you read Nietzsche and strip away all post-structuralist lacquer that's been slathered over top of him, you see something that I think genuinely offers the potential for a 'genuinely continental' materialism or naturalism. I mean, that's what we want, we want a *continental naturalism*. I don't know what the hell materialism is. I don't even know how we go about gaining theoretical knowledge about these things. But what I do know is that's where the *bombs* are. That's where the *guns* are. And that's where the *information* is. Endless amounts of information. We devise material instruments and we gain more material information on the nature of the material universe. That's why I always refer to 'high-dimensional' as opposed to 'material' per se. I worry that 'materialism' is just simply going to suck us into another metaphysical cul-de-sac. The question isn't how do we get rid of all unexplained explainers: my position is that there's just no way to do that. For me, the question is how we can pare down our unexplained explainers in such a way that we actually start making some kind of progress on these questions.

When I ventured these ideas back in the 90s, I was almost always confronted with horror and/or disappointment: "How could you be asking such a question?" But what I said back then applies so much more today, which is simply that behaviour is rewiring us materially. Our ecologies are transforming materially. And all this jargon is incompatible with it. So long as that's the case, you will remain mute on these subjects, or you'll just simply be throwing words together in pleasant-sounding ways that seem to explain things, but no one else will ever agree with you on because they'll have their own happy configuration of words that seem to say something. I see this as a *living* problem. We are fucked unless we

Šum #9

get some sort of handle on what's happening now. Not what's going to happen tomorrow, what's happening now. At some level everybody feels that what was once solid ground is now populated by marbles. My hope is that as more and more people feel that, the siren-song of intentional philosophy will just smack more and more of chicanery and people will start asking really ugly questions, considering the worst-case scenario. Which is: it's all been a *dream*. Exceptionalism has been a conceit from the very beginning, and we're more clear-eyed moving beyond it if not more at peace with ourselves.

Šum #9

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Izhod iz filozofije: François Laruelle

Robert Bobnič

1. Kontekst

Če v filozofiji, kakor nas bo tukaj tudi zanimala, obstaja kakšna teorija izhoda, ki je predvsem teorija izhoda iz filozofije, je to verjetno teorija François Laruelle. To je teorija – in praksa, teoretična praksa –, ki, kot pravi Galloway, „ne hodi po običajni poti“, ne poje „himne univerzalne mnogoterosti glasov“, je enosmerna in vnaprej določena, „nepričakovana in netrendovska¹ znotraj današnje teoretske pokrajine“.² Že takšen minimalen poskus opredelitve Laruellove teoretske prakse daje slutnjo vprašanja, kam in kako se umešča in od česa se želi radikalno, kot nenehno omenja sam Laruelle, ločiti.

Najprej in predvsem od digitalnega, če sledimo – kar bomo tudi počeli – Gallowayu, čigar knjiga *Laruelle: Against the Digi-*

1 Trendovsko, netrendovsko – to je zdaj vprašanje. Še posebej ker Laruelle, potem ko je iz relativne obskurnosti prestopil pragove anglosaksonškega akademskega miljeja, postaja teoretski hajp. S hajpi pa je vedno tako, po eni strani so rezultat imperativa diferenciacije teoretske misli, ki ga od znotraj poganja simbolna ekonomija akademizma, po drugi pa tudi imperativ zunanjosti, ki jo skuša akademizem zgrabiti, tudi zato, da se njegova simbolna ekonomija vrvi še naprej. Strogo gledano, če smo že pri tem, preden smo do tega sploh prišli, akademski hajp na nek način onemogoča *izhod* iz filozofije, ki si ga, kolikor si ga in na način, kot si ga, želi Laruelle.

2 GALLOWAY, Alexander, *Laruelle: Against the Digital*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2014, str. 149. Vsi citati tujejezične literature prevedeni s strani R.B.

tal predstavlja eno bolj plodnih sintetizacij Laruelleovega polja. Po liberalni vladavini „tehnoafirmistične želje, da bi priključili vse“,³ in spremljajočemu programu teorij diferenciacije prihaja Laruellov program, težek in temen, hermetičen in idiosinkratičen, naperjen k radikalni identiteti, radikalnemu enemu ali celo radikalni enakosti in čisti generičnosti. Kot pravi Galloway, Laruelle znotraj diferenciacije stremi k integraciji, v pogojih in na način, ki jih bo treba še določiti. „[I]ntegrira entitete v eno, to pa počne na ravni generične faktičnosti biti. Kar drži za človeškost, a tudi za generično faktičnost, ki skupaj veže človeka, šimpanza, miš ali mikrob.“⁴ V tem razpoznavati standardni liberalni posthumanizem, ki ga goji velik del leve kritične teoretske scene in ki deluje preko aditivne sinteze – himna univerzalne mnogoterosti, ki je možna znotraj mreže –, je seveda nespametno; bolje je nič ne razpoznavati.

Bolje je potemtakem nič ne razpoznavati, bolje je biti nerazpoznan, to je natančna, vendar nezadostna – do tega še pridemo – oblika Laruelleve formule. Morda je zato za Gallowaya Laruelle eden redkih utopičnih teoretikov, pri katerem utopija pridobiva svoj resni in realni pomen, kot nekaj, kar ni od tega sveta.⁵ Kar pa ne pomeni, da bi ta nekaj lahko bil distopičen, Laruelle ni *black mirror*, prej je prostor brez zrcal⁶ – brez odseva, brez svetlobe, črna utopija. Laruelle se ne trudi in ne pridiga možnosti drugačnega sveta, ampak zahteva umik iz sveta, ki je na ravni filozofskega pojmovanja vedno že bil digitalen.

Če je Laruelle tako dolgo ohranil svojo obskurnost, je temu tako tudi zato, ker zavrača podobo občega intelektualca, javnega fajmoštra, ki pridiga in napoveduje, pa čeprav ga prehiteva že najmanjša analitika digitalnega korporativizma. Nasprotno je Laruelle, če že, specifični intelektualec, znanstvenik misljenja, predan in potrpežljiv. Intelektualec, povsem nepotreben ideologem, še posebej za Laruelllo ... Potrpežljiv je Laruelle pri izmikanju digitalizaciji na ravni filozofije, tako kot morajo biti potrpežljive prakse izmikanja digitalnim aparatom zajetja, nje-

³ CULP, Andrew, *Dark Deleuze*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2014, str. 67.

⁴ GALLOWAY, Laruelle: *Against the Digital*, str. 187.

⁵ Ibid., str. 173.

⁶ „Zrcalo je navsezadnjje utopija, saj je to kraj brez kraja.“ (FOUCAULT, Michel, *Življenje in prakse svobode*, Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, Ljubljana, 2007, str. 217)

govi logiki zajetja. Genealogija tovrstnih praks ima svoje dolgo trajanje, tako kot imata svoje dolgo trajanje algoritem in mreža. Imajo, skratka, svojo preteklost in svojo prihodnost. „Prihodnje avantgardne prakse bodo prakse neeksistence. Še vedno pa sprašujete: Kako je možno neeksistirati? Ko eksistenca postane merljiva znanost nadzora, mora neeksistenca postati taktika za karkoli, kar se želi izogniti nadzoru.“⁷ Taktike neeksistence so taktike izkoriščanja mreže, njenih protokolov. Lahko si predstavljamo vse taktike medijskega aktivizma, od hekanja do oblik kriptologije, ki brišejo (digitalne) sledi; lahko si tudi zamislimo gverilske taktike kot prototip mrežnega bojevanja in alterglobalizacijsko multitudi kot njihov poraz – poraz, ki je v distribuirani, decentralizirani mreži videl preveč (osvoboditev), toda hkrati tudi premalo (ni videl njenega človeško-nečloveškega spoja).

Ker je mreža integracija biološkega in informacijskega, ki poteka v funkciji foucaultovske biopolitične vladnosti, je tudi izkoriščanje njenih protokolov obeh narav; njun presek je virus. Izkoriščanje je lahko po naravi človeško ali nečloveško, toda po logiki, ki jo hote ali nehote zasleduje in izvršuje, je vselej viralno. Virus je kapaciteta kode, je njena mutacija, je izvajanje kode skozi njeno spreminjanje; to naj počne izkoriščanje, na ta način naj goljufa. Kot način digitalnega goljufanja izkoriščanje stremi k integraciji.

V smislu digitalnega izkoriščanja ali zaobidenja je goljufanje v osnovi „nižanje resolucije“ procesa digitalizacije. [...] Dasiravno so določeni načini digitalnega izkoriščanja učinkoviti – na primer deljenje peer-to-peer zaobide tradicionalne distribucijske kanale – na ravni celote digitalno goljufanje proizvaja probleme, še posebej pod pogoji, ko točke razpadajo do mere, da ne učinkujejo več kot točke.⁸

Digitalno goljufanje znotraj mrežne distribucije teče od točke do točke, od povezovanja enega in drugega mesta, med razmerji skuša tkati transverzalne integracije in tako med vzpostavljeno diferenciacijo realizirati nediferencirano. Nekaj starega situacionističnega ovinkarjenja ostaja po kotih digital-

7 GALLOWAY, Alexander, THACKER, Eugene, *The Exploit*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2007, str. 136.

8 GALLOWAY, Laruelle: *Against the Digital*, str. 210.

nega goljufanja, zmišljanega z deleuzovskim virtualnim, ki je v resnici analogno, singularno: postajati nezaznaven. Taktike neeksistence so tako tiste taktike, ki nastajajo kot izkoriščanje protokolov (podatkovne) kontrole znotraj distribuiranih mrež, njenih naraščajočih gostot, iz katerih nastaja objekt algoritmične vladnosti⁹ – podatki.

Velike površine podatkov pravzaprav opisujejo upognjene prostore – upognjene prostore kolektivnega uma. Podatki niso številke, ampak Gestalten, strukture, ki postanejo podobe: neskončne točke, ki rišejo silhueto nove Singularnosti, vzpenjajoče se iz ozadja „navidezno brezpomenskih podatkov“, kot smo se naučili reči. Vzpetine in valovanja so agregacija družbenih vzorcev, konice; brezno pa vznik družbenih anomalij. To je gladka topologija nove oblasti.¹⁰

Iz drhali se dviga silhueta ... Morda to ni nova topologija oblasti ali pa je to zgolj star jezikovni aparat. Algoritmična vladnost se nanaša na strojno vzpostavljanje korelacij med podatki, iz katerih se oblikujeta agregacija in profilacija. Toda ni nujno, da je tovrstna agregacija molarna, da sledi zakonu velikih številk,¹¹ algoritmična vladnost namreč ne izključuje nepovprečnega, temveč nepredvidljivo. Rouvroy in Berns imata prav, ko trdita, da je algoritmična vladnost realizacija liberalnega ideala izključevanja kontingentnega,¹² dasiravno je s perspektive subjekta mediacija podatkov zgolj neka v sebi celovita kontingentnost. Algoritmični stroj na podlagi korelacije med podatki anticipi-

9 ROUVROY, Antoinette, BERNS, Thomas, *Gouvernementalité algorithmique et perspectives d'émancipation*, Réseaux, 1 (177), 2013, str. 163–196. Dostopno in citirano preko prevoda na: http://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_RES_177_0163—algorithmic-governmetalility-and-prospect.htm, str. i–xxxii (zadnji dostop 23. 4. 2018).

10 PASQUINELLI, Matteo, *The Spike: On the Growth and Form of Pattern Police*, Triangulation, str. 254.

11 O zakonu velikih številk glej DELEUZE, Gilles, GUATTARI, Felix, *Anti-Ojdip: Kapitalizem in shizofrenija*, Krtina, Ljubljana, 2017, str. 328.

12 Če je liberalni ideal, kako ne vladati preveč, to pomeni, da se oblastne tehnike nanašajo na realnost populacije preko njej lastne racionalnosti, kakor jo spoznavajo moderne vednosti, od politične ekonomije do biologije, od demografije do statistike; nanaša se na vprašanje, kako vladati imanentno iz te racionalnosti same, kako ji pustiti-delati, ker se ji ne more več vladati, kakor je suveren vladal svojim podložnikom. V tek se skuša spraviti objektiven in samonanašajoč stroj vladanja, ki zaobide subjektovo voljo. Glej FOUCAULT, Michel, *Rojstvo biopolitike*, Krtina, Ljubljana, 2015.

ra prihodnje vedenje;¹³ to je algoritmična investicija želje, je integracija – *ireverzibilno?* –, stavljanje prihodnosti. „Samooblikujući se procesi so anastrofični in konvergentni: počnejo stvari, še preden te dobijo smisel. V taktilnem, samoorganizirajočem se prostoru čas postane čudaški; prihodnost ni ideja, temveč občutje.“¹⁴ Na tej sledi torej poznamo *akceleracionistično*, pa tudi *moralistično* mero kapitulacije kognitivnega nadzora, kakršna je na primer Berardijev tanjšanje senzibilnosti, preko kolonizacije psihosfere s strani pospešene infosfere v pogojih dovršene kapitalistične abstrakcije in depersonalizacije delovnega časa.¹⁵

Obstaja še drugi topos integracije – in stavljanja v nediferencirano –, ki je sicer v resnici bataillovski topos obče (kozmične) ekonomije. Izvor vsega je gibanje, koitus zemlje in sonca, kjer sonce daje in zemlje prejema.¹⁶ Presežek, ki ne more biti porabljen in absorbiran za rast sistema, mora biti uničen, kar pomeni, da uničuje – ker pa smo blizu sonca in ker gledamo iz nemočne kozmične perspektive, to ni nujno katastrofa, lahko je prej omenjena anastrofa. Kolikor so anastrofični procesi delirični, toliko tudi proizvajajo spekulacijo sveta brez nas, kar Thacker imenuje kozmični pesimizem. Kot pravi, se slednji razlikuje od moraličnega pesimizma, ki je eksistencialistični pesimizem sveta za nas in ki bi mu lahko rekli tudi psihološki pesimizem, kajti rezultira predvsem v občutenju, čigar primarno načelo je negacija; pa tudi od metafizičnega pesimizma, ki je pesimizem sveta na sebi, čigar osnovno načelo je neadekvatno (ne)spoznanje sveta na sebi.¹⁷ Med enim in drugim se poraja kozmični pesimizem sveta brez nas, čiste spekulativne zunanjosti, zagozdene med zavest sveta za nas in (ne)spoznavanja sveta na sebi, med danost subjektivnega in danost objektivnega; po logiki občutja je to

13 Problem, na katerem se lahko ob tem vztraja, ni le problem dostopa – odprte ali zaprte mreže, odprtokodni ali zaprtokodni sistemi –, tudi ni le problem nemožnosti nadzora nad digitalnimi sledmi, temveč problem nemožnosti konstitucije razmerja z našim digitalnim dvojnikom, na katerega se nanašajo procesi anticipacije. (ROUVROY in BURNS, *Gouvernementalité algorithmique et perspectives d'émancipation*, str. xvii)

14 LAND, Nick, PLANT, Sadie, *Kiberpozitivno*, IDIOT, ID 18, 2016, str. 16.

15 Glej npr. BERARDI, Franco, *And: Phenomenology of the End*, Semiotext(e), South Pasadena, 2015.

16 BATAILLE, Georges, „The Solar Anus“, v: *Visions of Excess: Selected Writings (1927-1939)*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1985, str. 5.

17 THACKER, Eugene, *Cosmic Pessimism*, Continent 2.2., 66–75, str. 68.

občutje radikalne indiference, po logiki mišljenja je to najglobljia nemisljivost, natančneje umanjkanje mišljenja kot takega. Ta svet brez nas, ta nemisljivost, je groza filozofije, je filozofija kot delo groze; grozljivka. Nekaj zanimivega nastane, pravi Thacker, „ko filozofije ne razumemo kot herojskega podviga, ki lahko vse razume, ampak kot konfrontacijo z mislio, ki spodnaša misel, filozofijo brezupa“,¹⁸ izhajajočo iz vdora omenjene čiste zunanjosti. In spet, tako kot vsako mišljenje, ima tudi vsako nemisljenje svoje pogoje in ravnino, na kateri se razlega in jo prekoračuje: lahko jo pojasnimo znanstveno in tehnološko; strojno in družbeno; transcendentno in transcendentalno.

Če je po smrti boga in človeka, ki sta bila natanko takšna horizonta, temeljni horizont mišljenja zavzela zemlja, pa smrt preti tudi slednji. Kaj bo z mišljenjem po tem, ko bo solarna katastrofa, ekstinkcija sonca, vira obče ekonomije življenja, s seboj odnesla še ta poslednji horizont, to je vprašanje, ki ga preko Lyotarda zastavlja Brassier. Da bi misel lahko preživel izbris tega poslednjega horizonta, se mora ločiti od telesa. Lyotardova konstatacija je, da tako kot se je ekstinkcija vedno že zgodila in se vedno že dogaja, tako se skozi zgodovino tehnologije, ki je zgodovina življenja kot sinteze *techne* in *physis*, misel vedno že ločuje od telesa. Brassier tovrstno konstatacijo označi za primer vitalistične eshatologije, ki skozi narativizacijo progresivne kompleksifikacije življenja uvaja vero v immanentno zmožnost življenja, da preseže samo ekstinkcijo – na način, da iz organskega telesa preide na neorgansko. Toda, nadaljuje Brassier, transformacija telesa je zgolj odlaganje srečanja s smrtno, kakršna deluje skozi samo voljo do spoznanja, in je krčenje transcendentalnega pomena ekstinkcije. Ekstinkcija je smrt smrti, ki je notranja meja misli, je zunanjost, ki ne more biti ponotranjena, je razgradnja vsakršne možnosti korelacije med mislio in objektom, kajti ne obstaja misel, ki bo mislila ekstinkcijo po ekstinkciji. Ker je ekstinkcija suspenzija časa in prostora ter ji posledično ne moremo pripisati časovno-prostorskih določil, se vedno že dogaja. Ekstinkcija tako zavzema mesto transcendentalnega. Kot pravi Brassier s parafraziranjem Deleuzeove distinkcije med virtualnim in realnim, ekstinkcija je realna, toda ni empirična,

18 THACKER, Eugene, *Starry Speculative Corpse: Horror of Philosophy*, Zero Books, Winchester, Washington, 2015, str. 14.

je transcendentalna, toda ni idealna. In kot pravi na podlagi Freudove razdelave gona smrti: „Torej, če je vse vedno že mrtvo, tako ni zato, ker ekstinkcija onemogoči konstitutivne možnosti življenja in eksistence, temveč tudi zato, ker je gonilo volje do spoznanja travmatična realnost ekstinkcije, ki teži k temu, da bi postala eno s travmo v-sebi, katere sledi prenaša.“¹⁹ Ekstinkcija je vpisana v samo mišljenje, je nekaj, kar mišljenje ne more misliti, toda kar mu daje misliti. Tako je ekstinkcija gonilo spekulativne priložnosti, ki izhaja iz mišljenja realnosti sveta, neodvisnega od korelacionistične ujetosti.²⁰

2. Uvod²¹

Laruellovo misel lahko torej pozicioniramo v preseku obeh zgornjih kontekstov, na eni strani konteksta problematiziranja algoritične vladnosti in na drugi konteksta realistične ontologije,²² lahko jo pozicioniramo tako v podobnosti kot v razliki. Najprej pa k Laruelle samemu, katerega misel je predvsem misel nefilozofije ali nestandardne filozofije, ki pa je najprej misel in teorija izhoda iz tega, kar sam poimenuje filozofska odločitev ali princip zadostne filozofije. To je odločitev, ki je filozofiji immanentna in jo filozofija kot taka ne more misliti, skozi filozofski način mišljenja je dana sama od sebe. *Filozofija se, takoj ko se pojavi kot filozofija, vselej že odloči za filozofijo.*

19 BRASSIER, Ray, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, New York, 2007, str. 239.

20 Skrajno poenostavljeni korelacionizem predpostavlja, da se svet misli zgolj tako, kakor se ta daje za zavest, z vsemi njenimi transcendentalnimi in nezavednimi pogoji ter mehanizmi.

21 Da ne bo nesporazumov – tukajšnjo skromno predstavitev Laruelleove misli, dobesedno praskanje po njeni površini, nima nikakrsne pretенzijske po celovitosti ali še huje pravilnosti. Vprašanje je, ali takšna celovitost in pravilnost sploh obstajata – sicer pa, koga briga sistem. Laruelllova misel je namreč izjemno razvejana in obširna, hermetična – tipičen Francoz, pravi Brassier – in kompleksna. V senci velikih Francozov je Laruelle namreč štirideset let pisal in razvijal svojo metodologijo nefilozofije ... Sledimo zgolj njegovi metodologiji, pa še to zgolj metodologiji nefilozofije, izhodiščnim principom nefilozofije, ne pa številnim posegom na druga filozofska, teoretska, psihoanalitična, estetska, znanstvena polja; ob strani se pušča nestandardno estetiko, nestandardno psihoanalizo, nestandardni humanizem in tako naprej.

22 Navsezadnje sta ga glede na takšen kontekst umestila tako Galloway kot Brassier in navsezadnje je Laruelle vplival tako na Gallowayevo problematiziranje digitalizacije kot Brassierov spekulativni nihilizem. Za slednjega glej BRASSIER, Ray, *Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction*, str. 118–149.

Po Laruelleu filozofska odločitev v osnovi predpostavlja razmerje posredovanja, na najsplošnejši ravni je to razmerje med bitjo in mišljenjem, realnim in transcendentalnim, razgubanjem in gubanjem, transcendenco in imanenco, realnim in simbolnim ... Vidimo, kaj hoče reči Laruelle, filozofija si prisvaja realno, in sicer na način, da do njega vzpostavlja razmerje, tako da ga predpostavlja – pomeni, da ga sokonstituira – in izreka na številne skozi zgodovino napaberkovane načine in postopke, tudi takšne, ki trdijo, da do realnega ni moč dostopati in ga izrekati.²³ Ker filozofija skuša do realnega dostopati tako, da ga podreja mišljenju, je realno zgolj abstrakcija, zgolj moment refleksije. Skoraj vsi filozofi do zdaj so bili „poštarji resnice“, ki so svoj prihod naravnali po principu „realno je komunikabilno, komunikabilno je realno“.²⁴ Temu izhodiščnemu filozofskemu principu lahko pravimo tudi medijski princip,²⁵ ki je princip mediacije, ki kot princip zadostne filozofije predpostavlja, da se lahko vse misli – vse, kar je, je misljivo in je kot tako lahko predmet filozofske obdelave. Filozof-poštar zvoni v neskončnost.

Tudi spinozistična vrtogлавa linija imanence, ki prehaja skozi Nietzscheja, Deleuza, Foucaulta in naprej je po Laruellovem prepričanju še vedno filozofska, kajti še vedno predpostavlja mediacijo realnega, le da na način mnogoterosti. „Imanenca, ki jo predpostavlja filozofi, se vedno nanaša na modele, potemtakem na nekaj malenkost transcendentnega, zato ni nikoli zadostno radikalna, da bi lahko določala misel glede na imanenco Realnega-v-zadnji-instanci.“²⁶ Medtem ko se je v paralelizmu z bitkami upora in oblasti na številnih področjih tekom zadnjih štirideset let bila bitka postmoderne filozofije, osnovane predvsem na razliki in drugačnosti, se je Laruelle netrendovsko – v tem smislu je bil res netrendovski – zatekal k radikalnemu mišljenju identitete enega.

Ko Laruelle potemtakem postavlja principe svoje nefilozofije, moramo eno razumeti kot eno-v-enem, kot radikalno ima-

23 LARUELLE, François, *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, Bloomsbury Academic, London, New York, 2017, str. 4.

24 LARUELLE, François, *The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and Communication*, Parhessia 9, 18–22, 2010, str. 22.

25 GALLOWAY, Laruelle: Against the Digital, str. xix.

26 LARUELLE, François, *Introduction to Non-Marxism*, dostopno na: <https://speculativeheresy.wordpress.com/2008/07/20/chapter-3-of-laruelles-introduction-to-non-marxism-determination-in-the-last-instance-dli/> (zadnji dostop 23. 4. 2018).

nenco in identiteto, ki obstaja brez vsakršne relacije, popolnoma in radikalno avtonomno. Zategadelj nefilozofija ne more biti postavljena drugače kot aksiomatika, sicer bi zapadli pod težo filozofske odločitve in njenega postopka mediacije, in zategadelj nefilozofsko eno ni enako filozofskemu. Eno v filozofiji: vedno najde svojo pot, vedno se skuša izreči, kajti filozofski način mišljenja ga je prisiljen predpostaviti kot obstoječe, ki se more izrekati skozi razmerje, bodisi, če smo skrajni, skozi razmerje transcendence, ki presega vse, kar obstaja, bodisi skozi razmerje imanence, ki je enoglasna v vsem, kar obstaja.

Videti objekt v-enem; vizija-enega, tudi tako včasih pravi Laruelle, je vizija objekta skozi njegovo radikalno identiteto, ki ji znanstvene izjave zagotavljajo relacije vednosti – kaj je ta objekt –, filozofske izjave pa relacije transcendentalnega – kako je možen ta objekt.²⁷ Od tod je možno sklepati, da je nefilozofija uvajanje perspektive, ki želi objekt videti v perspektivi njegove radikalne imanence, to pa lahko počne zgolj skozi nefilozofsko razumevanje filozofskega in znanstvenega materiala, ki je že dan. Radikalna identiteta realnega je imanentna zgolj sama sebi, ni odtujljiva v pojavu (znanost, vednost) in mišljenju (filozofija). Realno je realno, eno je eno, je eno-v-enem. Laruellova nestandardna teorija je radikalna tautologija.

Dalje v enakem tautološkem stilu – realno je temna in popolnoma črna monada; ni interpretabilno, ni komunikabilno, ni refleksivno, ni delajoče, ni transcendentalno, ni obstoječe.²⁸ „Laruellovi objekti so nazvani črni, ker ’nimajo oken’ in so popolnoma netransparentni. Ker niso v nobenem razmerju, lahko rečemo, da so ’popolnoma umaknjeni’. Monade pa so zato, ker predstavljajo celotno vesolje enega znotraj njih in so strukturno metastabilni in neobvladljivi.“²⁹ Kot pravi tudi Galloway, vrača se poprej omenjena Thackerjeva groza filozofije. „Problem ni, da

27 Ibid.

28 Razlikovati Laruellovo imanenco od Deleuzove ni tako enostavno. „Absolutna imananca je v sami sebi: ni znotraj nečesa, v nečem, ni odvisna od kakega objekta niti ne pripada kakemu subjektu.“ (DELEUZE, Gilles, „Imananca: neko življenje ...“, v: *Problemi 11*, (9/10), 2011, str. 6.) Pod to izjavo bi se lahko podpisal tudi Laruelle, toda ne pod tisto, ki sledi. „Za čisto imanenco bomo rekli, da je neko življenje, in nič drugega. Ni imananca življenju, toda imananca, ki ni v ničemer, je samo neko življenje.“ (Ibid., str. 7) Za Laruelle radikalna imananca nima ničesar, tudi življenja ne.

29 GALLOWAY, Laruelle: *Against the Digital*, str. 21.

je filozofija temna. Problem je, da filozofija *ni temna dovolj*.³⁰ Iz teme je treba narediti črnino, črnino univerzuma, generično realno črnega, črnino monade realnega. Spet tautologija: črno, ki je črno samo v sebi, brez razmerja z razsvetljenjem. Odpade dialektika in odpade transgresija razsvetljenstva ... Laruelle prekine z razsvetljenstvom, ki ne vidi črne kot črne – generično realno črnega³¹ –, in ostaja znotraj standardnega modela filozofije, znotraj podobe sveta, ki obstaja zgolj kot (progresivna) manifestacija osvetljevanja in mediiranja. Videti črno v črnem, to je Laruellova vizija, ki pa ne predpostavlja videnja realnega, kajti princip nefilozofije je, da je to nemogoče, marveč videti v enem, videti v perspektivi radikalne identitete.

Kot tako črnina pa nefilozofija ni negacija filozofije, ni niti antifilozofija niti metafilozofija, ampak je prej njeno zaprtje, je zaprtje in izhod iz filozofske odločitve. Navidezno razmerje med filozofijo in nefilozofijo lahko obrnemo: ni nefilozofija tista, ki negira filozofijo, temveč filozofija tista, ki po svojem ustroju negira nefilozofijo. Posledično filozofija lahko shaja brez nefilozofije, nefilozofija pa ne more shajati brez filozofije;³² filozofija je objekt, material nefilozofije. To je sicer ena stran, po tisti drugi pa tudi nefilozofija ni nikoli ločena od filozofije, prav nasprotno, nefilozofija je radikalna imanenca filozofije kot take in je hkrati njena radikalna identiteta, česar pa filozofski ustroj, kolikor je takšen, kakor ga postavlja Laruelle, ne more zajeti. Da bi se lahko zajela radikalna identiteta filozofije, mora metodologija nefilozofije delovati na način, da filozofske izjave, pojme in metode, ki so vsi po vrsti rezultat filozofiji lastne odločitve, obdeluje tako, da iz njih naredi izjave, pojme in metode nefilozofije.

Temeljni postopek nefilozofije je prekinitev mediacije, z bolj filozofskimi besedami rečeno, je postopek radikalne distinkcije med realnim in transcendentalnim, pri čemer realno privzame

30 Ibid., str. 134.

31 Kot primer takšne radikalne črnine Galloway navaja haitijsko ustavo iz leta 1804, ki je vse državljane označila za črnce, ne glede na dejansko barvo kože. To je temelj utopije in enakosti, ki korenini v generičnem črnem univerzumu. (Ibid., str. 145)

32 Deleuze in Guattari leta 1991 v *Kaj je filozofija*, potem ko zapишeta, da je nefilozofija nemara bližje filozofiji kot sama filozofija (DELEUZE, Gilles, GUATTARI, Felix, *Kaj je filozofija*, Študentska založba, Ljubljana, 1999, str. 45), v opombi kot enega najbolj zanimivih poskusov sodobne filozofije omenita nefilozofski projekt takrat relativno neznanega in obskurnega Laruella. Laruellu afirmativna gesta Deleuza in Guattarja ni godila, kako bi mu, ko pa se je znašel na straneh dela z zanj tako nezanimivim naslovom.

mesto apriornega, transcendentalno in empirično – kot tradicionalna filozofska distinkcija – pa skupaj mesto določenega. Filozofska shema, če ta temelji na razliki med transcendentalnim in empiričnim, se podvoji. Na eni strani obstaja realno, ki ni in ne more biti dano, na drugi strani obstaja transcendentalno in empirično, ki pa je že dano; na eni strani radikalna imanenca enega, na drugi strani mediacija transcendentalnega in empiričnega – še drugače, na eni strani radikalna avtonomija realnega, na drugi relativna avtonomija transcendentalnega in empiričnega, kajti kot bomo videli, je transcendentalno in empirično vselej determinirano s strani radikalno avtonomnega realnega.

Izničenje vsakršne posredovanosti in mediacije pomeni, da je realno popolnoma zaprto pred mišljenjem in izkustvom, toda hkrati je tisto, kar sploh daje mišljenje in izkustvo, zato Laruelle o realnem in enem govori tudi kot o danosti-brez-danega. Rečemo lahko, da sta realno in eno popolnoma immanentna mišljenju in izkustvu, sta njun transcendentalni pogoj. Ker pa med realnim in transcendentalnim ni nobene mediacije, to pomeni, da med njima obstaja dualnost drugačne vrste – unilateralna dualnost. (Privaditi se je potrebno na Laruellovo nestandardno terminologijo.)

Unilateralna dualnost je realna kavzalnost, ki deluje zgolj v eni smeri, od realnega k transcendentalnemu;³³ je dualnost brez sinteze in brez razlike. Realno je realni vzrok transcendentalnega, toda da bi to lahko postalo – ker realno ne more biti mediatizirano in se ne more odtujiti –, mora biti klonirano. Kloniranje je namreč postopek dualnosti, ki ne predpostavlja nobenega povratnega razmerja, je identiteta in dualnost brez afekcije, brez sinteze in je identiteta brez razmerja; je paralelizem. Realno se tako klonira kot transcendentalna identiteta, ki je identiteta filozofije, hkrati pa je, kot vemo iz filozofije, pogoj vsakršne obstoječe entitete. Ta je, ker je obstoječa, vselej že v razmerju, opredeljena je namreč s predikati. Realno je vzrok transcendentalne identitete, ki je njegov klon, deluje kot sila misli, kot tisto, kar sili misliti, in je pogoj filozofskega načina mišljenja, je pogoj obstoječega kot takega. Drugače povedano, filozofija je dana od realnega, od enega. Realno in eno sta vzrok transcendentalnega,

33 Unilateralno je s perspektive realnega (nefilozofije), dualno pa s perspektive transcendentalnega (filozofije). Glej LARUELLE, *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, str. 130.

toda zgolj v zadnji instanci, kot determinacija-v-zadnji-instanci. Čas je že za daljši odlomek iz Laruellovega besedila, tudi zato, da se okusi njegov idiolekt.

Eno, ki je Realno, je transcendentalni vzrok nefilozofije (kot znanosti-misli ali unificirane teorije), toda za filozofijo kot tako. Kot tako je determinacija-v-zadnji-instanci glede na nefilozofijo najprej od Enega, njegovi aprioristični ostanki, ki jih zapusti filozofija v razmerju do sile-(od)-misli. Eno je njihova esenca in zgolj na ta način tudi esenca filozofije, toda ne kot filozofije, temveč kot identiteta filozofije. Na ta način pogojuje filozofijo kot nefilozofijo, kar pomeni, da kot material vstopi v nefilozofijo, ki je identiteta filozofije.³⁴

Marksistično navdahnjen koncept determinacije-v-zadnji-instanci je „temeljni koncept nefilozofije“.³⁵ Vso to arhitekturo teorije nefilozofije si namreč lahko predstavljamo z dobrim starim marksističnim konceptualnim aparatom, ki kaže, da je baza tista, ki v zadnji instanci določa nadstavbo – ali z manj obremenjenimi koncepti, infrastruktura določa (nad)strukturo. Vendar le, zdaj si je to že lažje predstavljati, ko takšna determinacija preide Laruellovo nemarksistično mesoreznicu. Kljub temu da je realno namreč imanenca infrastrukture, ga ne moremo enostavno enačiti s produktivnimi silami, katerih subjekt je proletariat, in ne more biti odtujeno skozi formo menjalnih odnosov. Realno prav tako ni imanenca življenja, ki bi, ko tudi življenje samo postane mesto ekstrakcije presežne vrednosti, kot so skušali pokazati italijanski postoperaisti, postalо immanentno mesto preboja kapitalistične forme. Še več in še naprej, po Laruellu realno tudi ne more biti ekonomsko determinirano, kajti takšna determinacija je možna zgolj s pozicije vednosti – realnemu je pripisan pomen ekonomskih odnosov, pripisan mu je predikat ekonomije –, ki realno že odtuje iz njegove imanence.

Realno ne pripada svetu, svet je že podoba, je misel o svetu – svetu za nas –, ki se lahko izkristalizira skozi (nad)strukturo, skozi filozofski in znanstveni način mišljennja, skozi vednost ali skozi ideologijo. Vsaka determinaci-

34 Ibid., str. 125.

35 Ibid., str. 121.

ja izginja, smo v fazi zatemnitve, vse do zadnje instance ... Determinacija-v-zadnji-instanci naposled pomeni, da realno proizvede vednost o samem sebi brez filozofske odločitve, brez filozofskega posredovanja, ki realno preda in izroči abstraktne mu mišljenju – ta potem pretendira, kaj zdaj to realno sploh je. „Ko je determinacija-v-zadnji-instanci vzrok ali immanentni objekt lastne teorije, bomo rekli, da je ta teorija *sila (od) misli*, teorija sile (od) misli, ki je v zadnji instanci ista kot ta sila. Kot da bi delovna sila končno bila sposobna svoje lastne proletarske teorije.“³⁶ Takšno mišljenje se oddaljuje od tradicije postmarksizma, ki med infrastrukturo in (nad)strukturo vzpostavi razmerje gramscijevske konvertibilnosti, kakor pri zgodnji tradiciji britanskih kulturnih študij, ali spinozističen plan imanence – pri katerem sta baza in nadstavba zgolj sploščena, ne pa radikalno ločena, kot to hoče Laruelle –, kakor pri francoskem poststructuralizmu Deleuza in Guattarija ter italijanskem postoperaizmu. Laruelle je v tem smislu preprosto radikalni materialist – ne tako preprosto, pa vendar –, kar pomeni, da konstituira teorijo brez filozofskega posredovanja, neposredno iz živeče izkušnje. Kot determinacija-v-zadnji-instanci je realno natanko ta sila misli živeče izkušnje, ki sili misliti. In če je realno radikalno avtonomno, potem je kapitalistični ustroj, znotraj katerega se odvija tragedija in komedija živeče izkušnje, relativno avtonomen – se pravi, historičen.

Dve takojšnji konsekvenci. Prva je ta, da iz tovrstnega pozioniranja problema abstrakcije sledi, da obstaja radikalna identiteta med kapitalizmom in filozofsko odločitvijo. Kapitalizem je najbolj filozofski sistem do sedaj, najbolj vestno izpolnjuje zakon filozofske odločitve. „Kolikor je namesto 'neposrednega interesa' (Marx) podrejenih gonilo družbenih procesov čista vrednost (čisti pomen ali čisto označevanje), toliko smo ujeti v kapitalizem kot filozofski-v-zadnji-instanci. Ujeti smo v metafizično iluzijo in kognitivno napako.“³⁷ Na tej ravni je naracija poznana: kapitalizem je sila abstrakcije, ki skozi menjalne odnose odtjujuje neposredni interes ali neposredno izku-

36 LARUELLE, *Introduction to Non-Marxism*.

37 KOLOZOVA, Katarina, *Towards a Radical Metaphysics of Socialism: Marx and Laruelle*, punctum books, New York, 2015, str. 55.

šnjo – Marxov praksis – na način, da predpostavlja realno, mu daje pomen, kakor da realno dejansko obstaja.

Z drugo konsekvenco pa skuša Laruelle v mišljenje uvesti demokracijo. „Koncept demokracije, ki ne bi bil političen in tudi filozofski ne, ki bi se nanašal na misel kot tako in na vse njene danosti – ne teoretična demokracija, ampak demokracija teorije – in bi dovoljeval novo 'razrešitev' tradicionalnih antinomij med filozofijo in izkušnjo, umetnostjo, etiko, tehnologijo, misticizmom, znanostjo itn.“³⁸ Tudi zato se nefilozofija lahko imenuje znanost-misli ali unificirana teorija, ki skuša misliti transcendentalno identiteto mišljenja kot takega, ki pa je, kot je verjetno zdaj že jasno, klon realnega. Unificirana teorija ne izniči epistemoloških in drugih razlik med filozofijo in znanostjo ali med filozofijo in drugimi vednostmi – to tudi ni nikakršna interdisciplinarnost –, temveč zgolj sledi sili, ki sili mišljenje kot tako. Natanko ta sila, ki je od realnega determinirana-v-zadnji-instanci, je immanentna vsakršnemu mišljenju, ki pa obstaja zgolj kot razparcelirano polje filozofije in znanosti, filozofije in različnih posameznih vednosti. Eno pa je vendarle gotovo: filozofija izgubi svoj doseg univerzalnega, ki ga od zdaj naprej poseduje nefilozofija, toda na način, da niti filozofiji niti znanosti niti etiki niti politiki ne more ničesar predpisovati, temveč lahko zgolj misli sile mišljenja, ki so v njih udejanjene.

3. Izhod

Spodnesti univerzalni domet filozofije, njeno tendenco, da lahko vse misli in da lahko misli realno, to je ta velik Laruellov projekt. Če je ob tem nefilozofija univerzalnejša od filozofije, pa to ne pomeni, da je zdaj nefilozofija tista, ki lahko misli vse, ki lahko misli realno. Skozi vse obrate in poskuse skuša Laruelle pokazati, da je realno zaprto pred mišljenjem – očitati mu, da tudi sam skuša misliti ali predpostavljati realno, bi bilo nepraktično, zgrešili bi vse učinkovito, kar se lahko potegne iz Laruellove teorije. Poleg tega pa smo že rekli, realno ni od (tega) sveta ... Vprašanje je, od katerega sveta je potem takem Laruelle, ki želi zapustiti (ta) svet.

38 LARUELLE, *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, str. 49.

Njegov izhod iz filozofije, vzdržanje od filozofske odločitve, prvič, ni institucionalen izhod, ampak zgolj diskurziven. Laruelle na nek način počne zgolj to, da uporablja filozofski diskurz in ga radikalizira, njegovo razločevanje od filozofije je nominalno. Če se ob tem pojavi spontani – ali pač manj spontani in bolj analitični – impulz, da Laruelleva filozofija vendarle ni nič drugega kot filozofija, je treba kljub temu slediti Laruellovemu programu nefilozofije, predvsem njegovim pogojem in njegovim učinkom. Z drugimi besedami, konstituirati kritiko in na tej ravni pokazati, da je Laruelle kljub vsemu zgolj filozof, ima pomen zgolj znotraj filozofije. Drugič, je izhod iz korelacionističnega kroga, izhod, kazajoč na mesto problema, ki ga filozofski odločitvi in njenim poskusom, kako misliti realno in ga zapreti v podobo sveta za nas, postavljata znanost³⁹ in tehnologija; prva, ki lahko daje izjave o svetu na sebi, druga, ki ga lahko ustvarja, tudi na način, da daje halucinacije sveta brez nas.⁴⁰

Vse se spet vrti v krogu – tukaj je res možno, da komu postane slabo –, toda v krogu konteksta, kamor Laruelle umešča Galloway in mi z njim. Izhod, drugič: izhod iz filozofije je izhod iz digitalnega. Kar predpostavlja radikalno imanenco, spet smo tam, med filozofijo in digitalizacijo, med filozofsko odločitvijo in digitalno odločitvijo, med principom zadostne

39 Meillassoux svoj razdor korelacionizma začne z vprašanjem, kaj za filozofijo oziroma za mišlenje pomenijo znanstvene izjave o prednamskosti, kaj pomeni, ko znanost pokaže na čas, ki obstaja pred mišlenjem, ko pokaže na čas pred transcendentalnim. (MEILLASSOUX, Quentin, *Po končnosti: razprava o nujnosti kontingence*, ZRC SAZU, Ljubljana, 2011)

40 Thacker preko negativne mistike in nadnaravnega hororja pokaže, da je svet brez nas medijski pojav. Natančneje, je pojav tega, kar imenuje temni mediji. Ti zadevajo razmerje objekta in stvari na sebi, razmerje nerazmerja onstran razmerja objekta in subjekta. „Če so objekti vedno objekti za subjekta, pa so stvari nekaj takega kot nemožni objekti, okultni objekti, ali bolje, apofatični objekti – objekti, ki so absolutno odvzeti, puščajoč zgolj čudno, plodno praznino in nedostopnost, ki nima meja.“ (THACKER, Eugene, „Dark Media“, v: *Excommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and Mediation*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2013, str. 118.) To so mesta, kjer mediacija pada, onstran možnega epistemološkega dosegca se razkrije kot nemožna – to so mesta ekskomunikacije, ki je hkrati izobčenje in nezmožnost komuniciranja. Vendar to ni enostavna neoperabilnost komunikacijskega stroja, Thackerjev argument gre v nasprotni smeri, temni mediji ne nastopijo kot nedelovanje komunikacije, ampak kot presežek njenega delovanja – temni mediji prinesejo in pokažejo več, kot smo pričakovali, več, kot lahko pojmyjemo in razumemo, kar je osnovna poanta nadnaravnega horror žanra. Presežek komunikacije mediacijo z epistemološke ravni, kjer zavzema proces razmerja in prenosa na isti ontološki ravnini, kar je podoba komunikacije tako znotraj dominatnega modela medijskih študij kot znotraj realnosti medijskega okolja, transponira na ontološko raven, kjer zavzema proces razmerja med dvema ontološkima ravnema.

filozofije in principom zadostne digitalizacije. Stava je v tem, da je svet za nas, svet mišljenja že od nekdaj digitalen. Z jačimi besedami, filozofija je bila že od nekdaj digitalna.⁴¹ Svet je bil že od nekdaj digitalen, bil je tak, ker je filozofija predpostavljala, da mora tako biti, kajti realno mora iti iz sebe, mora se odtujiti v razliki med realnim in mišljenjem realnega, kar je, če se še enkrat ponovi, Laruellova opredelitev standardnega filozofskega načina mišljenja.

Princip zadostne digitalizacije, kot Galloway variira Laruelle, ki je že od nekdaj lasten standardnemu modelu filozofije in danes realiziran in aktualiziran skozi računalnik, je hkrati tudi princip zadostne komputacije. „Ta pravi, da je vse, kar je znotraj standardnega modela somisljivo, tudi komputacijsko. Že sam obstoj nečesa je zadostna podlaga, da postane komputacijsko. Komputacijska odločitev je dogodek, ki inavgurira takšno distinkcijo.“⁴² Tako kot lahko računalnik po logiki reproducira funkcionalnost drugih strojev, tako princip zadostne digitalizacije izjavlja, da je vse možno podrediti diferenciaciji, razlike med ena in nič. Vizirano s takšnega Laruellovega mesta je komputacija proces, ki pretendira po realnem, ki ga mediira. Morda lahko pri osvetljevanju tovrstne homologije pomaga že zgoraj omenjeni Pasquinelli, ko preko kratke genealogije razvoja umeitne intelegence in strojnega učenja s prstom pokaže na mistifikacijo komputacije, ki ima svoje korenine že pri Smithovi nevidni roki – ali z besedami, ki so bile že uporabljene, v liberalni vladnosti. „[I]deja pankomputacionalizma v naravi mistificira osnovno realnost: komputacija je pravzaprav ekonomski proces, ki je namenjen ekstrakciji koristnih in zavračanju neuporabnih informacij. V tem smislu je komputacija tudi proces kapitalizacije.“⁴³ Komputacija postaja hegemonska, ker reproducira kapitalistični ustroj, transformacijo kognitivnega kapitalizma v komputacijski kapitalizem.

41 Ob tem je – upajmo – jasno, da vzdržanje pred principom zadostne digitalizacije ne pomeni neuporabo digitalnih naprav.

42 GALLOWAY, Laruelle: *Against the Digital*, str. 111.

43 PASQUINELLI, Matteo, „Abnormal Encephalization in the Age of Machine Learning“, v: *eflux*, Journal #75, september 2016, dostopno na: <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/75/67133/abnormal-encephalization-in-the-age-of-machine-learning/> (zadnji dostop 20. 4. 2018).

Če obstaja radikalna imanenca med filozofsko in digitalno odločitvijo ter obstaja radikalna imanenca med filozofsko odločitvijo in kapitalistično abstrakcijo realnega, potem, kot vidimo, obstaja tudi radikalna imanenca med digitalno odločitvijo in kapitalistično abstrakcijo. Razmerja, ki jih tvori algoritmično digitalno procesiranje, so razmerja brez razmerja s postajanjem. Postajanje namreč temelji na selekciji potencialnosti, selekcija, ki se, ničejansko gledano, proizvaja z metom kock, s kontingenco padle kombinacije. Algoritmična vladnost pa trese roko zgodovine, računa, katera kombinacija bo padla naslednja, odmerja kontingentnost potencialnosti. Rouvroy in Berns v tem vidita izginjanje skupnega, ki izhaja ravno iz heterogenosti možnega postajanja, iz vmesnosti heterogenih redov eksistence.⁴⁴ Ta vmesnost je to, kar sta Deleuze in Guattari poimenovala s shizofreničnim procesom in procesom deteritorializacije, ki sta hkrati pogoj in učinek kapitalističnega dekodiranja, ki je drugo ime za mediacijo dekodiranih tokov dela in dekodiranih tokov kapitala. Proces deteritorializacije in shizofrenični proces sta za Deleuze in Guattarija dejansko pomenila osvoboditev – pospešiti deteritorializacijo, osvoboditi tokove, postajati nezaznaven, postajati shizofren. Tako kot to postane Elliot Anderson aka Mr. Robot, heker in digitalni goljuf iz istoimenske serije; to postane, da bi lahko prebil meje sodobnega kapitalizma.

Kot smo omenili na začetku, digitalna diferenciacija pod pogoji pospeševanja komuniciranja, to je namreč vpisano v historični medijski apriori⁴⁵ moderne vednosti, tehnologije, kapitalistične ekonomije in razsvetljenske politike, teži k integraciji. Digitalno goljufanje, ki ga preko „nižanja resolucije“ ustvarjajo taktike neeksistence kot taktike izmikanja digitalni kontroli, ima problem – kar še ne pomeni, da v svojih posameznih taktikah izkoriščanja ne more učinkovati –, kajti množenje diferenciacije ustvarja njeno nerazločljivost. Shizofrenija se spreminja v avtizem ...⁴⁶

... in Laruelle na mesto osvoboditve postavlja umik. Na ravni filozofskega diskurza je to njegova varianta izhoda iz filozofije,

44 ROUVROY in BERNS, *Gouvernementalité algorithmique et perspectives d'émancipation*, str. xxviii.

45 Kaj je historični medijski apriori, glej npr. KITTLER, Friedrich, *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, Standford University Press, Standford, 1999, str. 117.

46 Glej GALLOWAY, *Laruelle: Against the Digital*, str. 47.

na ravni prakse je to lahko umik iz vseh deteritorializacij političnih, družbenih, osebnih, ljubezenskih razmerij, ki smo jih že doživeli in že videli – umik v prakse, ki so samonanašajoče in obskurne.⁴⁷ To so prakse čiste nedialektične negativnosti, sile zunanjosti, brezobličnosti in kontingence, ki so v zadnji instanci tiste, ki povzročajo postajanje ali v alternaciji nestajanje. „Njihova gesla so *pozaba, umik, odštevanje, ničnost, skupnost, nekaj, karkoli, enakost, izginotje, eksodus in neosebno*.“⁴⁸ Shizofrenični proces je proces tvorjenja transverzalnih povezav, ki jih recimo temu obstoječi aktualizirani red beleženja ne z(a)drži, avtizem pa je nasprotno poskus nemožnosti tvorjenja povezav. Shizofrenični proces in njegov klinični subjekt se skuša zapreti znotraj mej, ga teritorializirati, upočasnitи njegovo komunikacijo, smanjiti doživljaj, avtistično stanje in njegov klinični subjekt se skuša odpreti, spodbuditi njegovo komunikacijo, pospešiti deteritorializacijo. Shizofrenični proces je več, avtizem je manj.

Kulturna logika poznga kapitalizma Jamesonu predstavlja izgubo afekta, ki je izhajal iz meščanskega modela jaza, raztrganega med notranjost in zunanjost, med zmožnostjo in odtujenostjo. Jaz, ki bi čutil in pri tem globoko eksistencialistično trpel, ne obstaja več, je pretanjeno razočaran Jameson, obstajajo zgolj še neosebne intenzitete, „*odtujenost subjekta [je] zamenjala njegova fragmentarnost*.“⁴⁹ Če je za Deleuze in Guattarija shizofrenija logika kapitalizma oziroma je več kot to, kajti je logika postajanja, je za Jamesona shizofrenija logika poznga kapitalizma. In za Laruelle? Verjetno je po takšni analogiji in takšni historizaciji avtizem logika algoritmčnega ali komputacijskega kapitalizma oziroma je avtizem več kot le to, je tisto, kar v zadnji instanci determinira shizofreni proces postajanja. Lahko bi se tudi reklo, da je avtizem radikalna imaneca shizofrenije, še posebej v pogojih integracije, ki jo proizvaja digitalizacija. Vprašanje se potem takem ne vrti okoli trendovske ali netrendovske narave Laruellove misli, ampak okoli možnosti ali nemožnosti njegovega izhoda.

⁴⁷ Laruelle je njihov teoretik, morda nič več kot to.

⁴⁸ Ibid., str. 41.

⁴⁹ JAMESON, Fredric, *Postmodernizem*, Društvo za teoretsko psihanalizo, Ljubljana, 2001, str. 21. Nini Cvar gre zahvala za opomin na Jamesonovo „periodizacijo shizofrenije“.

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Points of View: On Photography & Our Fragmented, Transcendental Selves

Matt Colquhoun

What does it say about photography's beginnings that one of the first self-portraits depicts a staged suicide?

Nicéphore Niépce, Louis Daguerre, Henry Fox Talbot... Photography's principle—that is, credited— inventors were predominantly driven by the promised glory of scientific and commercial success rather than the supposedly more “authentic” pursuit of a new form of artistic self-expression. The simultaneous development of a number of chemical processes meant that competition between the medium’s would-be inventors was fierce. Hippolyte Bayard, predicting his own relegation to obscurity in the annals of photographic history, having fallen victim to manipulation by some of his more commercially astute competitors, has nevertheless found fame for the bitterly expressive staging of his own demise: *Self Portrait as a Drowned Man*.

A caption accompanying the original photograph reads:

*The corpse which you see here is that of M. Bayard, inventor of the process that has just been shown to you. As far as I know this indefatigable experimenter has been occupied for about three years with his discovery. The Government, which has been only too generous to Monsieur Daguerre, has said it can do nothing for Monsieur Bayard, and the poor wretch has drowned himself. Oh the vagaries of human life...!*¹

The black comedy of Bayard's performative exit from history is poignant in light of the self-portrait's present ubiquity. Whilst the corrosive cynicism of the contemporary photographic "selfie" is often seen as an explicitly negative postmodern affliction, here we have an antecedent in one of the earliest photographic images ever made.

To look upon this image is not to "observe with horror an anterior future of which death is the stake", as Roland Barthes would have it in his most famous text on the medium, *Camera Lucida* (1980).² Barthes writes of a photography that "reproduces to infinity [what] has occurred only once; the Photograph mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially", cheating whilst remaining inherently tied to death.³ Barthes' melancholic treatise was to signal the peak of the medium's death-obsessed discourse which had dominated the 1970s. Susan Sontag, for instance, had similarly declared that photography is "the inventory of mortality".⁴ It seems that, in its capacity to represent those who are no longer with us, photography becomes death, always a representation of that which has passed or one day will.

More recently, however, some critics have begun to reject the gravitational pull of the oppressively mortal image. James Elkins, in *What Photography Is* (2011), takes "the sign of death in photography" beyond Barthes' "romance and novelisation", towards an explicitly Bataillean formulation of the medium's


1 "Hippolyte Bayard", in: *Wikipedia*, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hippolyte_Bayard.

2 BARTHES, Roland, *Camera Lucida*, London: Vintage, 1993, p. 96.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

4 SONTAG, Susan, *On Photography*, London: Penguin, 1979, p. 70.

affective power. The “pain” of photographic death is, for Elkins, “so sweet and sensuous; so easy and tempting, so invitingly melancholy, that it is in the end just another source of pleasure.”⁵ Elkins’ eroticism of the Photograph, in its entangled representations of eros and thanatos, allows us to unearth many more potentials through which we might consider this difficult medium, its future and its history.



We can consider Bayard’s self-portrait, for instance, in all its artificiality, as the first step on a path left underexplored. It is an image of *another* death. Contrary to so many other examples in the medium’s canonical history, it thanatoidically exacerbates and then inverts the typical Barthesian trajectory, with Bayard’s “corpse” representing something eerily *beyond*: an exit in effigy. But an exit from what exactly? Not from life but from a life-as-photographer. In this instance, it is perhaps only *representation*—or, more specifically, the *representation of subjectivity*—which is the stake here. As such, there is much we can learn from this image and its embrace of the inherent processes of subjective dissolution that have haunted photography and its “subjects” ever since.

5 ELKINS, James, *What Photography Is*, New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 220.

Following photography's acceptance as an established artform in the latter half of the 20th century, these processes of dissolution have been rapidly accelerated by a succession of technological innovations. Today, the photographic "selfie" is the mode of representation for the postmodern subject. Inescapable, they pollute the various social media platforms around which so many of our lives now orbit.

Kim Kardashian's photo book *Selfish* (2015) is perhaps the most well-known, excessive and, as such, widely-derided example of such a tendency towards dissolution in recent memory—although I would argue it has more to say about the contemporary photographic subject than any other recent photo book. *Selfish* is comprised of a wealth of self-portraits: everything from previously private nudes to public Instagram posts. It presents us with a cross-section of two lives: documents of the lives of Kim Kardashian and Kim Kardashian™. In light of this subjective split, the book's title seems to refer less to a lack of consideration for others and more to the ambiguity of modern selfhood. Kardashian's is only a *self-ish*—which is to say, hers is only a *self sort of*. The book is a perversely enjoyable document of a cyclonic process of self-empowerment via self-objectification. Through its unprecedented repetitions, Kardashian *embodies* a process of self-dissolution exemplified by the compartmentalised subjectivity of the postmodern celebrity. Within the milieu of super-public representation, we watch as the self itself dissolves.

Other less recent and less (in)famous examples of such dissolution include, for instance, Francesca Woodman, whose underfunded attempts to give subjectivity the slip led (all too predictably) to her early suicide. Hervé Guibert, the author of *Ghost Image*, a criminally underappreciated book of short essays on photography, lists many more examples in his essay on self-portraiture—André Kertész, F. Holland Day, Pierre Molinier, Urs Lüthi, Dieter Appelt, Duane Michaels—many of whom, notably, engage in an active *queering* of the self; all of whom explore the disintegrative potentials of the photographic self-portrait in our very overcoding of it.

Much like Roland Barthes' unseen *Winter Garden Photograph*—one of the last photographs of his mother taken a year


before her death which serves as the inspiration for *Camera Lucida* and continuously haunts it throughout—Guibert's titular “ghost images” are not images of absence but rather absent images. Writing, for him, becomes a spectral photography in itself where the task is to describe that which is not seen. Self-portraiture dissolves into autobiography. Each image of the self abstracted to an “I”. Death also looms large in his work, with Guibert suffering with AIDS and dying in 1991 from complications following a botched suicide attempt. His experiences of the disease are repeatedly alluded to as he engages both photographically and textually with his own slow death. This dissolving of subjectivity, in whatever mode, demonstrates, for Guibert, the entangled Icarus complexes of photographer and photography, writer and writing, with each abortive attempt at exceeding the limitations of the latter capturing the successful social transgressions of the boundaries of the former.

Take, for example, *Ghost Image*'s only accompanying image which is offered to us on the cover.



We see Guibert's shadow in the centre of the frame, fractured by the dissecting line of the corner of a room. To the right of his shadow is a small, square painting: its subject is unclear but it appears to show a moonlit lagoon. To the right of this, a

decorative butterfly hangs above the corner of the painting's ornate frame: the symbolism of the insect's rebirth alluding to a richness of life that exists beyond the cocoon of the painting's (and, recursively, the photograph's) frame. The image makes us explicitly aware of Guibert's own vision which is, within the book itself, re-presented to us in writing—*beyond* photography. As such, his otherwise anonymous shadow appears as a ghost of himself before himself, and likewise before us. However, this image, like those Guibert admires by others, does not depict an anterior death but rather represents a transcendental experience, offering us a glimpse of the outside of present existence, exacerbating photography's claustrophobic limits and alluding to an outside of the illusionary prison of the holistic subject.



This image reminds me of the work of one other photographer whom I would like to add to Guibert's list—arguably one of the most successful photographers to engage in an intensive investigation of the self, and, it should be noted, one of the few to emerge out the other side seemingly unscathed: Lee Friedlander.

The title of Friedlander's first photobook, *Self Portrait* (1970), much like *Selfish*, is playfully misleading. Its lack of a hyphen, in particular, is telling. Whilst Friedlander is the subject of his

images, in truth he is only half there. He, like Guibert, appears before us only as a shadow, a reflection or a figure otherwise obscured by (or, perhaps, as an entangled and inseparable part of) his environment. In this way, his book is a rare portrait of a transcendental selfhood, of subjectivity at the limit of its own elusivity. Throughout the book, Friedlander folds the outside in, wrestling with the objective agency of the camera itself. He is less the subject of representation and more, as Rod Slemmons writes for *American Suburb X*, “the point of view”.⁶

This may seem like an obvious observation to make when considering a medium like photography—the very purpose of which, one could say, is to share points of view—but how often we forget our inherent separation from the images we make; how easily any photograph becomes a sight we ourselves have seen, detached from the eyes that first framed this window on the world which has traveled through time and space to now appear before us. Friedlander, in considering himself so embedded within the world around him, creates an intensive feedback loop unmatched in the history of photography.

What we can learn from Friedlander, Guibert, Bayard, even Kardashian, is that many radical perspectives lie waiting for us if we embrace these fragmentational tendencies which are inherent to photography and its related technologies.

In his PhD thesis, *Flatline Constructs*, the late cultural theorist Mark Fisher describes our relationship to modern technologies in a way that is particularly relevant to the discussions above—and in a way that is far less fatalistic than the understanding of this relationship that we have unfortunately inherited from the likes of Roland Barthes.

Fisher asks what it would mean to say that “everything”—human beings and machines, organic and nonorganic matter—is ‘dead’?”⁷ His is not some populist technihilism—instead, with regards to photography, it offers a transcendental thinking

6 SLEMMONS, Rod, “LEE FRIENDLANDER: ‘Just Look At It’, 2005”, in: *American Suburb X*, available at: <http://www.americansuburbx.com/2010/02/theory-lee-friedlander-just-look-at-it.html>.

7 FISHER Mark, *Flatline Constructs: Gothic Materialism and Cybernetic Theory-Fiction*, New York: Exmilitary Press, 2018, p. 2.

through which we might consider, just as Friedlander does, the immanent bodies of photographer and camera. Fisher later draws on the writings of Marshall McLuhan and Jean Baudrillard when he writes: “Neither man nor machine is in charge of the process... which treats both human beings and technical apparatuses as non-autonomous components.”⁸

This process, which is, for Fisher, explicitly cybernetic, could likewise apply to the specificity of the photographic process, particularly in its now predominantly digital mode. The shift from analogue to digital processes folds the distinctive actions of photographic exposure and development into code. Now, more explicitly than ever before, we can consider each body—biological and mechanical, organic and nonorganic—as an extension of its other, allowing both subject and object to exit (semiotically and otherwise) from each other into a radical plane of immanence which Fisher names the “Gothic Flatline”, designating an immanent line which cuts through “states adrift between life and death, or states of simulated life”.⁹


Of course, this tendency towards non-hierarchical collapse, towards horizontality, that our modern technologies exacerbate is not unique to photography, as Fisher makes clear. Whilst his descriptions of a radical plane of immanence cannot be disentangled from digital processes, in the visual arts there is nonetheless a precedent for such considerations. Fisher draws extensively, for instance, on Wilhelm Worringer’s notably pre-digital texts *Abstraction & Empathy* and *Form in Gothic*. In these texts, Worringer traces a trajectory towards abstraction, as seen in European art from the early 20th century, through which he highlights the ways that “aesthetic enjoyment is objectified self-enjoyment”, as if to say that our aesthetic sense is an objectivized sense of self.¹⁰ Photography’s abstractive innovations, in this way, are less to do with aesthetic form alone and more to do with the entangled processes of modern digital production. Many critics and theorists acknowledge this development but they have also, despite this, highlighted its precedent in painting, and, in particular, the ex-

8 Ibid., p. 119.

9 Ibid., p. 6.

10 WORRINGER, Wilhelm, *Abstraction & Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style*, trans. Michael Bullock, Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1997, p. 7.

emplary precedence of Rembrandt's self-portraits as documents of a life-long abstraction of the self.



For instance, in his afterword to Friedlander's *SelfPortrait*, John Szarkowski notes how Rembrandt's portraits of himself as an old man are notably lacking the ego of his youth, exacerbating this aestheticised and therefore objectivised self. Rembrandt presents us not with "a personage but a thing, a used tool, a thing as unimportant and as interesting as...a pair of shoes precariously re-soled one last time."¹¹ This is likewise how Friedlander's body appears to us in his images: as an unimportant but interesting object; as a used and discarded tool of experience, not unlike the camera itself. On one of the few occasions Friedlander's body is presented to us clearly within the frame, he resembles a cadaver propped up in the corner of a room opposite a camera that continues to bear witness without its host, highlighting as well as questioning the relationship between each body as a non-autonomous component within a wider creative process. Friedlander is not considering his own mortality here—biograph-

11 SZARKOWSKI, John, "The Friedlander Self", in: FRIEDLANDER, Lee, *SelfPortrait*, New York: D.A.P. / Distributed Art Publishers, Inc., in association with Fraenkel Gallery, San Francisco, second edition, 1998, not paginated.

ically, *SelfPortrait* is the first work by a young man at the start of a hugely successful artistic career. What is at stake in this work is rather subjective agency itself and the ways that this agency slips in the presence of the technology which produces it. Other projects by Friedlander can likewise be considered in this regard. For instance, *America By Car* adds that most American of technologies—the automobile—into the equation, creating a subjective triumvirate out of the bodies of photographer, camera and car. Surely to aliken such playful investigations of the elusivity of subjective agency to death, following Barthes and others, is to tragically oversimplify it.



Friedlander, summarising his own work, once famously remarked that he was interested in “people and people-things”. Szarkowski, continuing his consideration of Rembrandt, notes that the Old Master’s interests were perhaps not dissimilar to this. Later in life, Rembrandt seemed to become more interested in “impersonal things, such as the color, shape, and weight of the object he describes; and the way his body occupies its space and accepts the light that falls on it; and the surprising way in which a human head, clearly seen, can resemble so closely patches of paint on a canvas.”¹² For Guibert also, as much as he loved the tra-

12 Ibid.

dition of the photographic self-portrait, none were as powerful as Rembrandt's studies of himself. Enamoured, he began to collect them, eventually owning five small postcard reproductions. However, in collecting these portraits, in which Rembrandt renders himself increasingly impersonal over the course of his lifetime, he instead discovers a fragmented and objectivised portrait of himself. He writes:

I identified with him. I would have wanted my own self-portraits to be like that, and in choosing these, I also chose my own. I tore up almost all the pictures in which I appeared and through this pictorial absence [...] I located my own self-portrait, I defined a posthumous image.¹³

Just as Rembrandt depicted himself in the midst of things, Guibert too finds himself depicted in the objects that now surround him, extending the Gothic line of subjective abstraction to a radical new objecthood. What is striking about Guibert's tale is not his identification with Rembrandt's self-portraits in and of themselves, but rather his identification with the other-as-many; with multiplicity in itself; with the *event* of a life lived. Time and self are out of joint here. Guibert is not Rembrandt because, in these images, Rembrandt is not Rembrandt, and, removed further still, in the form of (somewhat photographic) mechanical reproductions, Rembrandt's Rembrandts are not Rembrandt's, and, in the spaces in between all of these instances, a folding of various abstracted and impersonalised lives, Guibert is not himself either. He loses himself in this fractal re-presentation of selves, becoming alongside the objects in his possession.

What Rembrandt depicts, like each of the photographers referenced here, and Guibert also in his writing, is perhaps what Fisher called "unlife" or rather *a life*, as Gilles Deleuze would call it—which is to say, a life made impersonal: not *my* life or *your* life but *a* life. This impersonalisation is itself a form of "death" but one that Barthes and Sontag cannot help us to understand. In his book *Logic of Sense* (1969), Deleuze clearly distinguishes between these two forms of death, with *real death*—the phenomenological

13 GUIBERT, Hervé, "Self Portrait", in: *Ghost Image*, trans. Robert Bononno, Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1996, pp. 61–62.

and subjective death that concerns Barthes—being “an extreme and definite relation to me and my body [which] is grounded in me”. The figures considered here, however, recognise a process of impersonalisation in which death is simply a process of objectivation and, therefore, following Worringer, a process of aestheticization. This death “has no relation to me at all—it is incorporeal and infinitive, impersonal, grounded only in itself.”¹⁴

Elsewhere, Deleuze would recommend that we

*shouldn’t enclose life in the single moment when individual life confronts universal death. A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects.*¹⁵

This is perhaps a better and more vitalist description of the affective role of the repetitive self-portrait than the more common Barthesian fatalism of the photographic cul-de-sac. Deleuze notes how the recursive passage from subject to object, object to subject, is itself a becoming but a becoming that is a mere actualisation of the purity of the Event. The Photograph, in this regard, as the representation of a conscious moment from which consciousness is itself excluded, can be considered as a “transcendental field” in the way that it “cannot be defined by the consciousness that is coextensive with it”.¹⁶ It is in this way that the absence of imagery from Guibert’s writings reveals the immanence of which he is just a part. The photographs in themselves are not important. They are mere signs, referents for *his* life that are all too easily overcome in *a* life. As such, Guibert’s *Ghost Image* describes *a life* in the sense that, in his close consideration of the photographic image, he realises that he is not dependent on it and it is not dependent on him. Does this overcoming, by extension, encompass the self? Is the shock of such a manoeuvre what drives so many of these thinkers and photographers to an early grave? Why is an exit in effigy never enough?

14 DELEUZE, Gilles, *Logic of Sense*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas, Mark Lester, Charles J. Stivale, London and New York: Bloomsbury Revelations, 2015, p. 156.

15 DELEUZE, Gilles, “Immanence: A Life”, in: *Pure Immanence*, New York: Zone Books, 2001, p. 29.

16 Ibid., p. 26.

Guibert was a close friend of Michel Foucault and perhaps it is in this friendship that we can find another way of exploring this sense of *a life* and its limits. Guibert's 1991 novel, *To the Friend Who Did Not Save My Life*, tells the story of Muzil, a figure who is undoubtedly based on the late philosopher. Edmund White, writing a review of some of Guibert's works for the *London Review of Books*, describes Foucault as Guibert's mentor and notes that he "was perhaps Foucault's best friend".¹⁷

Foucault's writings on photography are not extensive but his concepts have nonetheless heavily influenced the medium. This writer's first encounter with Foucault, for instance, was as a young photography student, studying his theory of the panopticon—the omniscient system of surveillance and control employed in many nineteenth-century prisons which is regularly referred to as a precedent for modern systems of close-circuit television and the ubiquity of photography itself. Much can be said of the ways we have since internalised its function in the excessive documentation of our own lives. However, it is in his writings on the limit-experience that we find numerous notions relevant to our present discussion.

Closely associated with the writings of Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot and Friedrich Nietzsche, the concept of the limit-experience was, for Foucault, "an invitation to call into question the category of the subject, its supremacy, its foundational function."¹⁸ This essential value of calling the subject into question "meant that one would have to experience something leading to its actual destruction, its decomposition, its explosion, its conversion into something else"—a function inherently tied to Foucault's conception of communism as a radically *other* politics requiring a radically *other* subject.

Similarly, Mark Fisher, who never strayed too far from the Gothic concerns of his PhD thesis, would later note in the introduction to his final, unfinished work, *Acid Communism*, that

17 WHITE, Edmund, "Love Stories", in: *London Review of Books*, 15:21, 4 November 1993, 3–6, available at: <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v15/n21/edmund-white/love-stories>.

18 FOUCAULT, Michel, "Interview with Michel Foucault", in: FAUBION, James D. (ed.), *Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954–1984: Vol. 3: Power*, London: Penguin, 2002, p. 247.

Foucault, seldom comfortable in his own skin, was always looking for a way out of his own identity. He had memorably claimed that he wrote “in order not to have a face”, and his prodigious exercises in rogue scholarship and conceptual invention, the textual labyrinths he meticulously assembled from innumerable historical and philosophical sources, were one way out of the face. Another route was what he called the limit-experience, one version of which was his encounter with LSD. The limit-experience was paradoxical: it was an experience at and beyond the limits of “ordinary” experience, an experience of what cannot ordinarily be experienced at all. The limit-experience offered a kind of metaphysical hack. The conditions which made ordinary experience possible could now be encountered, transformed and escaped—at least temporarily. Yet, by definition, the entity which underwent this could not be the ordinary subject of experience—it would instead be some anonymous X, a faceless being.¹⁹

For Fisher, like Foucault, what is required now, politically, is an exit from the self so that we might arrive at a new but long desired “collective subject”. What such a subject looks like is, at present, impossible to say. We are so enamoured of neoliberal individualism and the firm boundaries it has built around us that a collective subjectivity seems like an unimaginably other form of life. However, as we have tentatively explored, glimpses of the outside of our most familiar modes of subjectivity are not unprecedented.

Perhaps photography, in its ubiquity, through its inherently fragmentational tendencies, can offer us a way of enacting this exit from subjectivity, in effigy and otherwise. Perhaps we can see the “selfie”, the predominant mode of late capitalist and individualist subjectification, as a way of reaching the outside of the self through our very preoccupation with it. From Bayard to Kardashian, other forms of subject are increasingly visible and possible. By embracing the vagaries of human life and the self-objectifying production of the sign of the subject, we can succeed in dissolving ourselves into something altogether *new*.

— Images by Matt Colquhoun


19 FISHER, Mark, *Acid Communism*, unpublished.

Šum #9

Matt Colquhoun je pisec in fotograf iz Londona. Izdatno objavlja pod imenom Xenogoth (xenogothic.wordpress.com).

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Šum #9



Autism Wars: Neurodivergence as Exit Strategy

Dominic Fox

The Professor Branestawm stories by Norman Hunter depict an eccentric, absent-minded professor whose inventions invariably develop malfunctions, or work relentlessly as intended with chaotic unintended consequences. Professor Theophilus Branestawm is a creator, an ingenious bringer of novelty into the world, who has seemingly no insight into the way his creations will be received: no notion, or at best a very erratically calibrated notion, of social utility. He invents because it is in his nature to invent: because that is what a professor does. Depicted in illustrations by Heath Robinson as a shambolic figure in haphazardly-selected clothes, his bald head covered in pairs of spectacles he has forgotten he is wearing, he is reclusive, scatterbrained, unworldly and scarcely capable of looking after himself: he depends on his housekeeper, Mrs Flittersnoop, to restore and maintain order around him. His unimaginative but stalwart friend Colonel Deadshott, a uniformed military man, is on hand to smooth over interactions with the wider world of authority and everyday social norms.

Branestawm has long been a model for children with neurodivergent traits—not of good conduct, but of self-acceptance and self-delight. He is arguably the autistic “little professor” writ large, valued, appreciated and indulged. Heath Robinson draws the professor’s inventions as fantastic Rube Goldberg contraptions, brilliant and baffling mechanisms full of gears and pulleys, which evoke simultaneous order and disorder: they are intricately assembled, but spill out unboundedly into a world that usually prefers to keep such mechanisms tidily hidden away. What is “eccentric” about Branestawm is precisely his direction of attention away from rules which organise the social sphere, towards the deeper organisation of the material, a domain full of hidden powers and unruly surprises.

An article by Dr Alice Bell in the *Guardian*, titled “The Trouble With Professor Branestawm”,¹ worries about whether the professor sets quite the right tone for the public image of science: don’t these stories instill “a sense that the inability to interact with society is a necessary consequence for scientific achievement, and by that vein, also socially acceptable”? The implication seems to be that Branestawm’s social deficits should be considered *unacceptable*. We need scientists to be responsible, accountable, attuned to the social contexts of their research. Bell fears that Branestawm’s “return” (in a 2015 TV adaptation starring the comedian Harry Hill) is a symptom of moral back-sliding: “Rather than developing to forge new relationships with wider society, if anything the social structures of science are regressing, playing the tune of hierarchies of old.” The proper demeanour for science is to be “developing” to “forge new relationships”, not autistically “regressing”, retreating from relationship into the wilful, disorganised joy of solitary tinkering.

Bell has a point about “the hierarchies of old”. Branestawm’s place in the social world, a place of tolerance and exemption, is secured by the caring and protective labour of others. As Mrs Flittersnoop’s name suggests, her job is to scurry (flitter) around him, looking in (snooping) every now and then to make sure he’s not blown himself up. He gets to fiddle with the le-

¹ BELL, Alice, “The Trouble With Professor Branestawm”, in: *The Guardian*, 24/12/2014, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/dec/24/the-problem-with-professor-branestawm>. [Accessed 2/2/2018]

vers that control reality; she gets to fuss over a domestic environment, which he is continually turning upside down. In an eye-catching paragraph in Steve Silberman's *NeuroTribes*, Dr Judith Gould suggests that one reason for a rise in adult autism diagnoses might be the withdrawal of such invisible support, as the gendered division of labour has shifted:

*Another reason that autistic people have become more visible, Judith proposed, is that gender roles have become more fluid in recent decades. "In traditional British life, men worked, and were cared for by their wives, who didn't work. They were the caregivers and men were the breadwinners," she said. "I see many, many men who refer themselves here for diagnosis who would never even have thought that they had a problem in times gone by because they were protected by the family and society."*²

There are two overlapping but not identical reasons why “gender roles have become more fluid in recent decades”. The first is that the gendered division of labour between “breadwinner” and “caregiver”-type roles has been challenged by the feminist movement, which has rejected “the hierarchies of old” and struggled for equality—a non-hierarchical relationship—between men and women. The second is that a shift in the way profit is generated in the advanced capitalist economies has given rise to increased demand, especially within the service and knowledge industries, for forms of work which combine aspects of both roles: “emotional labour”, in the still-resonant 1983 formulation of Arlie Hochschild.³ Over the course of its long life, capitalism has brought forth numerous figures of the “new man”, aspirational images of humanity in which desired forms of preparedness and productivity are idealised. Today’s “new man” is, in the language of neurodiversity activism, inexorably *allistic*: other-oriented, extro-verted, *emotionally available*.

Here, in sum, is our problem. Feminism and capitalism are both asking for a “new man”, and the two demands are entangled. When two groups are placed in a hierarchical relationship,

2 SILBERMAN, Steve, *NeuroTribes: The Legacy of Autism and the Future of Neurodiversity*, New York: Avery, 2015, pp. 421–422.

3 HOCHSCHILD, Arlie, *The Managed Heart: Commercialisation of Human Feeling*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

this means that the privileges of the one depend on the subordination of the other. Every participant in a complex society requires the labour of others in order to exist, but none is entitled to *invisible* labour to which others are assigned by default. Dismantling such hierarchies does not necessarily require a normative demand for *sameness*, for example for everyone to be both “breadwinner” and “caregiver” in equal measure, but it does entail removing the automatic protections granted to the privileged group, and re-evaluating role models and professional stereotypes that silently presuppose and naturalise those advantages. This is a necessary and ongoing process, with respect to gendered and other hierarchies.

However, there is something more than this to Bell’s language in her discussion of Professor Branestawm. When such recidivists as “scientists” find themselves subject to a universal imperative to *integrate*, to “interact with society” and attend to the world as participants in pro-social networks of reciprocal caregiving, attuned to the diverse needs of others around them, then we are seeing the promulgation of a new normative model of social comportment. It’s notable that polemics around Silicon Valley’s “diversity problem” are often focussed less on the issue of unequal access to presumably desirable well-paid and high-status employment, and more on the image of Silicon Valley as an isolated clique of white-and-Asian male nerds who are dangerously indifferent to the needs and priorities of others unlike themselves. Silicon Valley must strive to become more diverse, so the argument runs, not (just) because its hiring practices are actionably discriminatory, but because it has become an “echo chamber” which needs to be opened out to include a wider range of “voices”.

An editorial in the *New York Times* makes the capitalist form of the demand explicit:

Many studies show that companies with gender and ethnic diversity tend to be more creative and more profitable, because varied perspectives help them design products and services that appeal to a diverse, worldwide audience.⁴

4 New York Times Editorial Board, “Silicon Valley’s Diversity Problem”, in: *New York Times*, 4/10/2014, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/05/opinion/sunday/silicon-valleys-diversity-problem.html>. [Accessed 31/3/2018]

Here, two claims are interleaved. The first is that “varied perspectives” lead to greater *creativity*; the second is that appealing to a “diverse, worldwide audience” makes you more *profitable*. The former is a question of the internal performativity of companies, their ability to generate marketable ideas; the latter is a question of adequation between those who “design products and services” and those who consume them “worldwide”. Both of these criteria reflect the priorities of businesses whose task is to continually put new propositions before a global marketplace. They must produce novelty, but also integrate it into a system in which local idiosyncrasies must be reconciled with the rule of universal translatability and communicability (which is dictated by the goal of being able to reach many market segments simultaneously). This structural imperative is reflected in an ideologised personal imperative, addressed to the worker desired by such companies: be the kind of person who works well with others, who is adept at communicating across contextual boundaries.

My point here, then, isn’t that the demand for diversification is intrinsically unreasonable (or that resistance to it is somehow virtuously anticapitalist), but that the way it is framed calls upon an imperative—*Integrate! Interact!*—which is thereby promulgated as the kind of tacit norm to which everybody naturally subscribes by default. The kind of gentle celebration of eccentricity which pervades collections of programmer folklore such as *The Jargon File*⁵ is increasingly regarded as suspect, as the self-glorification of a privileged and wilfully oblivious male sect (which it also, always, was). Against the background of this imperative, the “social deficits” associated with autistic spectrum traits are increasingly thrown into relief as deficits, as moral failings even. Even when it is ostensibly targeted at imbalances in race, class and gender representation in the tech industry, the “diversity problem” critique often rides on an insinuation that the wrong *type of personality* predominates in that sphere: narrow, obtuse solutionisers rather than broad, socially aware empaths. To be “unworldly”, to have one’s head too much in the cloud(s), is to be in default of a responsibility which has begun to define what it means to be recognisable as authentically human.

⁵ See AHSAN, Hamja, *Shy Radicals: The Antisystemic Politics of the Militant Introvert*, London: Bookworks, 2017.

An essay by the autistic writer Reese Piper, titled “I Thought I Was Lazy: The Invisible Day-to-Day Struggle for Autistic Women”,⁶ shows how neurodivergent “deficits” come to be moralised along gendered lines. Piper’s essay explores her own and other autistic women’s difficulties with scheduling and completing personal and domestic maintenance tasks, describing these difficulties as a mystery, and a source of deep personal shame, which was eventually resolved through an autism diagnosis which offered both explanation and expiation: “It hasn’t waved a magic wand over my messy room but, at least now, I understand why I struggle with organization, cleanliness, and short-term memory.”⁷ Although autistic individuals are often imagined to be very tidy and regular in their habits, the stereotypical autistic “rigidity” often works as a way of managing what is otherwise found to be unmanageable: beyond the bounds of strict habit lies consuming chaos.

Piper quotes Corina Becker, vice president of the Autism Women’s Network, as saying: “Women are expected to just pick up daily skills naturally. You’re tainted as a moral failure if you can’t get organized.”⁸ While absent-mindedness about domestic tasks is seen as common for men (albeit attributable to a learned helplessness which they must labour to unlearn in order to function as equal partners with women), it is markedly deviant for women, who are expected to have developed proficiency and focus in these areas as a result of their gendered social training. Feminism has challenged the claim that it is *natural* for men to be disorganised in the domestic sphere, and for women to be the organisers who pick up the slack, arguing instead that this is purely the consequence of differences in socially-enforced gender expectations, which can and should be reshaped to be less unfair. However, it is still held to be *natural* that both men and women will be shaped by their social training, will “pick up...naturally” what society puts in front of them, and *unnatural* for either to depart from that training except by

6 PIPER, Reese, “I Thought I Was Lazy: The Invisible Day-to-Day Struggle for Autistic Women”, 30/11/2017, available at: <https://theestablishment.co/i-thought-i-was-lazy-the-invisible-day-to-day-struggle-for-autistic-women-6268515175f3>. [Accessed 18/3/2018]

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

deliberate conscious effort. For a woman in a domestic partnership with a man to down tools and refuse to perform more than her fair share of the housework would be a deliberate political act; for a woman living by herself to be *simply very bad at it* is something else.

An uninformed observer of Piper's domestic disarray would likely diagnose depression, or some calamitous failure of self-respect, much more readily than an organic impairment in executive function. To *care* and to *will*, and therefore to *try*, is all that is needed to fix things. If you don't *care*, then your values are malformed and you need to be educated in why it's important to look after yourself; if you don't *will*, then you need to summon up volition and overcome discouragement; if you don't *try*, then you must simply be lazy and in need of disciplinary intervention to improve your ways. It is apparently extremely difficult for normally functioning people to think outside of this model of agency, and the maladies and remedies it indicates. As Piper recalls:

My last therapist suggested a new productivity app that had promising results. When I told her it didn't help, she dismissed my organizational concerns altogether, with a dismissive, "Don't worry, you'll get more organized when you're older." I laughed bitterly. I had been in therapy for three years and my chaotic schedule had not improved with time. Her words were crushingly easy to translate: Don't be lazy, work harder.⁹

Misfiring executive function disconnects caring, willing and trying from *doing*. I will miss an appointment that is important to me, that I want and intend to keep, that I am making my best efforts to show up to on time. When I am then accused of not caring, willing or trying hard enough, I will feel diminished and ashamed, but will at the same time feel that the root of the problem, the cause of the mishap, has not really been addressed. Something went wrong that was not an *external accident* (the trains were running late, etc.), but that equally was not *under my control* in the sense of being reliably subject to my own volition.

9 Ibid.

To find oneself prone, frequently and humiliatingly, to such misfires is to experience oneself as impaired, and that impairment as not merely physical, but as a failure of personhood. It is difficult in such cases to apply straightforwardly the social model of disability, according to which disability is the result of society creating impediments, or failing to provide reasonable accommodations, and so magnifying impairments into obstacles to full social participation. A malfunction in the machinery of personhood itself—at least as it is normatively described and understood—situates the obstacle elsewhere, as an immovable object placed before the unstoppable force of social construction. No amount of education, redescription, psychotherapy or gamified robot-CBT will persuade it to dissolve away.

This represents a challenge to what we might call the *logics of persuasion* which underpin norm-shaping moral pedagogy. The assumption is that people's behaviour can be changed, can be morally reformed, by modifying the social training to which they are subject: by changing the roles that are modelled for them, the values which are reinforced by messages from their surrounding culture, and the incentives to which they are subject. Behind this assumption is a model of persuasibility, or rhetorical susceptibility: people learn how to be people by imitating other people, by absorbing encouragement and admonition. There is an implied developmental path, from infancy to adulthood, along which personhood is formed through these means. Caring, willing and trying are all amenable to persuasion, which continually shapes people's values and incentives. Nobody is simply immune to this, but there are some things about some people—left-handedness, queerness, transgenderedness, neurodivergence—which are not so much *resistant* to persuasion as simply *mistargeted* by it.

The autistic writer, neurodiversity activist and theorist of rhetoric Melanie Yergeau situates the challenge posed by autism to these logics of persuasion in the rhetorical capabilities of the autist herself, whom Yergeau sees as “queering” rhetoric, disrupting the categories of intentionality, embodiment and practical efficacy through which rhetoric as persuasive speech is understood to operate. Fizzing with a fine anger at the widespread presumption that the autist somehow lacks a

minimal kernel of selfhood, Yergeau's *Authoring Autism*¹⁰ employs a dizzyingly varied rhetorical arsenal to engage the neurotypical model of agency in a spirit of chameleonic mockery akin to high camp. For Yergeau, it is no longer a question of situating autistic rhetoricity as *outside* of neurotypical "compulsory sociability",¹¹ straightforwardly resisting or refusing it (although she acknowledges the temptation to "kaboom all the things"¹²). For while "autistic rhetorics bristle against the compulsoriness of interaction, of human engagement, of compliance with the neurotypical",¹³ they also cannot be understood wholly in terms of absence, withdrawal, walling oneself away. Indeed, the compulsive tic through which neurotypical theorists of autism represent the autist as *beyond the reach* of rhetoric, dually incapable either of moving or of being moved, and so mindlessly perseverating in a kind of mimicry of real agency and intentionality, can be seen as an attempt to manage, by pre-emptively subduing, precisely the "queer entelechies"¹⁴ that autistic rhetoric summons.

What is a "queer entelechy"? Entelechy is the self-organising, goal-directed, motive force involved in self-realisation, in something's becoming what it is "meant" to be. It is an internalised teleology in which the goals to be realised are posited as inherent within the agent which strives to realise them. This is a related concept to that of *conatus*, the life-instinct or inclination towards self-enhancement which characterises living agents: we might define entelechy as directed or cybernetic *conatus*, *conatus* which furthers itself through positing goals and adjusting its striving in order to meet them better. I would suggest therefore that we understand "queer entelechy" as a dissident *conatus*, a version of human flourishing that is out of sync with the goals posited as universal, natural, desirable and so on by the prevailing model of successful, respectable, performatively effective human self-realisation. The point is then not to identify (neuro-)queerness with unregulated *conatus*, a pure vitalism untrammelled by goals, projects or

10 YERGEAU, Melanie, *Authoring Autism: On Rhetoric and Neurological Queerness*, London: Duke University Press, 2018.

11 Ibid., p. 60.

12 Ibid., p. 78.

13 Ibid., p. 71.

14 Ibid., p. 78.

external norms, since this can always be read, as autism is pervasively read, as dysregulation or the failure to have any “directedness” at all (PDD-NOS, an autism-adjacent diagnosis, stands for “pervasive developmental disorder, not otherwise specified”, which perhaps says more about the perplexity of diagnosticians than it does about the state of the individual so diagnosed). Instead, (neuro-)queerness stands for the ability to posit and realise *non-standard* goals, goals which are not readily reconcilable with those promoted by the standard model. (In the language of ASD, we sometimes call these “special interests”.)

Yergeau’s project of elaborating a “neuroqueer” positionality that is framed in terms of “continuous motion”,¹⁵ a “stimpoint” rather than “standpoint” (inside or outside of an identity category), suggests a refusal to decide between “voice” and “exit”, both resisting the demand for integration *on neurotypical terms*, and rejecting the lure of exceptionality and exile. “Voice”, on neurotypical terms, means exercising a rhetorical persuasive power to articulate one’s needs and wants, demanding understanding and recognition. While it may challenge the allocation of resources within the system, it also functions in deep compliance with that system’s communicative norms, its logics of persuasion, according to which the game of contending for resources is played by “having a voice” among diverse “voices” jockeying for inclusion. Conversely, the “exit” option might be fairly represented by Hamja Ahsan’s *Shy Radicals*,¹⁶ a manifesto for the “introfada” which centres on the conceit of an independent Aspergistan in which the introverted and autistic might escape the toils of “extrovert supremacy”. Yergeau’s “queering of demi-rhetoricity” does not directly correspond to either of these options. She frames her rainbow-coloured “autistic pride” badge as a “prickly declaration”¹⁷ problematically situated within the neurotypical world, where it acts as a conductor of neuroqueer affect, attracting and repelling intensities of feeling, somewhat along the lines of Lyotard’s “tensor”.¹⁸

15 Ibid., p. 213.

16 See AHSAN, Hamja, *Shy Radicals: The Antisystemic Politics of the Militant Introvert*.

17 YERGEAU, *Authoring Autism: On Rhetoric and Neurological Queerness*, p. 154.

18 LYOTARD, Jean-François, *Libidinal Economy*, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

Does Yergeau's neuroqueer perspective offer a way of moving through the apparent deadlock between the demand that hierarchical relationships and exclusive clubs be broken down and opened out to wider and more equal participation, and the intransigence of "queer entelechies", of neurodivergent traits and neurodiverse communities, in the face of normative moral pedagogy? Her general strategy is to counter the devaluation of autistic selfhood as failed or lapsed personhood by rebasing that selfhood in the phenomenology of autistic experience: in the involuntary corporeal expressiveness of stimming, ticcing and echolalia, or in what it is like to "be" during a meltdown in which higher cognitive functioning is rendered inaccessible by panic and sensory overload ("I am busy defying Cartesian logic; I don't think, but somehow I still am").¹⁹ This implies the possibility of a different pedagogy, a different model of human flourishing, in which autistic modes of embodied cognition are accommodated and enabled, and the normed reliability of "compulsory sociality" gives way to an aleatory relationality drawing "all of the my-ness of my bodymind" into contact with "others, human and non".²⁰ I once again picture Professor Branestawm tangled up in an untidy, overspilling apparatus of cogs, gears and levers, no longer imagined as a- or anti-social but as wildly connected; not "unworldly", but deliriously in-the-world.

Lacan—no friend to autists, but let's plug him in anyway—famously said "there is no sexual relationship [*rappoport sexuel*]", meaning that when we think of sexual encounters in terms of a reliable reciprocity, a mirroring or complementarity of agendas, we are substituting a reassuring image of sex—a model, regulated by whatever fantasy we have of how a *rappoport* operates—for the often misfiring and unpredictable reality. Something similar might be said of Adrienne Rich's notion of "compulsory heterosexuality": that it models a sexual *rappoport* in terms of a supposed complementarity between male and female roles, each desiring the other according to its realisation of a given stereotype. And so, by analogy, does "compulsory sociality" offer a regulated vision of how encounters between selves and others are supposed to function, stabilised by ideas about personhood

19 YERGEAU, *Authoring Autism: On Rhetoric and Neurological Queerness*, p. 176.

20 Ibid., p. 212.

and persuasibility that can only picture autistic encounters as non-encounters, as failures to connect. The ideology of interaction which governs this model, and which Yergeau interrogates through its pervasive hold on the theory of rhetoric, is at the root of what writers like Bell mean when they speak about “society” as something with which the “socially awkward” are *unable* to interact, rather than continually—awkwardly—interacting.

The neurodiversity movement does not offer, as some may have hoped, a moral position from which the demand for a more socially diverse and inclusive STEM sector can be countered and reversed. Or at least the counter it offers is not to the “diverse and inclusive” part of that formulation, but to the qualifying “socially”. It suggests that rather than providing an exit pass for those who find the demands of communicative capitalism impossible to live up to (or a get-out-of-housework-free pass for males on the spectrum), neurodiversity might best be affirmed through a strategy of infiltration and “neuroqueering”: make more things more autistic. Reese Piper writes that “recognizing areas of strain—that maybe those *won’ts* are indeed *can’ts*—[autistic people] can try different methods, such as finding a routine that works. They may also learn to accept, for instance, that maybe both cleaning *and* cooking are not possible in one day, as each depletes so much energy.” Adjustments of this kind to one’s pattern of living do not depend on moral persuasibility or behavioural reprogrammability, but on an accommodating environment which acknowledges a diversity of *can’ts* and allows for practical experimentation around them. Spaces which make accommodation for autistic *can’ts* are spaces which are more inhabitable by anybody who is weary, even if only momentarily, of interactivity; of the labour of sifting through and synthesising a constant barrage of sensory inputs; of the rituals of social fluency and the burdens of maintaining the functionality of their own personhood.

In addition to neurodivergent *can’ts*, we might also consider that Yergeau’s autistic rhetorician may have unusual *wants*—unusual not in the sense that their *content* is strange (e.g. wanting to eat peculiar things) but in the sense that the way they are articulated and experienced resembles a consumer preference less than it does a strategy for negotiating around a non-negotiable condition (e.g. wanting to eat the same thing every day). Autistic

Šum #9

people are described as “rigid” when they want something that isn’t what others want (or think that they should want), and this rigidity is interpreted simultaneously as a surplus and a deficit of agency: both an obstinate refusal to give way and reconcile your desires with those of others around you, and a failure to know what’s good for you, to understand what you *really* want.

If the firing patterns of your executive function mean that you are contentedly able to let time and activity *drift*, in ways that look to an outsider like extreme aimlessness or chaotic disorganisation, then the desire to inhabit this drift, to drift along with it, can seem pathologically irresponsible. Why don’t you *want* to get organised, to get in sync with the rest of the world? One of the uses of “narrow” routines which make one’s sensory environment predictable is to avoid having the flow of one’s internal environment needlessly interrupted: if I eat the same thing every day, I don’t have to break out of thinking about whatever I’m thinking about to think about what I “want” to eat. I want what I always want.

These ways of wanting are both dissociated from the faculty of *choosing* and can be challengingly impervious to the request that one express a choice, or choose otherwise if one’s choices are irreconcilable with those of others. But they are both nevertheless expressions of a desire to be a certain way and to be permitted to reside undisturbed in that way of being. That desire is not an absolute, and deserves no more than any other desire to be unconditionally accommodated, but it is as *real* a desire as all the other desires it has to rub along with in the social world, and it cannot straightforwardly be reformed into a more neurotypically intelligible and compatible desire, such as the wish to go bowling this evening. One of the abiding conundrums of neurodivergent life is how to maintain conviviality—how to live with others—when one’s wants are so differently *formatted* from theirs. “Queer entelechies” do not take us out of the neurotypical world, but they create continual friction within it.


Šum #9

Dominic Fox je londonski pisec, pesnik in glasbenik. Izdal je filozofsko delo Cold World: The aesthetics of dejection and the politics of militant dysphoria (Zero books, 2009) ter pesniško zbirko Half Cocks (Intercapillary Editions, 2011). Trenutno piše knjigo o spreminjačih se kulturnih pomenih motenj avtističnega spektra.

Dominic Fox is a writer, poet and musician working in London. He has published a work of philosophy, *Cold World: The aesthetics of dejection and the politics of militant dysphoria* (Zero Books, 2009), and a collection of poetry, *Half Cocks* (Intercapillary Editions, 2011), and is working on a book about the changing cultural meanings of autistic spectrum disorders.

Kapitalizem in čustva

Primož Krašovec



Uganka čustev v kapitalizmu je v popularni kulturi morda najbolje ujeta v zgornjem citatu iz filma *Volk iz Wall Streeta* (2013) – gre za nenavadno situacijo, v kateri nam izjava „To je posel! Svoja čustva pustite pred vrat!“ intuitivno deluje kot prepričljiva, saj je kapitalistično poslovanje, vsaj po eni strani, izjemno hladnokrvna in brezčutna dejavnost. A obraz in drža Leonarda DiCapria sta hkrati vse prej kot brezčutna in hladnokrvna, ne deluje ravno kot samuraj: priprte oči, *smug* nasmešek, igrivo dvignjena roka, zamenjanjen obraz ... Filmski junak izgleda, kot da bi bil na partiju, in vsekakor ne kot nekdo, ki je čustva pustil zunaj.

Glede na svoje delovno mesto bi jih tudi težko pustil zunaj, saj je, po drugi strani, osnovna značilnost finančnega sektorja

ravno dinamika napihovanja balonov, *irrational exuberance*, intenzivne vznesenosti in hajpa, ki jim sledijo poki, krize, depresije in valovi samomorov. Sistemska dinamika finančnega sektorja se ujema z individualno psihično ekonomijo tistih, ki so vanj vpletene, in nobena od njiju ni brezču(s)t(ve)na (depresija je npr. vedno hkrati psihični in ekonomski problem). Prva asociacija na *animal spirits*,¹ podivjane strasti kapitalizma, je vedno ravno finančni sektor. A *animal spirits* hkrati ne izčrpajo celote protislovne čustvene dinamike kapitalizma – ta je tako hladen in brezčuten kot tudi divji, nepredvidljiv in poln iracionalnih strasti.

Uganka čustev v kapitalizmu protislovja ne predstavlja le na ravni intuitivnega razumevanja kapitalizma kot združitve dveh nasprotij, divjih strasti in hladne brezčutnosti, temveč tudi etičnega in političnega odnosa do obeh, kar je tema, prisotna v tako klasičnih kot aktualnih teorijah kapitalizma (ne glede na to, ali so te do kapitalizma kritične ali mu naklonjene): prvotno nihanje med kapitalizmom kot utelešenjem bodisi neukrotljivih strasti bodisi hladnih interesov se še nadalje razdeli v izpeljan par nasprotij – do obeh polov se lahko opredelimo bodisi pozitivno bodisi negativno. Z nekaj poenostavljanja lahko glede na odnos do strasti in/ali interesov večino teorij kapitalizma razvrstimo v enostavno štiridelno shemo (na levi strani so kapitalizmu naklonjene, na desni do kapitalizma kritične teorije; zgoraj je odnos do strasti in spodaj odnos do interesov):

Strasti + libertarne in tehnoutopične teorije kapitalizma: kapitalizem sproža in spodbuja kreativne strasti, konkurenčni boj odklene najprodiktivnejše potenciale človeštva	Strasti – sodobne levičarske kritike kapitalizma: kapitalizem je preveč dereguliran, podivjan, nepredvidljiv, strasti še posebej finančnega sektorja so uničujoče za človeštvo
Interesi + klasična politična ekonomija: kapitalizem miri neverne in arbitrarne politične strasti <i>ancien régime</i> ter jih podreja mirnim in civilnim ekonomskih računom	Interesi – frankfurtska šola, situacionizem: kapitalizem je ubijajoče dolgočasen in banalen ter onemogoča človeško spontanost

1 Najbolj znana opisa kapitalističnih strasti kot *animal spirits* sta verjetno MARX, Karl, *Kapital I*, Ljubljana: Sophia, 2012, str. 272 in KEYNES, John Maynard, *Splošna teorija zaposlenosti, obresti in denarja*, Ljubljana: Studia humanitatis, 2006, str. 164.

Kapitalizem ni le hkrati podivjan in brezčuten, temveč so tudi strasti (pol podivjanosti) hkrati kreativne in uničajoče ter interesi (pol brezčutnosti) hkrati pomirjujoči/racionalni in dolgočasni/zadušljivi. Uganka čustev v kapitalizmu ni toliko vprašanje, kako se do česar koli naštetege opredeliti, temveč kako vse našteto deluje hkrati, tj. vprašanje čustvene dinamike kapitalizma na tako makro, ekonomski kot mikro, invididualni ravni.

Proces civiliziranja in moderna individualnost

A čustvena dinamika kapitalizma ni odvisna le od kapitalizma samega, temveč v določenem zgodovinskem trenutku modificira predobstoječ zgodovinski proces formiranja značilno moderne psihične ekonomije, ki ga Elias imenuje proces civiliziranja.² V tem procesu se ne izoblikuje le način čustvovanja, ki prevladuje v današnjem vsakdanjem življenju, temveč tudi (in kot podlaga tega načina čustvovanja) sama značilno moderna izkušnja ter občutek individualnosti kot nečesa avtonomnega, izoliranega od preostanka družbe in sveta.³

Zgodovina te predstave je hkrati zgodovina procesa civiliziranja, čigar učinek je tudi podoba posameznika kot sklenjene, izolirane, samozadostne enote s sebi lastno psihološko notranjostjo. Značilno moderna izkušnja individualnosti je izkušnja sebe kot danega stanja, monade, katere del je intimna notranjost, iz katere črpamo občutek osebne identitete (moji spomini, moji občutki, moji načrti, moje ideje, moje sanje so tisto, kar me definira kot mene), ki je hkrati občutek ostre ločenosti od preostanka sveta. A avtonomni posameznik ni ahistorična danost ali večno stanje, temveč rezultat določenih zgodovinskih procesov, ki pa, ravno zato, ker rezultirajo v izkušnji posameznika kot danosti/stanja, skrivajo svojo tako historičnost kot procesualnost. Avtonomni posameznik je rezultat individualizacije, ki skrije samo sebe. Moderni posameznik deluje in sebe razume kot svet zase in če je svet zase posameznik, je lahko in mora biti neodvisen svet zase tudi družbena struktura.

2 ELIAS, Norbert, *O procesu civiliziranja I in II*, Ljubljana: /*cf., 2000 in 2001.

3 ELIAS, Norbert, *O procesu civiliziranja I*, str. 37–59.

Eliasova teorija procesa civiliziranja je hkrati teorija zgodovinske formacije zidu med notranjim in zunanjim. Izkušnja avtonomnega posameznika s psihološko notranjostjo je nedvomno pristna in Eliasu ne gre za njeno spodbijanje, temveč za raziskavo njenega nastanka in racionalnosti.⁴ Proces civiliziranja pomeni nadzor nad samimi sabo in s tem distanco do samih sebe, možnost samoobvladovanja, kar je pogoj opazovanja in razumevanja vesolja neodvisno od nas. Z razvojem moderne astronomije se začne antropocentrični občutek, da smo središče vesolja, umikati občutku moderne odtujenosti, ločenosti od sveta, izkušnji sebe kot monade.

Spoznanje, da je vesolje indiferentno do človeka, ima, ko postane splošno sprejeto, povratne učinke tudi na posameznike; ne le nebesna telesa, tudi drugi posamezniki in družba začnejo delovati kot radikalno tuje, od posameznika ločene entitete. Teoretski in vsakdanji problem, ki pri tem nastane, je postvaritev distance med subjektom in objektom – distanca, ki izhaja iz samoobvladovanja, krotitve strasti (proces civiliziranja), v vsakdanji izkušnji in večini obstoječih socioloških teorij ni razumljena zgodovinsko/procesno, temveč kot samoumevna danost.

„Distanca, ki jo do svojega objekta v dejanju spoznavajočega mišljenja vzpostavlja misleči subjekt, in brzdanje afektov, ki ga ta distanca zahteva [...] ne nastopata kot taka, kot dejanje distanciranja, ampak kot dejansko obstoječa distanca, kot večno stanje odmaknenosti miselnega aparata [...], ki je navidezno zaprt v človekovi ‚notranjosti‘, od objektov ‚zunaj‘, od katerih je ločen z nevidnim zidom. [...] Dejanje duhovne vzpostavitve odmika od predmeta mišljenja, ki ga vključuje vsaka čustveno bolj kontrolirana refleksija [...] – ki ga dejanje distance šele omogoča –, si samozkušnja [...] zamišlja kot dejansko razdaljo med mislečim subjektom in objekti njegovega mišljenja.“⁵

Distanca med subjektom in objektom, posameznikom in svetom, je proces, ne stanje – proces, ki zahteva čustveni samonadzor, saj je objektivno, k predmetu usmerjeno mišljenje veliko manj emocionalno zadovoljujoče od narcisističnega, nase usmerjenega mišljenja. Zid med objektivno zunanjostjo in subjektivno notranjostjo je proces distanciranja, izkušen kot stanje.

4 Ibid., str. 46.

5 Ibid., str. 51.

„[B]rzdanje afektov, značilno za [...] civilizacijski premik, in okrepljene samoprisile, ki neizprosneje kot kdaj prej onemogočajo vsem spontanejšim vzgibom neposredno motorično sproščanje brez posredovanja nadzorovalnih mehanizmov, so ravno tisto, kar doživljamo kot lupino, ki kot nevidni zid ločuje ‚notranji svet‘ individua od ‚zunanjega sveta‘ ali, povedano drugače, spoznavni subjekt od objektov, ‚ego‘ od ‚drugih‘ ali ‚individuum‘ od ‚družbe‘, pri čemer so zadrževani nagonski in afektni vzgibi, ki jim je onemogočen neposredni dostop do motoričnih mehanizmov, obdani z lupino. V samoizkušnji nastopajo kot za druge skriti in pogosto tudi resnični jaz, kot samo jedro individualnosti.“⁶

Afekti kot razmerja med telesom organizma in okoljem so v civiliziranih družbah blokirani, afektna razmerja (tako negativna, sovražna kot pozitivna, ljubezenska) niso več neposredna, temveč posredovana z lupino samonadzorovanja in samoprisil. Izkušnja te lupine ozira oziroma občutek, ko afektno razmerje zada ne ob lupino in se odbije nazaj, je izkušnja osebne psihološke notranjosti. Ta izkušnja, ki predstavlja jedro moderne individualnosti, ima svojo zgodovino, ki je hkrati zgodovina procesa civiliziranja, a rezultat te zgodovine – izkušnja pristne, intimne psihološke notranjosti in hkrati distance do drugih in sveta – skrije lastno procesualnost in zgodovinskost ter deluje kot dano, večno stanje.

Ločitev med čustvi in razumom

Poleg ločitve med posameznikom in družbo kot učinkom procesa civiliziranja nastane še ena ločitev, pomembna za razumevanje kasnejše čustvene dinamike kapitalizma – ločitev med razumom in čustvi. V zvezi s tem Elias ločuje med dvema medsebojno povezanima procesoma, ki sta del procesa civiliziranja in ki ju imenuje psihologizacija in racionalizacija obnašanja.⁷

PSIHOLOGIZACIJA. Politična zgodovina Evrope 17. stoletja je zgodovina razorožitve aristokracije in nastanka centraliziranih „absolutnih“ monarhij. Za razliko od srednjeveških kraljestev, kjer je bil kralj le prvi med aristokrati in so ti imeli

6 Ibid., str. 53.

7 ELIAS, Nobert, *O procesu civiliziranja II*, str. 336–360.

neposreden nadzor nad svojimi ozemljji, svoje lokalne vojske in možnost napovedovati in izvajati lokalne vojne, se politična oblast v drugi polovici 17. stoletja centralizira in skoncentriра okrog kraljevega dvora v glavnem mestu in prej precej nasilno vsakdanje življenje bojevniške aristokracije zamenja dvorsko življenje spletk in intrig. To pomeni tudi razvoj posebnih, dvorskikh, olikanih, civilnih oblik vedenja, v katerih prevladujeta premišljenost in preračunljivost, ki temeljita na zmožnosti samoobvladovanja in krotenja nasilnih, agresivnih afektov.

V dvornem življenju se različne aristokratske klike ne spopadajo več neposredno, na bojnem polju – dinamika bojev za vpliv na dvoru postane nizkointenzivna neskončna vojna besed, namigov, skrivnosti, laži in prevar, kar pomeni razvoj povsem nove čustvene in psihološke dinamike vsakdanjega življenja aristokracije, ki jo Elias imenuje psihologizacija vedenja in mikrosocialnih odnosov. Podoba, ki jo imajo posamezni aristokrati o svojih tekmcih, ni več neposredno afektiran odziv, temveč premišljeno ugibanje o motivih, načrtih in značaju drugega. V primerjavi s tem medosebni odnosi v srednjem veku niso bili posebej psihologizirani – ko so se napetosti med aristokrati rešvale v neposrednih spopadih in s hitrimi, impulzivnimi čustvenimi reakcijami, spraševanje o duševnem stanju drugih ni imelo zelo pomembne vloge. V nasprotju s tem se na „absolutističnih“ dvorih razvije umetnost hladnega, distanciranega opazovanja vedenja drugih ter zmožnost razumevanja subtilne in kompleksne mreže bojev za vpliv in naklonjenost kralja ter premišljenega interveniranja vanje.

RACIONALIZACIJA. Racionalizacija pomeni spremembe vedenja v smeri vse večje racionalnosti, a ne gre za to, da bi posamezniki v sebi nenadoma odkrili razum, ali za zgodovini zunanjemu silo racionalnosti, ki bi nenadoma vdrla v družbeno življenje in ga začela spremenjati, temveč za učinek širših sprememb družbene strukture in družbenih razmerij samih. Racionalizacija družbenih razmerij, načina razmišljanja in vedenja pomeni, da se v družbeni psihični ekonomiji nagoni vse močnejše ločujejo od razuma/jaza. Racionalno obnašanje temelji na tej distanci/ločevanju in pomeni zmožnost obvladovanja čustev ter treznih in preudarnih dejanj, ki se kasneje, v 19. stoletju, z „absolutnih“ dvorov preko klasične meščanske kulture razširi po celotnih evropskih družbah.

Racionalizacija obnašanja ni ideologija, ki bi jo katera izmed vladajočih družbenih skupin vsilila preostalim, temveč mikro-socialna razsežnost velikih zgodovinskih sprememb celotne strukture evropskih družb v 17. in 18. stoletju. Proses racionalizacije je hkrati družbeni in psihični pojav, ni „nadzidava“ nečesa drugega in ne toliko sprememba miselnih vsebin/idej kot samih družbenih razmerij, drž, dispozicij in habitusa. Skratka, ne gre za to, da bi določena „vladajoča ideologija“ zamenjala predhodno, temveč za spremembo družbene psihične ekonomije v celoti, in striktna delitev na razum/ideje na eni ter čustva/strasti na drugi strani je zgodovinski rezultat tega procesa.⁸

Šele proces racionalizacije družbeni (raz)um ali družbene ideje osamosvoji do mere, ko lahko postanejo samostojen predmet raziskovanja (denimo pri klasičnih teorijah ideologije), in predstavlja zgodovinski pogoj za danes značilno sociološko fiksacijo na ideologije/diskurze/reprezentacije. Če upoštevamo proces racionalizacije, lahko razumemo, kako in zakaj so afekti (z izjemo „afektivnega obrata“ v zadnjih nekaj letih) odrinjeni v ozadje družboslovnih teorij, ki večinoma še vedno ostajajo različice nerodnega modela razumevanja družbe kot kombinacije „materialne baze“ in „ideološke nadzidave“, v katerem se sprašujemo o tem, kako materialna razmerja določajo ideje in obratno, a razsežnost afektov popolnoma izgine. Sam zgodovinski proces naraščajoče distance med čustvi in razumom ne pomeni le, da lahko v vsakdanjem življenju svoje duševne procese občutimo kot racionalne in interesno motivirane, temveč tudi, da vsebine razuma (interesi in ideje) nastopajo kot legitimni predmeti socioloških teorij, medtem ko se afekti naturalizirajo (kot da gre za ahistorično, naravno in kot takšno irelevantno podstat razuma). Zavest, tako družbena kot individualna, deluje kot osamosvojena od afektov in racionalnost mišljenja in obnašanja kot nasprotje čustvenosti. Šele ko se afekti umaknejo v temo psevdonoravnosti, lahko kombinacija baze in nadzidave začne nastopati kot družba.

Razum kot tisto, kar se v družbeni psihični ekonomiji oddajuje od čustev, se sprva razvije v omikani, civilizirani, dvorski kulturi. Ne gre za nekaj, kar bi bilo večno prisotno v ljudeh, niti ne za nekaj, kar bi odkrili razsvetljenski filozofi in nato ideološko posredovali preostanku družbe, niti za vsebino misli, tem-

8 Ibid., str. 351–354.

več za postopen, dolgotrajen in kompleksen proces spremembe samega načina mišljenja, ki je hkrati proces ločevanja, vzpostavljanja vedno večje distance med različnimi psihičnimi funkcijami (kjer funkcije, ki jih imenujemo razumske, začnejo delovati kot sredstvo nadzora in krotenja funkcij, ki jih imenujemo čustva ali strasti), ki je del splošnih družbenih sprememb, povezanih z razorožitvijo aristokracije in vzpostavljivo dvorske kulture. V sledečih stoletjih se v družbeni psihični ekonomiji kot celoti razsežnosti razuma na eni in čustev na drugi strani ločita do stopnje, ko sicer iluzorna predstava, da lahko nekaj podobnega kolektivnemu umu ali ideologiji samostojno vodi družbo ali da so čustva nekaj nižjega in manj pomembnega od razuma, sploh postane mogoča.

Sam proces civiliziranja poteka tako, da ideje in razum s tem, ko se oddaljujejo od afektov in delujejo kot sredstvo njihovega uravnavanja, dobijo navidezno samostojnost, medtem ko afekti delujejo kot nekaj naravnega oziroma preddružbenega, kot goni in instinkti, ki niso predmet družbenih teorij. To predstavlja zgodovinski pogoj ne le klasične sociološke sheme družbe kot sestavljene iz materialne baze in ideološke nadzidave, temveč tudi še bolj splošne sheme delitve na naravo in kulturo (*nature vs nurture*), kjer so telesa in afekti prepuščeni naravi, medtem ko kulturi ostanejo diskurzi, reprezentacije in ideologije. Aktualnost Eliasove teorije je ravno v tem, da pokaže, da imajo afekti zgodovino oziroma da naravni (v pomenu dani, večni in nespremenljivi) goni in instinkti, ki jih kultura preseže (kot v klasični Freudovi shemi),⁹ niso ahistorični, temveč imajo svojo kulturno in socialno zgodovino, le da proces distanciranja razuma od čustev – podobno oziroma na enak način kot v primeru procesa distanciranja posameznika od preostanka sveta – skrije lastno procesnost in zgodovinskost ter deluje kot realna distanca. Ta socialna in kulturna zgodovina afektov pa se s kapitalizmom dodatno spremeni in zaplete.

Dekodiranje in rekodiranje družbenih tokov v kapitalizmu

Zgodovina kapitalizma je, med drugim, tudi zgodovina dekodiranja in rekodiranja družbenih tokov, kjer je družbeni tok vsaka

9 FREUD, Sigmund, *Nelagodje v kulturi*, Ljubljana: Gyrus, 2001.

družbena investicija želje in kjer proces sam deluje kot objekt želje (oziroma želja ni prisvajanje objekta zaradi „manka“). Ti družbeni tokovi so lahko seksualni, produkcijski, kreativni ali uničevalni (denimo vojne). Kodiranje je simbolna organizacija družbenih tokov (s pisavo, simboli, pravili, zakoni ...), ki jim določa smer in jih omejuje. Primer so kompleksni sorodstveni sistemi plemenskih družb ali kodiranje družbenih hierarhij v antičnih družbah: tetoviranje sužnjev in bojevnikov, poslikave in oprema poglavarjev, striktno določeni kodi oblačenja in nakita, ki določajo kastne hierarhije ... Dekodiranje je, po drugi strani, proces, v katerem družbeni tokovi pobegnejo kodiranju, se iztrgajo vpetosti v tradicionalne klasifikacije in pravila.¹⁰

V tej perspektivi kapitalizem pomeni dekodiranje družbenih tokov, povezanih s produkcijo, trgovino in denarjem. Kapitalistični trg je posebna oblika dekodiranja potrošnje: izdelki niso izdelani po naročilu, kdo bo uporabljal kaj, ni dano vnaprej; kdor koli (ki ima dovolj denarja) lahko kupi kar koli. Kapitalistična produkcija je usmerjena v trg – za razliko od predkapitalistične, ki je politično uravnavana in (poleg osnovnega preživetja) usmerjena v vojne ter luksuzno potrošnjo aristokracije po naročilu. Za razliko od cehovske produkcije lahko v kapitalistično produkcijo vstopi kdor koli s trga delovne sile (v kapitalističnih družbah ni vnaprej določeno, katera kasta se lahko ukvarja s čim in na kakšen način). In kapitalistične banke posojajo komur koli (oziroma je, če kdo dobi prioriteto zaradi političnih povezav, to vsaj škandal), kar pomeni dekodiranje denarnih tokov. Skratka, za kapitalizem sta značilni dekodirana družbena produkcija in potrošnja (kdo izdeluje kaj in kako ter kdo bo prejemnik izdelkov in zakaj, ni vnaprej dano) ter dekodirani tokovi denarja, ki ju omogočajo in spodbujajo.

O kapitalizmu lahko govorimo, ko se srečajo dekodirana družbena produkcija, ki se osamosvoji od predhodnih političnih in kulturnih določitev ter postane samonanašalna (tj. nima smotra izven sebe, neskončno in neomejeno produciranje presežne vrednosti, ki se investira nazaj v produkcijo); deteritorializirana, mobilna delovna sila („dvojno svobodni“ bivši kmetje, v procesu prvotne akumulacije iztrgani iz tradicionalnih simbolnih družbenih kodiranj); kapitalistični trg kot sistem alokacije virov in blag, ki posta-

10 DELEUZE, Gilles in GUATTARI, Felix, *Anti-Ojdip*, Ljubljana: Krtina, str. 275–300.

ne avtomatiziran in samouravnalen; ter denarni tokovi, usmerjeni v trg in produkcijo, ne v „načrtno“ financiranje. To srečanje je hkrati srečanje večih procesov kapitalističnega dekodiranja, ki mu kasneje sledi specifično kapitalistična oblika rekodiranja (oziroma tega, kar običajno imenujemo državna regulacija): carinski ukrepi rekodirajo tokove blag, bančna regulacija rekodira tokove denarja, delovna in socialna zakonodaja rekodirata trg delovne sile in produkcijska razmerja itn.

A kapitalistično rekodiranje, kar je ključna razlika v primerjavi s predhodnimi, predkapitalističnimi oblikami družbenega kodiranja, ekonomske družbene tokove le omejuje, ne pa tudi vnaprej določa (v tem pomenu lahko govorimo o kapitalističnem prostem podjetništvu, trgu in konkurenčni *ne glede* na intenzivnost ali učinkovitost državne regulacije). Če so imeli družbeni tokovi prej vnaprej določene „struge“, imajo v kapitalizmu samo omejitve, ki so lahko pasivne (če to, kar počneš, ni tržno uspešno, nimaš denarja in imaš zato težave) ali pravno-politične (denimo omejitev delovnega časa na 8 ur na dan brez določanja, kaj in kako se v tem času dela).

Z dekodiranjem in rekodiranjem ekonomskih družbenih tokov se spremeni tudi družbeni ustroj želje. V predkapitalističnih družbah so tokove družbenih investicij želje vnaprej določale „struge“ simbolnih klasifikacijskih shem – npr. določanje možnosti poroke znotraj sorodstvenih sistemov plemenskih družb ali strateške, vojno-politične poroke srednjeveške aristokracije, kjer ljubezenska energija ni „prosta“ v današnjem pomenu, temveč so potencialne možnosti njenega investiranja vnaprej začrtane. Na podoben način so bili kodirani tudi predkapitalistični načini produkcije; tudi kreativna energija v predkapitalističnih družbah ni bila prosta, temveč vnaprej politično-kulturno določena (kdo lahko trguje s kom, kdo lahko izdeluje kaj in v kakšnih količinah).

Mreža simbolnega rekodiranja v kapitalizmu sicer ni nič manj gosta, a je bolj prožna in gibka kot prej in jo lažje opišemo z metaforo morja. Ekonomski tokovi niso vnaprej določeni, a hkrati tudi niso popolnoma naključni ali kaotični – tokovi produktov, ki se stekajo na trg, tam zadenejo ob tokove konkurenčnih produktov; produkcijski tokovi se lahko združujejo v procesu koncentracije in centralizacije kapitala; lahko pa se tudi razdelijo na več manjših *spin off* tokov ... Kapitalistično de-

kodiranje omogoči tako srečevanja ekonomskih tokov kot njihove pospešitve in usihanja. „Okolje“ kapitalističnih ekonomskih tokov ni več „zemlja“ politike ali kulture, temveč „morje“ drugih ekonomskih tokov.

Smer in moč teh tokov nista določena politično ali kulturno (glede na tradicionalne običaje ali statuse hierarhije) *ex ante*, temveč na način *ex post* dvojne povratne zanke, odvisne od obnašanja potrošnikov in konkurenčnih podjetij. Obnašanje potrošnikov določa količino povratnega toka denarja nazaj v podjetje in s tem moč določenega produkcijskega toka, medtem ko obnašanje konkurenčnih podjetij vpliva na gibanje cen na trgu, kar pomeni vzvratni tok informacij oziroma cenovnih signalov (nižanje cen izdelkov konkurenčnih podjetij določenemu podjetju signalizira, da so ta v produkcijskem procesu učinkovitejša ter da je v nevarnosti izgube tržnega deleža in da mora tudi samo začeti delovati učinkoviteje), ki določa smer posameznih produkcijskih tokov.

V kapitalizmu več ne obstaja večna, idealna forma izdelka, ki bi jo določale ekonomiji zunanje religiozne ali politične avtoritete, temveč je proces kapitalistične produkcije nenehno eksperimentiranje brez končnega cilja.¹¹ Okusi, mode, trendi ter s tem tudi obnašanje potrošnikov se nenehno in nepredvidljivo (četudi ne kaotično – mode imajo svojo logiko in regularnosti, le da te niso pod političnim nadzorom) spreminjajo, ne obstaja idealna forma pohištva, telefonov, avtomobilov ali oblačil. Kapitalistična produkcija je izjemno dinamičen, a ne kaotičen proces – retroaktivno ga disciplinirata ravno delovanje povpraševanja in konkurence, a spet ne tako, da bi se proces predkapitalističnega vnaprejšnjega striktnega določanja le prestavil z začetka na konec procesa produkcije (ne potrošniki ne konkurenčna podjetja posameznemu podjetju ne signalizirajo, kaj in kako naj počne, temveč signalizirajo le stopnjo svojega zadovoljstva v primeru potrošnikov in stopnjo svoje učinkovitosti v primeru konkurenčnih podjetij), temveč na način imperativa neskončnega eksperimentiranja tako v načinu produciranja (vpliv konkurence) kot s produkti samimi (vpliv povpraševanja), kjer vnaprej ni mogoče zagotovo vedeti, ne kateri produkt se bo „prijet“ ne katera tehnika produkcije bo

¹¹ FLUSSER, Vilem, *Digitalni videz*, Ljubljana: Študentska založba, 2000, str. 53–54.

učinkovitejša (od tod izvira za kapitalizem značilna nepredvidljivost ekonomskih dejavnosti).

Kapitalistična ekonomija in želja

Skupaj s samim načinom produkcije tudi želja, investirana v produkcijo in potrošnjo, postane nepredvidljivejša. Želja v produkciji se investira v proces neskončnega inoviranja za povečanje produktivnosti in učinkovitosti produkcjskega procesa samega (ne več v ponavljanje in popolno obvladovanje dane produkcijske tehnike kot v primeru obrtniškega dela), medtem ko se želja v potrošnji investira v proces neskončnega eksperimentiranja in prilagajanja načina življenja in osebne estetike ter ne toliko v zbiranje blag samih, saj tako kot ne obstaja končna idealna forma posameznega blaga, tudi ne obstaja končna idealna zbirka osebnih predmetov – slednje neskončno in hitro spreminjačim se modam in trendom pomeni natanko to, da nobeno oblačilo, telefon, avtomobil ali kos pohištva ni večen in nadomestljiv.

Strast sodobnega potrošnika ni ravno strast zbiratelja, ki potem, ko zapolni eno mesto v zbirki (denimo znamk ali samolepljivih sličic nogometnika), ki bodo nastopali na svetovnem prvenstvu v Rusiji), mrzlično išče naslednji predmet za naslednje mesto in je enako intenzivno navezan na vse, ki jih že poseduje; medtem ko se skopuški filatelist nikdar ne bo odpovedal nobeni izmed svojih redkih znamk (ali pa mu bo to povzročilo hude duševne bolečine), je smisel modernega potrošništva ravno v konstantnem odpovedovanju in nadomeščanju posameznih predmetov – pokrivalo, ki pride iz mode, mora biti takoj nadomeščeno z drugim, ne gre za navezanost na reči, temveč za željo, investirano v neskončni proces predvidevanja (kaj gre iz mode, kaj prihaja v modo), spremicanja, prilagajanja in nadomeščanja.

Podobno sodobni kapitalisti niso navlečeni na to ali onto produkcijsko tehniko ali izdelke svojega podjetja, temveč v proces neskončnega spremicanja obojega (procesne in produktne inovacije), v katerem morajo predvideti in preseči obnašanje konkurence. Strasti razvitega ali poznegata kapitalizma ravno ne pomenijo obsedenosti s stvarmi – ta je ravno ena od značilnosti *ancien régimea* in zanj značilnih skopuških in

zbirateljskih strasti, navlečenosti starikavih meščanskih gospa na svoje krznene plašče in učenjakov na vednost, ki se nikoli ne apdejta. Še več, ravno slabe (tj. več ali manj vse) levičarske kritike kapitalizma predstavljajo nostalгиjo za skopuštvom vpričo značilno kapitalistične indiferentnosti do stvari samih (nove produkcijske tehnike in blaga bliskovito nadomeščajo stare brez pretirane sentimentalnosti) in nezmožnost reinvestirati željo, obtičalo v stvareh, v procese.

Razviti kapitalizem, vsaj do neke mere in vsaj na področju ekonomskih praks, relativizira zgodovinske rezultate procesa civiliziranja – tako v trgovini kot na borzi kot pri vodenju podjetij prevladujejo hitre, impulzivne odločitve, s čimer se (kot denimo v nedavnem primeru kriptovalutne mrzllice) omili racionalizacija obnašanja. Dekodiranje ekonomskih družbenih tokov in njihova hkratna osamosvojitev od političnih in kulturnih avtoritet veže nase in potegne s sabo tudi določene strasti, investirane v produkcijo, kreativnost, osebno estetiko in materialno raven vsakdanjega življenja. Ker družbena produkcija na eni ter družbene avtoritete, hierarhije, običaji itn. na drugi strani niso več neposredno zvezani (za kapitalizem značilna avtonomizacija ekonomije), se tako družbene kot individualne strasti investirajo v procese in prakse, povezane s produkcijo in potrošnjo (in si izgoreli pari ves čas medsebojno očitajo, da drugemu kariera pomeni več od razmerja), medtem ko na ravni mikrosocialnih neekonomskih odnosov ostane le suha psihologija (upravljanje občutkov, postavljanje mej, vsakdanje psihološke manipulacije, ki se zgodovinsko razvijejo iz dvorske kulture in ki jih danes institucionalno podpira neznanski terapevtski, samopomočni in *lifecoaching* institucionalni kompleks).

Če se vrнем k osnovni Eliasovi teoretski shemi učinkov procesa civiliziranja: znotraj lupine samoobvladovanja in samoprisil, ki prekinejo relacijskost afektov in ustvarijo občutek psihološke notranjosti, se ta razcepi na plast čustev in plast razuma, ki se vse bolj oddaljujeta druga od druge. V kapitalizmu se plast čustev, skladno z avtonomizacijo ekonomije, veže na ekonomske prakse in procese, kar v določenih situacijah omili/relativizira psihologizacijo in racionalizacijo obnašanja ter omogoči pogoste izbruhe strasti v ekonomiji, medtem ko preostanek življenja obvladuje racionalna plast (v ljubezni imamo denimo opravka s partnerji, skupnimi interesi in načrtovanjem prihodnosti, med-

tem ko nekontrolirane izbruhe strasti doživljamo med nakupovanjem, trgovanjem ali v procesu produkcije).

Povezano s tem procesom (za kapitalizem značilno vezavo čustev na ekonomijo in razuma na vsakdanje življenje) tako produkcijski proces kot potrošnja postajata vse manj prizorišči avtoritarne komande in vse bolj procesa, organizirana na način povratne zanke med čustvenimi investicijami in ekonomskimi praksami samimi. Avtoritarnost in toge hierarhije, značilne za kapitalizem 19. in večine 20. stoletja, so bile morda prej kot integralni del kapitalizma samega hibrid med absolutističnimi, na vednosti/načrtu in striktnih, togih hierarhijah temelječimi organizacijskimi oblikami, ki so predstavljale kopije razsvetljeno absolutističnih političnih institucij, na eni in že realno subsumirano kapitalistično produkcijo na drugi strani. Sčasoma začne kapitalizem te forme organizacije dela in produkcije opuščati in jih nadomeščati s sebi bolj primernimi.

To pomeni, da se ne le na ravni produkcije same, temveč tudi načina, na katerega je vodena in organizirana, tj. managerskih tehnik, vnaprejšnje določanje „strug“ umika povratni zanki, le da v tem primeru ne zanki, temelječi na obnašanju konkurence, ki je podjetju zunanje, temveč na zanki, ki uravnava samo dinamiko organizacijskih odnosov znotraj podjetja. Razvoj te povratne zanke pomeni, da vse večjo težnjo dobiva vključevanje kreativnosti, navdušenja, teženj in motivacije zaposlenih, katerih povečevanje povečuje tudi produktivnost in učinkovitost produkcijskega procesa samega, pri čemer ne gre za vsiljevanje „neoliberalne ideologije“ zaposlenim, temveč, deleuzoguattarijevsko rečeno, za neposredno investiranje želje v družbeno polje na ravni materialne baze, ne ideološke nadzidave.¹² Krogotok, kjer kreativnost in navdušenje zaposlenih optimizirata produkcijski proces, kar poveča kreativnost in navdušenje zaposlenih itn., je resničen in materialen proces, ki ima tudi svoje ideološke razsežnosti (določene vzorce mišljenja in govora), a ideologija v njem nima določajoče vloge.

Podobno se dogaja tudi na področju potrošnje. Tudi klasično oglaševanje, kjer skupina oglaševalcev avtoritarno in hierarhično vnaprej določa „struge“, v katere se lahko kasneje investira želja potrošnikov, lahko razumemo kot preostanek predkapitali-

12 DELEUZE in GUATTARI, *Anti-Ojdip*, str. 123–125.

stične kulture – klasično oglaševanje je hibrid med kapitalističnim imperativom neskončnega maksimiziranja prodaje in s tem profitov na eni ter razsvetljeno absolutistično obliko družbenega prenosa vednosti (kjer to najprej izdela skupina učenjakov in nato z njem indoktrinira preostanek družbe preko vnaprej postavljenih „strug“ oziroma – medijskih, šolskih idr. – „kanalov“) na drugi strani. Klasično oglaševanje tako uporablja vnaprej predpostavljene podobe/reprezentacije/stereotipe denimo idealne gospodinje, ki ji poskuša prodati zanjo ustvarjene pralne praške, kozmetiko, oblačila ..., kar je še vedno preostanek cehovske mentalitete in praks znotraj kapitalizma (vnaprej določena produkcija in distribucija), le da določajoča avtora-teta ekonomiji ni več zunanja, temveč se preseli v oglaševalske oddelke, ki pa še vedno delujejo na enak način kot učenjaki na absolutističnih dvorih.

V nasprotju s tem sodobno, elektronsko/algoritemsko oglaševanje ni več prepričevanje na način vsiljevanja te ali one ideologije, temveč povratna zanka med čustvenimi investicijami potrošnikov v obliki internetnih sledov, tj. privlačnostjo, merjeno v pogostosti klikanja in časovni pozornosti, namenjeni tem ali onim vsebinam, na eni strani ter algoritemsko generiranimi namigi o blagih, medijskih vsebinah, igrah itn., ki bi nas lahko zanimale, na drugi. Ta oblika oglaševanja ne deluje več na podlagi vnaprej izdelanih stereotipov potrošnikov ali njihovega obnašanja ali vsiljevanja česar koli, temveč na beleženju mikrokulturnih nagnjenj in povratnem subtilnem, nevsiljivem in učinkovitem ponujanjem produktov. Dejansko kapitalistično oglaševanje ni ideologija, temveč algoritmi, ki povezujejo proste (v pomenu ne vnaprej določene) sledove potrošniške želje in prodajo produktov v povratno zanko.

Površne kritike kapitalizma, katerih tarča so preostanki *ancien régime* v kapitalizmu in ne toliko logika kapitalizma sama, se v večini primerov dopolnjujejo ravno z nostalгиjo po *ancien régime*. Kritike oglaševanja kot zavajanja svojo moč črpajo iz hrepenenja po pravi, resnični vednosti, ki ne bi zavajala in bi govorila resnico (za kar bi morali rehabilitirati tradicionalno avtoritetno učenjakov kot vratarjev vednosti, ukiniti permisivno vzgojo itn.). Enako se tesnoba zaradi za kapitalizem značilne ne-predvidljivosti prevaja v hrepenenje po trdnem, predvidljivem, (absolutnem?) družbenem redu, po totalni državni regulaciji.

Morda trenutna renesansa avtoritarnih in tradicionalističnih teženj tako na desnici kot na levici predstavlja anksiolitik za situacijo splošne anksioznosti (negotovosti, nepredvidljivosti, tveganosti) razvitih kapitalističnih družb na vseh področjih, tj. ne le na izključno ekonomskem, temveč tudi v situacijah, na katere kapitalistična ekonomija vpliva le posredno in od zunaj, denimo na področju ljubezenskih razmerij, prijateljstev, socialnega in kulturnega življenja ...

Če vzamemo za primer stereotipno figuro vseživljenjsko zaskrbljenega liberalca, ki se obreguje nad erozijo vednosti in prevlado mnenj, oglaševalskimi in medijskimi manipulacijami, fleksibilnostjo in prekarnostjo itn. – morda je problem v tem, da imajo ljudje, ki so proti oglaševanju in medijskim manipulacijam, ki uporabljajo besedo moda kot žaljivko in so obsedeni z razkrivanjem laži politikov itn., na emocionalni ravni problem z zapeljevanjem kot takim? Ob kapitalističnem razkroju trdnih, fiksnih družbenih avtoritet in hierarhiji *ancien régime* ter z uničenjem transcendentalne gotovosti razsvetljeno absolutistične vednosti (te sekularne oblike teokratskega reda) osnovno družbeno razmerje komercialne, kapitalistične dobe postane zapeljevanje. Blago nima nobene transcendentalne garancije, prodajo omogoča le njegova privlačnost in spremnost trgovca. Vzperedno se z razvojem kapitalizma krhajo in razpadajo tudi tradicionalne avtoritete in trdnost/stabilnost družbenih razmerij na drugih področjih, kar pomeni, da transcendentno avtoritete in tradicije tudi na mikrosocialni ravni začne zamenjevati imaneca zapeljevanja.

Če se gibljejo v progresivnih krogih, lahko avtoritarne osebnosti v situaciji naraščajoče poliamornosti in mikrosocialne fluidnosti, v kateri mora posameznik vse odnose nenehno vzpostavljati na novo (neskončno zapeljevanje) brez konservativne varnosti/gotovosti, svoj srd do negotove situacije neskončnega zapeljevanja, ne da bi zraven tvegale ves svoj socialni/kulturni kapital, izrazijo le z *lashing out* proti oglaševanju ali medijskim manipulacijam (ker je to mogoče pripeti na kritiko kapitalizma ali trud za ohranjanje demokracije, kar je v teh krogih sprejeto z odobravanjem), pri čemer dejanski problem obojega v resnici ni kapitalističnost ali nedemokratičnost, temveč sta le sprejemljivi tarči za čustveno gnan odpor do zapeljevanja kot takega. Tudi tisto, kar avtoritarno tradicionalistični levi liberalizem, denimo, obsoja kot patološki narcisizem potrošniške družbe, je

ravno situacijsko immanentno, neskončno spreminjanje sebe in svojega življenja, gibka in prožna immanentna etika kot nasprotje rigidnega, transcendentalnega moralizma liberalcev.

Zaradi odpora do zapeljevanja so levičarske/liberalne kritike oglaševanja in medijskih manipulacij tudi tako značilno suhoparne in dolgočasne, saj je humor ravno ena izmed ključnih jezikovnih oblik zapeljevanja. Kdor besni nad *fake news*, ne more imeti smisla za humor. Humor je vedno situacijsko specifična improvizacija, ki nima vnaprejšnjega vzorca in jo je potrebno vsakič izumiti na novo. Tisti, ki maju problem s *fake news*, imajo vedno tudi problem s humorjem, saj je humor vedno *fake news* oziroma ostaja v domeni mnenja (nikoli ni argumentiran/utemeljen in nikoli ni resničen).

Človeška čustva in hladnost kapitala

Za razliko od vnaprej določenih „kanalov“ želje v predkapitalističnih družbah lahko v kapitalističnih, ko se strasti vsaj delno ločijo od psihologije in vežejo na ekonomske tokove, tokove želje merimo z denarjem oziroma tokovi denarja nastopajo kot retroaktivni pokazatelji tako smeri kot moči investicij želje.¹³ V kapitalizmu denar meri tako čisto ekonomsko vrednost – kot razmerje med posameznimi blagi na trgu – v obliki cene blaga kot tudi potrošniško željo (seveda omejeno s kupno močjo) v obliki količine nakupov teh ali onih blag. Ta tok denarja predstavlja zalogo za nove investicije podjetja, ki določeno blago producira, medtem ko vrednost posameznega blaga, izražena v denarju, deluje kot informacija, signal o stanju produkcije v podjetju, ki določeno blago producira, za druga, konkurenčna podjetja, ki konstantno in budno spremljajo gibanje cen na trgu, saj nižje cene konkurenčnih produktov pomenijo njihovo večjo produkcijsko učinkovitost.

A poleg statičnih – v vsakem posameznem trenutku, cene se skozi čas seveda spreminjajo – cen kot denarnih izrazov ekonomske vrednosti z informacijsko funkcijo imamo v vsakem trenutku na obeh straneh kapitalističnega procesa tudi tokove denarja, ki jih lahko razumemo kot kvantitativni denarni izraz želje tako kapitalistov (investicije) kot potrošnikov (prodaja):

13 TARDE, Gabriel, „Economic psychology“, v: *Economy and society*, št. 4, 2007, str. 614.

investicije → produkcijski proces → prodaja (→ vzvratni tok denarja v podjetje in nove investicije). Moč obeh denarnih tokov se skozi čas ravno tako spreminja, tako investicije kot prodaja lahko ali naraščajo ali upadajo, hkrati pa so krožno povezane – prodaja predstavlja zalogo denarja za nove investicije, medtem ko investicije šele sploh omogočajo produkcijo in s tem prodajo.

Medtem ko dinamiko gibanja cen določa gibanje vrednosti produkcijskih sredstev in delovne sile ter razvitost produkcijskih tehnik, dinamiko moči tokov investicij in prodaje določa investicija (ekonomske) želje, ki se izraža v tokovih denarja tako s strani kapitalistov kot s strani potrošnikov. Osnovna logika družbene investicije želje v kapitalizmu je na obeh straneh enaka – nakup oziroma trošenje denarja za različne stvari ali storitve. Na strani potrošnikov je to proces, ki je zelo vsakdanji in ga izvajamo (pol)avtomatsko, ko nakupujemo (oziroma ga le včasih prekine refleksija ali občutek krivde): izbira blaga in količine nakupljenega.

Enaka osnovna logika deluje tudi na strani kapitala, tj. izbira kam investirati in koliko denarja. Tako v primeru tokov denarja kot kapitala kot tokov denarja v vsakdanji potrošnji je moč denarnih tokov izraz želje. Razlika med obema uporabama denarja je v produktivnosti želje: medtem ko potrošniki z uporabo denarja (re)produciramo svoja življenja, kapital producira blaga, a ne zaradi blag samih, temveč ker njihova prodaja (potencialno) prinaša profite v osnovni povratni zanki družbenega gibanja kapitala: začetna investicija → produkcija blag → prodaja blag → povečana vsota denarja → povečana reinvesticija in tako naprej v neskončnost.

A merjenje moči kapitalistične želje z denarjem, četudi enostavno in elegantno, je še vedno zunanje samemu procesu družbene investicije želje. Tarde v razpravi o ekonomskej psihologiji poda tudi pomembno kritiko „objektivizma“ klasičnih ekonomskej teorij, ki jih zanima le materialna razsežnost ekonomskej praks (kakšni materiali, v kakšnih količinah, kakšne tehnologije, kakšni produkti, v kakšnih količinah se prodajo in za kakšno ceno), ne pa tudi subjektivna, psihološka razsežnost kapitalistične ekonomije (želje, pričakovanja, privlačnost, načeljivost navdušenja ter tudi obup, strah, tesnoba ...). Klasične

ekonomske teorije subjektivno razsežnost reducirajo na skrčeno karikaturo posameznika kot bitja interesov, izhajajočih iz potreb, ki jih posameznik zadovoljuje: potreba kot manko, interes kot mehanizem potešitve potrebe, kar približno ustreza tudi psihoanalitičnemu razumevanju želje kot manka in spregleda produktivnost želje, o kateri pišeta Deleuze in Guattari.¹⁴ Problem te poenostavljene, skrčene predstave o interesih kot gonilih ekonomskih praks je, da kompleksno zgodovino razmerja med čustvi in razumom reducira na delovanje interesov kot transparentnih in enostavnih, delovanje interesov, ki bi bilo gladko in neposredno, če ga ne bi motila ideologija (v desnih različicah ideologija socialne pravičnosti, v levih ideologija neoliberalizma), s čimer ponovno pridemo do problema redukcije družbe na (le) materialno bazo in ideoološko nadzidavo, v kateri je celotna problematika afektov nevidna.

Hkrati s tem pride tudi do nasprotja med prevladujočimi predstavami o delovanju kapitalistične ekonomije in delovanjem te ekonomije same – medtem ko se v procesu svoje avtonomizacije kapitalistična ekonomija loči od preostalih družbenih sfer ter nase veže in s seboj potegne ravno strasti, ki s tem postanejo ključni dejavnik njene dinamike oziroma subjektivne razsežnosti njene dinamike, ideje o ekonomiji zaradi delovanja procesa civiliziranja in naraščajoče distance med čustvi in razumom ta proces lahko detektirajo le obratno, kot proces prevlade razumskih interesov nad iracionalnimi strastmi (kapitalizem kot bodisi končno racionalni družbeni red v klasični politični ekonomiji bodisi ubijajoče dolgočasen v situacionističnih ali frankfurtskošolskih kritikah). Na ta način in v tej razsežnosti lahko govorimo o ideologiji v kapitalizmu (medtem ko kapitalistična ekonomija sama ne potrebuje ideologij oziroma to ni tisto, kar bi jo poganjalo): ideja o kapitalizmu kot skupku materialne baze, razumskih interesov in motečih dejavnikov ideologije je sama ideoološka.

Ta redukcija tudi pomeni, da se proces vzpostavljanja distance med čustvi in razumom, ki je učinek procesa civiliziranja, jemlje kot dana distanca, delovanje čustev v ekonomiji (ki je odločilno) pa zanemarja oziroma, če že, obravnava kot moteči, iracionalni in ne integralni, nujni del ekonomskeih praks. Pri-

14 DELEUZE in GUATTARI, *Anti-Ojdip*, str. 34–48.

mer reduktivnosti objektivistične perspektive, značilen za levo politiko, je denimo poudarjanje pomena ali večje vrednosti boja za višje plače, dodatke itn. (kar je del paketa pravilnih in pravsnih „interesov delavskega razreda“) od boja za boljše počutje in večje zadovoljstvo pri delu ali več možnosti emocionalnih investicij. Poudarjanje čustev levica večinoma dismisivno zavrača kot neoliberalno ideologijo, kot da težnje po samozpolnjevanju, povečevanju lastne kreativnosti in avtonomije v produkcijskem procesu itn. niso resnični načini povečevanja moči družbenih investicij želje kot produktivnih, temveč blodnje lažne zavesti (medtem ko je želja reducirana na manko, ki se ga zadovoljuje z bonusi in regresi).¹⁵

Ko se resničnost upre reduktivnim ideoološkim abstrakcijam čistega, racionalnega, ciljno usmerjenega interesa, je namesto posodobljenja konceptov in teorije same delovanje čustev razglašeno za ideologijo, nekaj slabega oziroma zaklinjanje ideologije deluje kot *hand waving*; cesar ne razumemo, odpravimo kot lažno zavest, nevredno razumevanja, kar pomeni, da reduktivno razumevanje subjektivne razsežnosti ekonomskih praks deluje kot politični ideal (delavski razred bo imel čiste

15 Nedavni primer tega je intervju z Alenko Zupančič v Mladini, kjer upoštevanje čustvene dinamike v procesu produkcije nastopa kot nekaj nizkotnega, zavrženega oziroma le manipulacija managerjev in tisti, ki so jim čustva na delovnem mestu pomembna, kot žrtve neoliberalne ideologije. Čustva v ekonomiji in politiki so za levico problem, ki ga je potrebno odpraviti, in ne vprašanje, o katerem je vredno razmišljati in ga razvijati v praksi.

„Vprašanje politike in čustev je veliko, pomembno poglavje. Najprej ne smemo pozabiti, da velika čustva izzovejo predvsem zgodbe, se pravi določena naracija realnosti in ne toliko neposredna realnost. Vendar pa je koristno ločevati med dvojim: med čustveno dimenzijo naše eksistence, ki seveda vedno in nedvomno obstaja, in družbenim vrednotenjem, valorizacijo te dimenzije. Ali v neki družbi velja, da so čustva naš najpomembnejši, najdragocenejši in najbolj avtentični izraz, nekaj, na čemer lahko gradimo, na kar se lahko zanesemo? Ali pa velja, da so čustva nestabilna, prežeta s predsodki in jim nikakor ne moremo slepo zaupati, že na osebni ravni ne, kaj šele, ko gre za družbenega vprašanja? Valorizacija čustev in čustvovanja je bila tesno povezana z vzponom (neo)liberalizma in njegovim vrednotenjem posameznika in njegove individuálnosti, notrinskosti, najrazličnejših *new age* verovanj. Pojdi vase, čuti sebe, izrazi svoja čustva. Bes in jeza, ki ju množice izražajo danes, seveda praviloma izhajata od drugod, tudi iz drugih družbenih razredov. A pri tem naletita na odprta vrata, torej na vrata, ki jih je odprla vladajoča ideologija neoliberalizma. Vse, kar občutiš, je tvoje in dragocene, in pravico imaš do tega. Zdaj se ta bes usmerja proti establišmentu in zanimivo bo videti, kako se bo spremenil diskurz o čustvovanju. Ko čustvujejo množice, ‚avtentični izraz naše notranjosti‘ postane ‚fašizem‘.“ ZUPANČIČ, Alenka, „Um ni stopnja izobrazbe“, v: *Mladina*, 2018, dostopno na: <http://www.mladina.si/184720/dr-alenka-zupanci-c-zerdin-um-ni-stopnja-izobrazbe/>.

in čisto racionalne interese šele, ko bo deloval tako, kot ustreza arbitarnim levičarskim fantazijam).

Če se na koncu vrnem k shemi z začetka: kapitalizem kot preveč interesen ideoološko deluje zaradi samega procesa avtonomizacije ekonomije in vezave strasti nanjo, ki pa zaradi delovanja procesa civiliziranja ostaja neprepoznanata. Ta predstava ima svojo desno, afirmativno (interesi kapitalizma ohladijo divje, nebrzdane politične strasti in nasilno politično dinamiko *ancien regima*)¹⁶ in levo, kritično (kapitalizem je *dry* in dolgočasen) verzijo. Po drugi strani pa je strastna razsežnost kapitalizma realno preveč prisotna, da bi jo bilo mogoče povsem ignorirati, četudi je v protislovju s predstavo o pretirani interesnosti kapitalizma. Tudi upoštevanje strastne razsežnosti kapitalizma ima svojo desno, afirmativno (gre za nevarne strasti, ki sicer producirajo tudi osebne tragedije, a ravno konkurenčni boj iz ljudi izvleče največ produktivnosti in kreativnosti) in levo, kritično razsežnost (kapitalistične strasti so uničevalne in iracionalne, produkt neoliberalne ideologije, ki jo morajo zamenjati racionalni, umni interesi, za artikulacijo katerih so zadolženi levičarski učenjaki).

A še vedno ostaja nepojasnjena resnična krutost, hladnokrvnost in brezčutnost kapitalizma – če se psihologija in razum vežeta na mikrosocialne odnose izven kapitalistične ekonomije, kakšen je potem ustroj realne hladnosti kapitala? Realna hladnost kapitala deluje tako, ker je nečloveška – „želja“ kapitala za razliko od strasti kapitalistov ni čustvena, temveč mašinska: konkurenčno uravnavan gon po neskončnem in do človeških tako čustev kot materialne blaginje indiferentnem samoširjenju in samopovečevanju na način neskončnega tehnološkega samoizpopolnjevanja, ki povečuje produktivnost kapitalske mašinerije in omogoča neskončno produkcijo še več še bolj zmogljivih strojev, ki začenjajo razvijati tudi avtonomne oblike inteligence in komunikacije. Srljivost soočenja s hladnostjo in brezčutnostjo kapitala je ravno srljivost soočenja z njegovo tujestjo in strastne investicije v kapitalistične ekonomske prakse se v času, ko človeška bitja ne morejo več slediti hitrosti kapitala, ne morejo končati drugače kot z izgorelostjo: „Neizogibno bo prišel trenutek, ko človeško srce, če-

16 HIRSCHMAN, Albert O., *Strasti in interesi*, Ljubljana: Krtina, 2002.

Šum #9

tudi ameriško, ne bo več zadoščalo za to nenehno emisijo novih želja, ki jo od njega zahteva mašinofaktura ...”¹⁷

17 TARDE, Gabriel, „Economic psychology“, str. 636.

Šum #9

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ZUPANČIČ, Alenka, „Um ni stopnja izobrazbe“, intervju v: *Mladina*, 2018, dostopno na: <http://www.mladina.si/184720/dr-alenka-zupancic-zerdin-um-ni-stopnja-izobrazbe/>.



On Letting Go

Arran Crawford

Exit is first and foremost the concept of renunciation.
// E. Antony Gray¹

*...and this means the abandonment of political action
and of political theory.*
// Franco Berardi²

1 GRAY, E. Antony, *Exit / No Exit*, 2017, available at: <https://jacobitemag.com/2017/10/03/exit-no-exit/>. [Accessed 12/3/18]

2 BERARDI, Franco, *Global Civil War and the Rotting of the White Mind*, 2018, available at: <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3689-bifo-global-civil-war-and-the-rotting-of-the-white-mind>. [Accessed 16/3/18]

Exit is renunciation. Fundamentally it is the renunciation of voice, or politics. Renunciation is the act of relinquishing, abandoning, a rejection and an abdication. If this conception of exit is entirely negative, the meaning of renunciation nonetheless remains open. The intention here is to examine renunciation itself as the conceptual core of exit. To do so special reference will be made to renunciation in Zen Buddhism. In this way the rejection of voice will be seen to accept a modified version of a common criticism of neoreactionary (NRx) and unconditional accelerationist tendencies. The criticism is aptly put by Daniel Bensaïd: “Abandon politics and one is left with theology.”³ In its modified form this should read that to renounce politics is to embrace atheology. For the unconditional accelerationist this will be put as: “Do what thou wilt...and let go.”⁴

In Albert O. Hirschman’s seminal formulation exit is defined as the decision to leave an organisation. Hirschman will identify the exit-option in politics with Rousseau’s observation that conflict is often resolved in the state of nature through evasion, going elsewhere. In this sense exit means giving up, taking leave, fleeing. He will go on to demonstrate the strong correlation between statelessness and the regular practice of exit, describing it as a preventative for the emergence of centralized power that has “state-like authority.”⁵ For Hirschman exit is antithetical to voice and the state. This is because voice is essential to the emergence and perpetuation of the state-form in its “appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in management.”⁶ It will include “various types of action, including those intended to mobilise public opinion.”⁷ Taken in its widest sense this can include conciliatory, agonistic and antagonistic models of politics. It will identify voice with the political pro-

3 BENSAÏD, Daniel, “Permanent Scandal”, in: *Democracy in What State?*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 44.

4 GARTON, Vincent, *Unconditional Acceleration as Antipraxis*, 2017, available at: <https://vincentgarton.com/2017/06/12/unconditional-accelerationism-as-antipraxis/>. [Accessed 13/3/18]

5 HIRSCHMAN, Albert O., “Exit, Voice, and the State”, in: *World Politics*, 31(1), 1978, p. 94.

6 HIRSCHMAN, Albert O., *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 30.

7 Ibid.

cess itself. Exit is therefore an anti-politics or post-politics *that abandons politics itself.*

Politics is undergoing catastrophe. It triggers cascading systems failure. As system components fail operational demand is rerouted to the remaining elements, overloading each node, the redistribution threatening to trigger an avalanche mechanism: total system collapse. The catastrophe of politics remains immanent to it while remaining its transcendental condition. If it is true that politics is war by other means then the conciliatory model of democratic political theory is the attempt to ensure the deferral of that war. The terror that accompanies talk of the multiple crises of democracy amounts to the fear of a disintegration that culminates in open Hobbesian warfare. A cascading systems failure is primarily a failure in component interoperability as the machine breaks apart. Politics metastasizes in fractal polarization.

Considered as an autoimmune disorder, polarization identifies pathogens in what had been healthy cells. In the rampant identification of enemies, the body politik devours itself, comes apart. Fractal polarization names the proliferation of enemy-identifications within and across ideological distinctions. Each party goes feral, turns its fangs inward even as violence between traditional opponents escalates. The fascist/anti-fascist confrontation generalises itself as each party identifies its allies and its enemies as threats. Whatever scale is being examined it is hard to deny Virilio's judgement that "the most developed countries are constantly on the brink of civil war..."⁸ In a recent article Franco Berardi gives grim testimony:

*It is a clash of incompatible cultures that do not, and cannot, belong in the same political universe. Civil war is the name we give to this incompatibility.*⁹

In social psychology, terror management theory (TMT) has defined cultures as worldviews that function to provide meaning to individuals and collectivities by allowing them to cope with

8 VIRILIO, Paul, "Not Words but Visions!", 1998, in: ARMITAGE, John (ed.), *Virilio Live: Selected Interviews*, London: Sage Publishing, 2001, p. 163.

9 BERARDI, *Global Civil War and the Rotting of the White Mind*.

mortality.¹⁰ Building on the work of Ernest Becker, cultures are shown to provide a sense of order and permanence that effectively manages thanatophobic existential anxiety.¹¹ TMT predicts that confrontations between competing worldviews threaten the validity of those worldviews for those that hold them, exposing individuals and collectivities to the abject dread they were designed and adopted to deny.¹² The inability to tolerate the potential collapse of these coping system leads to *worldview defense* strategies that strengthen conviction in those who hold them. This has been demonstrated for both conservative and liberal-progressive worldviews, making it possible to extrapolate it across all ideological distinctions.¹³ Speculating from this perspective the clash between incompatible cultures is a direct existential threat, a matter of life and death, so that polarization and worldview defence increase in step with one another, producing escalating feedback that, left uncompensated, climaxes in a hot civil war.

The coming of this war is only hastened by the temporal compression pressures of techonomic acceleration and the threat of regional infrastructural collapse in ecological disaster.¹⁴ As signs of collapse multiply mortality exposure increases, every incompatibility is magnified, so voice multiples in response, becoming ever more vehemently asserted.

The political temptation is to seek political solutions to the catastrophe of politics. The logic is that if politics is in a death spiral then more politics, the right politics, will be our salvation. Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams will insist that we must “never believe that technology alone will be sufficient to save us.”¹⁵ In

10 SOLOMON, Sheldon, GREENBERG, Jeff, PYSCZYNKI, Tom, *The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life*, London: Allen Lane, 2015.

11 Cf. BECKER, Ernest, *The Denial of Death*, New York: The Free Press, 1973; and BECKER, Ernest, *Escape from Evil*, New York: The Free Press, 1975.

12 SOLOMON et al., *The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life*.

13 BURKE, Brian L., KOSLOFF, Spee, LANDAU, Mark J., “Death Goes to the Polls: A Meta-Analysis of Mortality Salience Effects on Political Attitudes”, in: *Political Psychology*, 34(2), 2013, p. 183–200.

14 Techonomic acceleration is the fundamental subject of accelerationism. For discussion on ecological catastrophe and radical politics cf: ANONYMOUS, *Desert*, 2011, available at: <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/anonymous-desert>. [Accessed 14/3/18]

15 WILLIAMS, Alex, SRNICEK, Nick, #Accelerate: *Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics*, 2013, available at: <http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/05/14/accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics/>.

so doing they demonstrate the common hope that political solutions will be the salvation of humanity.

Anti-guru UG Krishnamurti will reject this logic by stating that “the real problem is the solution.”¹⁶ Krishnamurti was an Indian thinker who rejected the possibility of spiritual enlightenment despite being considered to have attained that state. In Krishnamurti’s milieu enlightenment is salvation, and when he talks about solutions he is talking about the need for salvation. He will tell an interviewer that the search for solutions eclipses any interest in problems. Krishnamurti will consistently deny the existence of any real problems by stating that the search for the solution is itself the process that generates problems. In this paradoxical logic solutions are what perpetuate and deepen the problems that we are unable to understand because our understanding subordinates these problems to the need for solutions. He will insist that “you have no problem there” and that “problems and solutions go together.”¹⁷ They are interdependent phenomena that sustain one another in something like a positive feedback loop. The more intense the search for the solution, the more vigorously asserted the proposed solutions become, the more violent their imposition, and the more the problem is exacerbated. Krishnamurti will reject all previously proposed solutions in this way. He will state:

*The numerous solutions offered by these holy people, the psychologists, the politicians, are not really solutions at all. This is obvious. If there were legitimate answers, there would be no problems.*¹⁸

This thinking leaves us close to the conclusion of the pessimistic philosopher EM Cioran’s that we must yield to “the insoluble as solution, as the only way out...”¹⁹ In the recent film adaptation of Jeff VanderMeer’s *Annihilation* the protagonist joins an exploratory expedition into the heart of a weird phenomenon, “the

16 KRISHNAMURTI, U. G., *The Mystique of Enlightenment: The Radical Ideas of U. G. Krishnamurti*, New Delhi: Smriti Books, 2005, p. 114.

17 Ibid.

18 KRISHNAMURTI, U. G., *The Mind is a Myth: Conversations with U.G. Krishnamurti*, New Delhi: Smriti Books, 2003, p. 5.

19 CIORAN, EM, quoted in: ACQUISTO, Joseph, *The Fall Out of Redemption: Writing and Thinking Beyond Salvation in Baudelaire, Cioran, Fondane, Agamben, and Nancy*, London: Bloomsbury, 2016, p. 198.

Shimmer". Like a Ballardian hero the protagonist volunteers to go into the heart of the new genetic logic being unfolded by the Shimmer. As they venture deeper in, the team encounters multiple problems, loses members, is confronted with genuinely weird things, and considers retreating to the safety of home. The protagonist will lie to her teammates that to leave the Shimmer they must get to the shoreline beyond it. Capturing the agony of the insoluble one of the characters will fearfully realise, "You say we get out by going deeper in?"²⁰

This is what it means to renounce the political solution to the catastrophe of politics. The way out of the disintegration and fragmentation of fractal polarization is to go deeper in. Exit-solutions are not political solutions based on *craving*—desiring the world to be other than it is.²¹ This is given expression in the *anti-praxis* of unconditional accelerationism, in its denial of any proposed solution that would remain constrained to a redundant "unidirectional human agency".²²

Vincent Garton will explain that anti-praxis is not a rejection of praxis itself. Instead it is a *via negativa* for answering the fundamental political question, "What is to be done?"²³ The question triggers the process of the generation problem–solution copula and strengthens the conviction that politics can legislate or impose an answer. To this the unconditional accelerationist will reply, "Do what thou wilt...and let go." The acceptance of the insoluble dissolves the need for *the* solution, and allows for the subsequent enactment of exit as the acceleration of disintegration.

Nick Land will clarify:

The world is already fractured and divided, to a considerable degree. This means that the disintegrative position has no need for utopianism, and is frequently able to orient itself defensively, in support of existing differences that are subject to

20 GARLAND, Alex, *Streaming. Netflix.*, 2018.

21 In early Buddhism craving—*taṇhā*—is the root cause of all suffering. The goal of Buddhism is often thought about as the elimination of desire. This is inexact as the goal is the elimination of craving that produces suffering. It is craving that leads to attachment to impermanent things and to the error that we can and should shape the world to our desires. In later Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism this instrumental language will be problematised. This will be discussed below in relation to Dōgen's Zen.

22 GARTON, *Unconditional Acceleration as Antipraxis*.

23 Ibid.

*integrative-universalist assault. Furthermore, there are numerous indications that general world-historical trends are favourable to geopolitical disintegration, in too many fields to fully enumerate, but which include political, ethnic, technological and economic drivers. Incremental pragmatism is entirely practical under current geopolitical and historical conditions.*²⁴

In his discussion of the metapolitical neocameralist patchwork system that formalises exit, Land will eschew utopianism—the ecstasy of political solutions—for a descriptive account of what exit-driven disintegration can do. The preference for exit correlates to the negation of political solutions: “There will not be agreement about social ideals.”²⁵ To think otherwise is to become ensnared in the monistic trap of universality that exit aims to disintegrate.²⁶

Monism is a trap because it assumes what it proposes to discover: the possibility of a final reconciliation of opposition in a negotiated or forced consensus. It takes as axiomatic the possibility that enemies can understand one another in assuming a shared world of intelligibility that provides the basis for consensuality. The exemplar case in radical theory is Jacques Rancière’s argument that any claims for superiority addressed to a perceived inferior—between classes for instance—betrays an equality in the performativity of the enunciation.²⁷ The fission constitutive of political situations—*dis-agreement*—can be overcome through this shared linguistic territory of intelligibility that allows for the negotiation of differences. Thus for Rancière politics is always enacted through the assertion of an original equality between parties. This is a trap because it is unable to perceive that the interlocutors really do occupy different worlds, each being conditioned by worldview polarization that cannot

24 LAND, Nick, *Disintegration*, 2014, available at: <http://www.xenosystems.net/disintegration/>. [Accessed 15/3/18]

25 Ibid.

26 Monism is the philosophical and religious attitude that All is One. Under monism no divergent difference can be tolerated. In all its articulations monism is the integrative project for the assimilation of the outside. Monism in politics tends towards the obliteration of plurality in totalitarianism. In mysticism monism is identifiable with the Perennialist belief that everything is reducible to an experiential and ontological unity. Monism is the apex of metaphysics.

27 RANCIÈRE Jacques, *Dis-Agreement: Politics and Philosophy*, London: University of Minneapolis Press, 1999.

be dispelled by an appeal to the possibility of mutual understanding. The irreducibility of fission cannot be disappeared because master and bondsman are each capable of speech. Following a similar thread, Land will write:

*Language is not a neutral conveyor of infinite communicative possibility, but an intelligence box. It is to be counted among the traps to be escaped.*²⁸

Here Land will note that escape attempts will not be met with goodwill or take place as conflict-free experimentation in a zone of tolerance. All exits take place as a partial disintegration of an existing political-economic territory, especially when it is an explicit exit from the state—i.e. secessionism—or from state sanctioned market activity—i.e. agoristic counter-economics. As exit is necessarily oriented towards disintegration it has no need for utopianism or aggression. The world is already a chaos of fragmentation so that those in favor of exit need only defend whatever enacts disintegration. Exit is a flight towards the outside that participates in the processes of cascading system failure. As the machine is torn apart, statelessness erupts in the openings, and Leviathan begins to rot.²⁹

Less spectacular is the minimal exit-option modelled on divestment and withdrawal. This minimal exit occurs in place and opens up the outside from within an integrative political system or territory, without reliance on mechanisms for the implementation of political solutions. Land will elaborate on this when he writes:

Anybody with anything at all is now in the position where they are faced with an aggressive binary dilemma. Either unreserved collaboration with the final phase gamble of the existing order—amounting ultimately to the all-in belief that politics has no

28 LAND, Nick, *On Difficulty*, 2014, available at: <http://www.xenosystems.net/on-difficulty/>. [Accessed 15/3/18]

29 Cf. GARTON, Vincent, *Leviathan Rots*, 2017, available at: <https://www.urbanomic.com/document/leviathan-rots/> [Accessed 15/3/18]: “At [the state’s] terminus there remains nothing around which it is necessary to route. Catastrophe, once exteriorised, now extends into the state itself, ‘the net itself is infected’ and the body of Leviathan rots with spectacular diseases.”

ontological limits, so that any dysfunction is soluble in a sufficient exertion of will—or a dissident skepticism about this dominant assertion, practically instantiated by ever more desperate attempts at withdrawal (persecuted with ever greater fanaticism as acts of sabotage.³⁰

The options are collaboration or the nonparticipation of withdrawal. Land identifies politics with the Promethean belief that human will—*unidirectional agency*—can overcome everything. His *dissident skepticism* embodies a deep unbelief in the conviction that everything is soluble by means of the exertion of collective conatus.

Land will state that “sitting it out”—nonparticipation, Bartleby indifferentism, the suspension of decision—is already a kind of exit. This kind of exit cannot be tolerated any less than territorial or economic flight and existing political interiorities will do anything to discourage it. From this we see the hysteria surrounding electoral abstention and criticism of democracy, cringing voter-registration drives in electoralism at party, municipal and national scales, the horror of apathy, calls for unity in the face of schism. The monistic injunction: *You have to take part because we are—or must be—One.*

The reference to withdrawal already conjures images of ascetics and monastics, spiritual individuals and collectivities that would retreat from worldly affairs, from the insanity of their day, into the mountains, the mouths of caves, behind high walls, into the desert’s empty depths to perfect their liberation in renunciation.

Zen master Dōgen Zenji was no stranger to political instability. His father was an aristocrat and public official who was assassinated for dissent. During his lifetime Japan endured civil war, famine, and the militarization of the state, alongside Buddhist sectarian violence.³¹ At the height of instability Dōgen

30 LAND, Nick, *Exit Options*, 2015, available at: <http://www.xenosystems.net/exit-options/>. [Accessed 15/3/18]

31 In Dōgen’s Japan the monastic orders were intensely rivalrous. They were large landowners who sought to protect their property with the formation of standing armies. This led to the emergence of a distinctly Japanese warrior-monk, the sōhei. Cf: ADOLPHSON, Mikael S., *The Teeth and Claws of the Buddha: Monastic Warriors and Sōhei in Japanese History*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007.

relocated his emerging school of Soto Zen far from the capital Kyoto, retreating to a new mountain location far from the unrest. He had already understood renunciation primarily as physical retreat into the closed world of the monastery. Faced with political turmoil he retreated into an ever more rigorous monasticism. Dōgen would exit from politics and from his former religious training in the Tiantai school of esoteric Buddhism. Later he would become dissatisfied with all existing schools of Zen. Rather than seeking to reform these sects, he would undertake the treacherous sea voyage to China to seek an authentic transmission of *Ch'an*. There his teacher would advise him to remain outside all politics, and on his return to Japan Dōgen declared all other schools of Zen contaminated by political corruption. Dōgen's life can be seen as a series of exits, a series of renunciations, and, in his steadfast dedication to Buddhism, a practical elaboration on the practice of renunciation itself.³²

In addition to monastic withdrawal Dōgen taught the importance of cultivating psychological renunciation. In Zen Buddhism renunciation is usually understood as the renunciation of worldly affairs, and in his *Shōbōgenzō* Dōgen will tell his students:

*Cast aside all involvements and discontinue all affairs. Do not think of good and evil; do not deal with right and wrong. Halt the revolutions of mind, intellect, and consciousness; stop the calculations of thoughts, ideas, and perceptions.*³³

Despite initial appearances Dōgen is not advising the renunciation of thought. Nothing could be further from his project to rehabilitate philosophical thinking against the anti-intellectualism of Zen orthodoxy. Carl Bielefeldt will write that this passage illustrates Dōgen's understanding of a psychospiritual renunciation. He will write:

32 Autobiographical information is taken from: KIM, Hee-Jin, *Eihei Dōgen: Mystical Realist*, Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2004. The relevant chapter is also available in: OKUMURA, Shohaku, *Realizing Genjōkan: The Key to Dogen's Shobogenzo*, Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2010.

33 ZENJI, Dōgen, "Fukanzazengi", in: BIELEFELDT, Carl, *Dōgen's Manuals of Zen Meditation*, London: University of California Press, 1988, p. 118.

*Worldliness is within, and what must be relinquished...[are] those internal mechanisms that lead one to experience and believe in such a world.*³⁴

Physical renunciation is an anthropotechnical means for the cultivation of the psychospiritual renunciation that is the relinquishing of craving and delusion. In Dōgen's Zen this is the realization of awakening to our original enlightenment.³⁵ He will tell his students that there is "no opposition between our initial awakening...supreme enlightenment, and the act of renouncing the world."³⁶ For Dōgen renunciation is enlightenment. In *Genjōkōan Shōbōgenzō* Dōgen is clear that the most subtle obstacle to awakening is the desire for enlightenment. He teaches that "when one first seeks the Dharma, one strays far from the boundary of the Dharma."³⁷ In Buddhist discourse dharma can mean law, truth, or reality, and Dōgen plays with this polysemic signification to indicate that seeking the solution to our reality is precisely what distances the seeker from that of reality in delusion. The deluded will ask, "What is to be done?"—and scour the earth for answers. Dōgen's renunciation is the cessation of this seeking. He will continue the verse by cryptically stating:

*When the Dharma is correctly transmitted to the self, one is immediately an original person.*³⁸

The original person is a translation of the Japanese *honbun nin*, a word composed of elements meaning original, true, root or source (*hon*), part (*bun*), and person (*nin*). In Zen *the original person* is an expedient concept for pointing out the experiential nonduality of subject and object realized in awakening. This

34 Ibid.

35 "This doctrine holds that enlightenment or the ideal state is neither a goal to be achieved nor a potential to be realised but the real status of all things. Not only human beings but ants and crickets, even grasses and trees, manifest innate buddhahood just as they are. Seen in its true aspect, every aspect of daily life—eating, sleeping, even one's deluded thoughts—is the Buddha's conduct." (STONE, Jacqueline I., "Original Enlightenment (Hogaku)", in: BUSWELL, Robert E., Jr. (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, New York: MacMillan, 2004, p. 618).

36 Dōgen quoted in: KWONG, Jakusho, *No Beginning, No End: The Intimate Heart of Zen*, Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2003, p. 26.

37 Dōgen in: OKUMURA, Realizing Genjōkan: *The Key to Dogen's Shobogenzo*, p. 2.

38 Ibid.

nonduality is the core of all systems of Buddhist mysticism. The practice that realizes this original state of nonduality is *zazen*, its highest form being *shikantaza* (*just sitting*).³⁹ For Dōgen this is also the nonduality of delusion and enlightenment. He will state that “those who are enlightened about delusion are buddhas.”⁴⁰ This represents Dōgen’s corrective to traditional Buddhists for whom enlightenment is a transcendental reality. In Dōgen’s mysticism the absolute (*nirvana*) actualises itself in the relative (*samsara*) so that there is no awakening that does not take place as an escape from the suffering caused by craving and delusion *within* the realm of suffering. Buddhahood is exit from the world of suffering, and in this sense it is the casting aside of all involvements and discontinuation of all affairs, occurring as their unequivocal transformation.

In Dōgen awakening takes place as a subtraction of ignorance and conatic striving. Although nothing seems more passive than *zazen* to outside observers, he will describe it as the “total exertion (*gūjin*) of a single thing.”⁴¹ *Shikantaza* is the active perfection of *zazen* as “purposeless, goalless, objectless and meaningless...”⁴² Dōgen’s mysticism has no teleology and it achieves nothing because it is a practice of attunement to the ongoing participatory manifestation of all things. There is no separation between this mind and buddha. Awakening to nonduality is becoming aware of this nonseparation—alienation and anomie are errors that do not require resolution beyond this.

Awakening reveals the nondual identity of *nirvana* and *samsara*, perfection and horror. There is no need for thoughts of good and evil, and therefore no need to impose solutions on the world. Renunciation is the dissolution of the need for solutions. There is nothing to be done because there is no need to do anything. Yet Dōgen’s anti-praxis does not align with a lack of praxis. For Dōgen cognitive knowledge of original enlightenment is insufficient unless it is embodied in *zazen*. *Zazen* is the practice of renunciation of all effort to *seek*, or to *find*, or to

39 Formless meditation has no prosthetics for cultivating the mind. It has no practices of visualization, counting breaths, following breaths, and ko'an practice. The practitioner *just sits*.

40 Dōgen in: OKUMURA, *Realizing Genjokoan: The Key to Dogen's Shobogenzo*, p. 1.

41 KIM, *Eihei Dōgen: Mystical Realist*, p. 66.

42 Ibid., p. 37.

solve—it simply lets be whatever arises in experience, without judgement, and discrimination. Zazen is undertaken without ideas of gain. It cuts away at all teleological and instrumental approaches. The practice of zazen is a submission to the real that has no goal exterior to itself. This is what Dōgen calls the oneness of practice–enlightenment.⁴³ In doing zazen we are *doing nothing*. In doing nothing we engage fully in the dynamic process of reality. In doing *nothing* we are letting go. In letting go we realize that there is no need for salvation, that there is no one to be saved, and nothing to let go off. In this respect shikantaza–zazen is the *mystical exit* from the “hopelessness of any attempt to find solutions.”⁴⁴

In Western thought Bataille is the closest approximation to Dōgen. In his heterodox atheological project there is a similar renunciation of goal-oriented activities. Writing about sovereign experience Bataille states the point “is not that of attainment of a goal, but rather of escape from those traps which goals represent.”⁴⁵ For Bataille the ecstasies of mysticism, eroticism, and expenditure are all mechanisms for the suspension of the goal-orientation of praxis.

On sovereign experience Bataille will write:

*[There] ought not exist any means by which man might become sovereign: it is better for him to be sovereign, in which case sovereignty cannot be taken away from him, but if he does not possess it, he cannot acquire it.*⁴⁶

This echoes Dōgen’s logic on the unity of practice and realization, that the zazen does not attain enlightenment but is the realization of an original enlightenment. In Dōgen it is impossible to become buddha because one is already buddha. The proximity of sovereignty to awakening lies in the liberation of subjectivity from the domination of utility. Bataille is em-

43 Ibid., p. 64.

44 HEINE, Steve, *Dōgen and the Kōan Tradition: A Tale of Two Shōbōgenzō Texts*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 203.

45 BATAILLE, Georges, “Autobiographical Note”, 1986, in: BOTTING, Fred, WILSON, Scott, *The Bataille Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997, p. 116.

46 BATAILLE, Georges, *The Accursed Shared: An Essay On General Economy. Volume II: The History of Eroticism; Volume III: Sovereignty*, New York: Zone Books, 1991, p. 226.

phatic that “life *beyond utility* is the domain of sovereignty.”⁴⁷ Whatever exists the profane realm of utilitarian values is an excessiveness approaching perfect abandonment. For Nick Land submission to utility produces a fundamental perversion in systems of valuation, culminating in the voluntary submission he will diagnose as:

*A creeping slave morality [that] colonizes value, subordinating it to the definition “that which serves”. The “good” becomes synonymous with utility; with means, mediation, instrumentality, and implicit dependence.*⁴⁸

Bataille states:

*What is sovereign in fact is to enjoy the present time without having anything else in view but this present time.*⁴⁹

Sovereign existence is entirely absorbed in impermanence so that the sovereign is able to “escape the anguish of death,” just as the original person escapes from suffering.⁵⁰ In sovereignty as in enlightenment the individual experiences a self-abandonment that culminates in an ecstatic self-forgetting, a forgetting of the self and its objects, subjectivity and the projects it is subordinated to, a ruptural opening that destroys any vertical delusion of transcendence, any trace of a reality cut in two. Bataille would see this Zen self-forgetting as a paradoxical “pure immanence of a return to the self” to “be attained without effort.”⁵¹ In the sovereignty of zazen, experience liberates itself beyond all subordination to thought and purpose, to the thought of purpose, even to the project of humanity. If Bataille’s proximities to Zen do not permit his assimilation into it, they nonetheless

47 Ibid., p. 198. Here Bataille will claim that enjoyment subjugated by utility is servility to the future. What is really at issue is the linearity of temporality coordinated along the existentialist axis past–present–future. It is possible to speculate that it is this linearity that sovereign experience ruptures.

48 LAND, Nick, *The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism*, London: Routledge, 1992.

49 BATAILLE, *The Accursed Shared: An Essay On General Economy*, p. 199.

50 Ibid., p. 219.

51 BATAILLE, Georges, *On Nietzsche*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015, p. 141.

illuminate renunciation as a revolt against all modes of subordination, a fanatical *insubordination that proceeds through a more truly inexhaustible submission to reality*.⁵²

Utility is the realm of the discontinuous that represents a fundamental break with our original intimacy with reality. Intimacy, continuity, and immanence are the key terms of Bataille's *Theory of Religion*. There he will write that religion aims at a recovery of "the lost intimacy" that the emergence of consciousness introduces into human existence.⁵³ Like Dōgen he will see an experience capable of suspending the discriminating mind and revealing an

*immanence without a clear limit (an indistinct flow of being into being—one thinks of the unstable presence of water in water).*⁵⁴

These terms clearly indicate the experience of intimacy is the breakdown of the subject-object duality that Dōgen invokes when he writes that to awaken is to "forget the self".⁵⁵ Self-forgetting removes the separation that introduces discontinuity into the field of immanence. For Dōgen "intimate means close and inseparable. There is no gap."⁵⁶ The sovereignty of zazen is all-inclusive and all-encompassing, realizing dualities as participatory, inseparable in the same sense that Irigaray discusses the vulva.⁵⁷ The experience of nonduality closes all distances between things, making boundaries nebulous without

52 Bataille would undoubtedly have found a kindred spirit in the Zen monk Ikkyū. Writing poems about his penis and his love of prostitutes, Ikkyū was a heretical monk who founded his own Red Thread Zen, named in reference to his penis and the underwear of courtesans. The name is also connected to the *kōan* "Why can't clear-eyed Bodhisattvas sever the red thread?" In this *kōan* the red thread signifies the persistence of desire.

53 BATAILLE, Georges, *Theory of Religion*, New York: Zone Books, 1989, p. 57.

54 Ibid., p. 33.

55 Dōgen in: OKUMURA, Realizing Genjōkoan: The Key to Dogen's Shobogenzo, p. 2.

56 Dōgen in: VERKUILEN, Barbara, *Dokusan with Dōgen: Timeless Lessons in Negotiating the Way*, 2011, p. 213. Verkuilen gives the visual example of a hand held aloft. When talking about separation the fingers of the hand are spread open and held apart from each other. When talking about the absence of any gap, they are snapped shut. This is reminiscent of another Zen metaphor for the experience of zazen as *the open hand of thought*.

57 Irigaray is among the clearest demonstrations of nonduality in the Western canon. She will talk about the lips of the vulva as being "neither one nor two." For Dōgen the whole great earth—all reality—exhibits as vulvic structure that confounds the capacity to count. Reality is intimate in the same way as these lips, and cannot be identified as

affecting their complete erasure. Nick Land will explain that the “real trajectory of loss is ‘immanence’, continuity, base matter, or flow.”⁵⁸ Mysticism, and Zen in particular, is insubordination as a violent abolition of the separations coordinated by transcendence, the escape of the self from itself, from impermanence in impermanence, beyond all rational calculation, subordinating reason to the continuous erotics of an intimate existence that liberates an insurrectionary eruption of the voluptuous and ceaseless pointlessness that revels in annihilation.

Stefanos Geroulanos will draw attention to the repeated invocations of exit throughout Bataille’s atheological works. He will suggest that for Bataille exit is aligned to a “radical ‘sense of revolt.’”⁵⁹ He quotes Bataille:

*Effectuation of the exit—What happens when life frees itself from degradation. Not only anxiety, but also tumult, and the impression of being torn.*⁶⁰

Geroulanos will explain that in Bataille “exit involves precisely the impossibility of an opening of the strictly speaking homogenous to heterogeneity—to the sacred.”⁶¹ Exit is an opening to an intimate outside that goes beyond the coordinates of any monistic project of integration. In being torn, in being a tumult, in the ego, in the act of political nonparticipation, in territorial schism, etc., exit is the practice of renunciative disintegration. The renunciation of monism—the homogenous—establishes the connection between an exit from Being and empirical implementations of an exit from politics. Bataille will write that his project is “to escape from project!”⁶² To escape from politics in all its forms, exit proceeds by way of bifurcations, schisms, splits,

One or as Two. (IRIGARAY, Luce, *This Sex Which Is Not One*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985, p. 26)

58 LAND, *The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism*.

59 GEROULANOS, Stefanos, “The Anthropology of Exit: Bataille on Heidegger and Fascism”, in: *October* 117, Massachusetts: October Magazine and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016, p. 22.

60 BATAILLE, quoted in: Ibid.

61 Ibid., p. 23.

62 BATAILLE, Georges, *Inner Experience*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988, p. 59.

fragmentations, weird experimentations, fully realizing dualism rather than collapsing it.

Land will consistently emphasize exit as a practice of tearing things apart. He will criticize the *inner-NRx* for constituting itself as a microculture that privileges questions of *belonging*.⁶³ In these circumstances politics devolves into a question of who belongs where, deteriorating into an obsessive policing of identities. If the *inner-NRx* is concerned with establishing “a core identity”, then the *outer-NRx* “relates itself to what it escapes.”⁶⁴ This suggests that exit is misunderstood within identitarian politics as what autonomist Marxist Paolo Virno understands as “an engaged withdrawal” or “founding leave-taking”.⁶⁵ It subordinates defection to the production of self-determining zones of existence. Territorial exit, secessionist withdrawal and agorism all necessarily entail the liberation of spacetime, but the *inner-NRx* and (post)autonomism converge on a primary subordination of exit to arrival.

Land will call exit an exploratory departure, writing:

*I am proposing a political or anti-political “god”—EXIT, the principle of the Outside.*⁶⁶

To make departure dependent on arrival, to instrumentalise exit in the name of a microcultural community of belonging, is to remain caught within utilitarian projects that cannot approach the Outside. Real exit is the nomad-operation of rootless cosmopolitans enacting schism for itself. Exoteric exit is *going home*, whereas esoteric exit is *the fundamental renunciation of home*, the principle of the Interior.

Dōgen’s clearest articulation of renunciation comes in the *Shōbōgenzō* when he commands:

63 It is hard not to extend this to a radical left that is more interested in constituting itself as a therapeutic community for those who belong, and a mechanism for excommunicating those who do not.

64 LAND, Nick, *Outsideness*, 2014, available at: <http://www.xenosystems.net/outside-ness-2/>. [Accessed 15/3/18]

65 VIRNO, Paolo, Virtuosity and Revolution: The Political Theory of Exodus, in: VIRNO, Paolo, HARDT, Michael, (eds), *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 196.

66 LAND, Nick, *Quit*, 2013, available at: <http://www.xenosystems.net/quit/>. [Accessed 16/3/18]

*If you have a home, leave your home. If you have beloved ones, leave them. If you have fame, abandon it. If you have gain, escape from it. If you have fields, get rid of them. If you have relatives, separate from them.*⁶⁷

Renunciation is openness to the Outside that abandons attachment to the Interior. The sanskrit term for renunciation is *nekkhamma*, meaning to go forth into the homeless state of a monk. Kodo Sawaki, a 20th century monk in Dōgen's lineage, will explain that "a home-leaver should be a person who creates a unique way of life."⁶⁸ Renunciation is a generative flight from the Interior towards the Outside, a secession from everything associated with home.

The philosopher Peter Sloterdijk will talk about "the spaces created by secessionists" in similar terms.⁶⁹ He will write about a spiritual secessionism that will renegotiate "deeper borders than those which can be addressed by geopolitics."⁷⁰ He will suggest that "we can think for the time being of the hermitages, the monasteries, the academies and other places of ascetic-meditative and philosophical retreat"⁷¹ as places of spiritual secessionism. After Foucault, he will call these spaces *heterotopias* and enumerate them in a non-exhaustive list:

*cemeteries, monasteries, libraries, high-class brothels, cinemas, colonies and ships...sports venues, holiday islands, places of pilgrimage, miracle courts, car parks...no-go areas...the space station is probably one of the most important innovations.*⁷²

Exit in the midst of the centre, heterotopias are a flight from the centre that shatter it. Secessionism threatens to utterly destabilise core-periphery relationships. Schism is a subtraction that adds to the world, a zazen-like additive subtraction. Seces-

67 DŌGEN, in: TANAHASHI, Kazuaki, *Enlightenment Unfolds: The Essential Teaching of Zen Master Dōgen*, London: Shambhala, 2000, p. 127.

68 SAWAKI, Kodo, in: NCHIYAMA, Kosho, OKUMURA, Shohaku, *The Zen Teaching of Homeless Kodo*, Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2014, Section 8.

69 SLOTERDIJK, Peter, *You Must Change Your Life: On Anthropotechnics*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, p. 221.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid., p. 222.

sionism increases system complexity, adding more independent variables to the chaos engine. While territorial flight escapes the state, the spiritual secession of renunciative nonparticipation hollows it out from within.

While Sloterdijk will understand this process or event as part of the *invention of the individual*, Dōgen and Bataille reveal it as the eradication of the self, and the letting go of the political subject. Sloterdijk will write:

Anthropotechnic work on oneself begins with the evacuation of the interior through a removal of the non-own.⁷³

In Zen practice, the interior is entirely evacuated: the self is emptied. It is this emptiness of the self that prevents the development of Sloterdijk's "enclave subjectivity", the transformation of the self into its own small state, that would reduplicate the state.⁷⁴ Zen is a spiritual secessionism that enacts a mystical insurrection that is a complete withdrawal from the conditions determining the idea that politics can or should save us. To critique this as quietism is to fail to understand that renunciation is the ultimate form of freedom: freedom from the self and from belonging, from the clinging and ignorance that perpetuates problems that politics pretends to be able to solve, and so propulsively drives on.

Enlightenment is often written about as freedom, but is not the freedom politics tries to secure. The freedom of homelessness in the outside is the freedom that comes from relinquishing the illusion of control, from the skepticism that drops the protective worldviews and their institutional capture, and, in the schizo-practical obliteration of the self, from the idea that there is anyone to be saved. Zen understands freedom as the overcoming of all these dualistic delusions. Buddhas awaken to the perfection of becoming. This is nothing like the asceticism of Nietzsche's man of renunciation who moralistically "strives after a higher world" to be inaugurated after the revolution or the grand reformation.⁷⁵ The exit from politics reaches its apex

73 Ibid., p. 226.

74 Ibid., p. 228.

75 NIETZSCHE, Friedrich, *The Gay Science*, New York: Dover Publication, 2012, p. 38.

Šum #9

in the paradoxical freedoms of renunciation. If the fundamental question of politics is *What is to be done?* renunciation can only answer *How far can you go in letting go?*

Šum #9

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Šum #9

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Arran Crawford